Archive – ATP/FM 3-21.8 (2016) – Appendix A: Planning

This is an excerpt from an old version of the manual ATP/FM 3-21.8 Infantry and Rifle Platoon Squad released in 2016. It has since been superseded by a newer version released in 2024.

SECTION I – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

A-1. Planning is the process by which the small-unit leader translates his visualization into a specific COA for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. Planning to determine the relationship among METT-TC begins with the analysis and assessment of the conditions in the operational environment, with particular emphasis on the enemy. It involves understanding and framing the problem and envisioning the set of conditions representing the desired end state. Based on the higher commander’s guidance, the platoon leader’s planning includes formulating one or more suitable COA to accomplish the mission. Planning continues as necessary during preparation and execution. The platoon leader relies on intuitive decisionmaking and direct contact with subordinate leaders to integrate activities when circumstances are not suited for TLP.

A-2. Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; information collection; coordination; inspections; and movement.

A-3. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decision.

A-4. Assessment refers to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. Assessment precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. It involves a comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events. Assessment entails three tasks:

• Continuously assessing the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities.
• Continuously monitoring the situation and progress of the operation towards the leader’s desired end state
• Evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

A-5. Leaders use TLP when working alone or with a small group to solve tactical problems. For example, a platoon leader may use the platoon sergeant, squad leaders, and the forward observer to assist during TLP. The type, amount, and timeliness of information passed from higher to lower directly impact the lower unit leader’s TLP. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

A-6. Parallel planning occurs when two or more echelons plan the same operation at about the same time. Parallel planning is easiest when the higher unit continuously shares information on future operations with subordinate units. Rather than waiting until company commander finishes planning, the platoon leader starts to develop his unit’s missions as information is received, and fleshes out his missions as more information becomes available.

A-7. The platoon leader starts by identifying his unit’s missions, stating his intent, and ensuring his intent reflects the operational concepts of his higher and second higher command. He chooses the tasks most likely to be assigned to his unit, and develops mission statements based on the information received. At all levels, developing and describing the vision of leaders requires time, explanation, and ongoing clarification. All leaders understand that their next higher commander’s concept of the operation continues to mature, and continue parallel planning as it does so, up until execution. Figure A-1 illustrates the parallel sequences of the MDMP of a battalion, TLP of a company with the TLP of its platoons.

Figure A-1. Parallel planning

A-8. Normally, the first three steps (receive the mission, issue a WARNORD, and make a tentative plan) of TLP occur in order. However, the sequence of subsequent steps is based on the situation. The tasks involved in some steps example, initiate movement and conduct reconnaissance may occur several times. The last step, supervise and refine, occurs throughout.

A-9. A tension exists between executing current operations and planning for future operations. The small unit leader must balance both. If engaged in a current operation, there is less time for TLP. If in a lull, transition, or an AA, leaders have more time to use TLP thoroughly. In some situations, time constraints or other factors may prevent leaders from performing each step of TLP as thoroughly as they would like. For example during the step, make a tentative plan; small-unit leaders often develop only one acceptable COA vice multiple COA. If time permits, leaders may develop, compare, and analyze several COA before arriving at a decision on which one to execute.

A-10. The platoon leader begins TLP when he receives the initial WARNORD or receives a new mission. As each subsequent order arrives, he modifies his assessments, updates tentative plans, and continues to supervise and assess preparations. In some situations the platoon leader may not receive or issue the full sequence of WARNORDs; security considerations or tempo may make it impractical. Leaders carefully consider decisions to eliminate WARNORDs. Subordinates always need to have enough information to plan and prepare for their mission. In other cases, TLP are started before receiving a WARNORD based on existing plans and orders (contingency plans or be-prepared missions) and on subordinate leader’s understanding of the situation.

A-11. Parallel planning hinges on distributing information as it is received or developed. Subordinate leaders cannot complete their plans until they receive their unit mission. If each successive WARNORD contains enough information, the higher command’s final order will confirm what subordinate leaders have already analyzed and put into their tentative plans. In other cases, the higher command’s order may change or modify the subordinates’ tasks enough additional planning and reconnaissance are required.

SECTION II – STEPS OF TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

A-12. TLP provide small-unit leaders a framework for planning and preparing for operations. TLP begin when the platoon leader receives the first indication of an upcoming mission and continues throughout the operational process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). The TLP comprise a sequence of actions helping the leader use available time effectively and efficiently to issue orders and execute operations.

A-13. TLP are not a hard and fast set of rules. Some actions may be performed simultaneously or in an order different than shown in figure A-2 (page A-4). They are a guide being applied consistent with the situation and experience of the platoon leader and his subordinate leaders. The tasks involved in some actions (such as initiate movement, issue the WARNORD, and conduct reconnaissance) may recur several times during the process.

A-14. The last action (activities associated with supervising and refining the plan) occurs continuously throughout TLP and execution of the operation. The following information concerning TLP assumes the small unit leader will plan in a time-constrained environment. All steps should be done, even if in abbreviated fashion. As such, the suggested techniques are oriented to help a leader quickly develop and issue a combat order. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information.)

Figure A-2. Troop leading procedures outline

STEP 1 – RECEIVE THE MISSION

A-15. In Step 1 of TLP, leaders determine their units’ missions and assess the time available to accomplish them. They can conduct an initial (light) analysis of the order using METT-TC. They conduct detailed METT-TC analyses only after they issue the first WARNORD (Step 2). Rarely will they receive their missions until after higher command issues the third WARNORDs or the OPORDs themselves. However, in the course of parallel planning, small-unit leaders already will have deduced their tentative missions.

A-16. Leaders can receive their missions in several ways. They can get them in the form of WARNORDs or, if higher chooses to wait for more information, an actual OPORD. Sometimes higher chooses not to send WARNORDs, opting instead to wait and send a full OPORD. Worst case, leaders receive new missions due to situational changes occurring during the execution of a prior mission. In addition to receiving (or deducing) their missions during this step, the leaders must also—

• Assess the time available to prepare for and execute the mission.
• Prepare an initial timeline for planning and executing the mission.
• Conduct an initial planning-time analysis.
• Determine the total amount of time to plan and prepare.
• As planning continues, use the initial planning-time analysis to conduct a detailed time analysis.
• Analyze the time his unit has available.
• Prepare an initial timeline.

A-17. The most important element of the leader’s WARNORD is the initial timeline for planning. They also may convey other instructions or information they think will help their subordinates prepare for the upcoming mission.

STEP 2 – ISSUE WARNING ORDER

A-18. A WARNORD is a preliminary notice of an order or action to follow. (Refer to ADRP 1-02 for more information.) Though less detailed than a complete OPORD, a WARNORD aids in parallel planning. After the leaders receive new missions and assess the time available for planning, preparing, and executing the mission, they immediately issue WARNORDs to their subordinates. By issuing the initial WARNORDs as quickly as possible, they enable subordinates to begin their own planning and preparation (parallel planning) while they begin to develop the OPORDs. When they obtain more information, they issue updated WARNORDs, giving subordinates as much as they know.

A-19. Leaders can issue WARNORDs to their subordinates right after they receive higher command’s initial WARNORDs. In their own initial WARNORDs, they include the same elements given in their higher headquarters’ initial WARNORDs. If practical, leaders brief their subordinate leaders face-to-face, on the ground. Otherwise, they use a terrain model, sketch, or map. (See figure A-3, page A-6 for an example of a warning order format.)

Figure A-3. Warning order format

WARNING ORDER

A-20. The WARNORD follows the five-paragraph OPORD format and includes the following items, at a minimum:

• Type of operation.
• General location of operation.
• Initial operational timeline.
• Reconnaissance to initiate.
• Movement to initiate.
• Planning and preparation instructions (to include planning timeline).
• Information requirements.
• Commander’s critical information requirements.

STEP 3 – MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN

A-21. In a time-constrained environment, a platoon leader typically develops only one COA. However, as time permits, he can develop as many COA, for comparison purposes, as time allows. He begins TLP Step 3 after he issues his own WARNORD, and after he has received company’s third WARNORD, or until he has enough information to proceed. He need not wait for a complete OPORD before starting to develop his own tentative plan.

MISSION ANALYSIS

A-22. The platoon leader begins mission analysis when receiving the mission. During mission analysis, the platoon leader—

• Restates the mission.
• Conducts an initial risk assessment.
• Identifies a tentative decisive point.
• Defines his own intent.

A-23. He conducts mission analysis to help him start developing his vision, and to confirm what he must do to accomplish his mission. At the lower levels, leaders conduct their mission analyses by evaluating METT-TC. He makes significant deductions about the terrain, enemy, and own forces affecting operations. These significant deductions drive the planning process and execution of operations. A leader must convey to his subordinates the importance of these deductions, and effect they will have on the units operations. In the end, the usefulness of mission analysis lies in recognizing and capitalizing on opportunities. The answers to the following questions become inputs into developing a COA. Mission analysis has no time standard. A leader may take as much time as needed, while still adhering to the one-third/two-thirds rule. Mission analysis answers the four questions of the leader’s visualization:

• What is my mission?
• What is the current situation?
• How do we accomplish the mission?
• What are the risks?

METT-TC

A-24. Analyzing METT-TC is a continuous process. Leaders constantly receive information, from the time they begin planning through execution. During execution, their continuous analyses enable them to issue well-developed FRAGORDs. They must assess if the new information affects their missions and plans. If so, then they must decide how to adjust their plans to meet these new situations. They need not analyze METT-TC in a particular order. How and when they do so depends on when they receive information as well as on their experience and preferences. One technique is to parallel the TLP based on the products received from higher. Using this technique, they would, but need not, analyze mission first; followed by terrain and weather; enemy; troops and support available; time available; and finally civil considerations.

Analysis of Mission

A-25. A mission is task and purpose clearly indicating the action to be taken and reason for the action. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a mission is a duty or task assigned to an individual or unit. The mission is always the first factor leaders consider and most basic question: What have I been told to do, and why?

A-26. Leaders at every echelon must understand the mission, intent, and operational concept one and two levels higher. This understanding makes it possible to exercise disciplined initiative. Leaders capture their understanding of what their units are to accomplish in their revised mission statements. They take five steps to fully analyze their assigned mission as directed from —

• Higher headquarters’ (two levels up) mission, intent, and concept.
• Immediate higher headquarters’ (one level up) mission, intent, and concept.
• Unit’s purpose.
• Constraints.
• Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
• Restated mission.

Higher Headquarters’ (Two Levels Up) Mission, Intent, and Concept

A-27. Leaders understand their second higher up concepts of the operation. They identify the tasks and purposes, and how their immediate higher up are contributing to the fight. They also must understand leaders’ intent (two levels up).

Immediate Higher Headquarters’ (One Level Up) Mission, Intent, and Concept

A-28. Leaders understand their immediate headquarters’ concept of the operation. They identify their headquarters’ tasks and purposes as well as their own contributions to this fight. They must clearly understand their immediate higher up intent from the OPORD. Also, they identify the tasks, purposes, and dispositions for all adjacent maneuver elements under headquarters’ control.

Unit’s Purpose

A-29. Leaders find their units’ purposes in the concepts of the operation in the immediate higher headquarters’ OPORDs. The operation’s purpose usually matches or achieves the purpose of the immediate higher headquarters. Similarly, shaping operation purposes must relate directly to those of the decisive operation. Sustaining operation purposes relate directly to those of the decisive and shaping operations. Leaders must understand how their units’ purposes relate to higher. They must understand why their leaders one level up assigned their unit’s particular purposes. Then, they determine how those fit into their superior’s concepts of the operation.

Constraints

A-30. Constraints either prohibit or require an action. Leaders identify all constraints the OPORD places on their units’ ability to execute their missions. The two types of constraints are proscriptive (required; mandates action) and prohibitive (not allowed; limits action).

Tasks

A-31. Leaders must identify and understand tasks required to accomplish a given mission. The three types of tasks are specified, implied, and essential.

A-32. Specified Tasks. Specified tasks are specifically assigned to a unit by a higher headquarters and are found throughout the OPORD. Specified tasks also may be found in annexes and overlays; for example—”Seize OBJ FOX.;” “Reconnoiter route BLUE;” “Assist the forward passage of 1st platoon, B Company.” “Send two Soldiers to assist in the loading of ammunition.”

A-33. Implied Tasks. Implied tasks are those being performed to accomplish a specified task, but that are not stated in a higher headquarters’ order. Implied tasks derive from a detailed analysis of higher up orders, from the enemy situation and COA, from the terrain, and from knowledge of doctrine and history. Analyzing the unit’s current location in relation to future area of operation as well as the doctrinal requirements for each specified task might reveal the implied tasks. Only those requiring resources should be used. For example, if the specified task is “Seize Objective Fox,” and new intelligence has OBJ FOX surrounded by reinforcing obstacles, this intelligence would drive the implied task of “Breach reinforcing obstacles vicinity Objective Fox.”

A-34. Essential Task. The essential task is the mission task􀊊it accomplishes the assigned purpose. It, along with the platoon’s purpose, is usually assigned by the higher headquarters’ OPORD in concept of the operation or Tasks to Maneuver Units. For decisive operations, since the purposes are the same (nested concept) the essential task also accomplishes the higher headquarters’ purpose. For shaping operations, it accomplishes the assigned purpose, which shapes the decisive operation. For sustaining operations, it accomplishes the assigned purpose, which enables both the shaping and decisive operation (again, nested concept).

Restated Mission

A-35. Leaders conclude their mission analyses by restating their missions. To do this, they answer the five Ws:

• Who (the unit).
• What (the unit’s essential task and type of operation).
• When (this is the time given in the company OPORD).
• Where (the objective or location stated in company OPORD), and.
• Why (the units purpose, taken from the companies concept of the operation).

Analysis of Terrain and Weather

A-36. When analyzing terrain, leaders consider manmade features and effects on natural terrain features and climate. Leaders also consider the effects of manmade and natural terrain in conjunction with the weather on friendly and enemy operations. In general, terrain and weather do not favor one side over the other unless one is better prepared to operate in the environment or is more familiar with it. The terrain, however, may favor defending or attacking. Analysis of terrain answers the question: What is the terrain’s effect on the operation? Leaders analyze terrain using the categories of OAKOC.

A-37. From the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) developed by higher headquarters, leaders already appreciate the general nature of the ground and effects of weather. However, they must conduct their own detailed analyses to determine how terrain and weather uniquely affects their units’ missions and the enemy. They must go beyond merely passing along the MCOO to their subordinate leaders and making general observations of the terrain such as “This is high ground,” or “This is a stream.” They must determine how the terrain and weather will affect the enemy and their units. Additionally, they apply these conclusions when they develop COA for both enemy forces and their units. At company level and below, leaders develop a graphic terrain analysis overlay. This product is similar to the MCOO in it shows the critical military aspects of terrain. Not only does it facilitate planning, but it also aids in briefing subordinates.

Defined Operational Environment

A-38. Leaders to have starting points for terrain analysis must first define their operational environment. They must know their areas of operation and areas of interest:

• Areas of operation. Higher commanders use boundaries to define their platoons’ and companies’ areas of operations. Assigning areas of operations to subordinates lets the subordinates use their initiative and supports decentralized execution.
• Area of interest. An area of interest is a geographical area, usually larger than the leader’s area of operation. The area of interest includes threat forces or other elements characterizing the operational environment and greatly influencing the accomplishment of the mission.

Prioritization of Terrain Analysis

A-39. Limited planning time forces leaders to prioritize their terrain analyses. For example, in the conduct of attacks, leaders might prioritize the areas immediately around their objective for analysis, followed by the platoon’s specific axis leading to the objective. Given more time, they might analyze the remainder of their platoons area of operation and area of interest.

Visual Aids

A-40. Leaders prepare a graphic depiction of terrain to help explain their findings about the effects of terrain and weather on the mission. The graphic depiction of terrain can be a photograph, overlay for a map sheet, or a terrain model. In it, leaders show terrain mobility classifications, key terrain, intervisibility lines, known obstacles, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors.

OAKOC

A-41. Military aspects of terrain OAKOC are used to analyze the ground. The sequence can vary. The leader determines the effects of each aspect of terrain on both friendly and enemy forces. These effects translate directly into conclusions applying to friendly or enemy COA. Even if time is tight, the leader should allocate as much time as possible to factor, starting at the objective area, and analyzing other aspects of key terrain. Terrain and weather are the most important aspects. Conclusions include at least the following:

• Template of enemy forces and essential weapon systems.
• Positioning of own assets.
• Understanding of time and space relationships of events, leading to thorough contingency plans.
• Echeloning and identifying of enemy observation and indirect fires.
• Selecting of movement techniques and formations, to include when to transition to tactical maneuver.

Obstacles

A-42. Leaders identify existing (inherent to terrain and either natural or man-made) and reinforcing (tactical or protective) obstacles limiting mobility in his area of operation. Reinforcing obstacles are constructed, emplaced, or detonated by military force:

• Existing obstacles, natural include rivers; forests; mountains; ravines; gaps and ditches more than three meters wide; tree stumps and large rocks more than 18 inches high; forests with trees eight inches or more in diameter, with less than four meters between trees.
• Existing obstacles, man-made include towns; canals; railroad embankments; buildings; power lines; telephone lines.
• Reinforcing obstacles, tactical—tactical (reinforcing) obstacles inhibit the ability of the opposing force to move, mass, and reinforce. Examples include mine fields (conventional and situational); antitank ditches; wire obstacles.
• Reinforcing obstacles, protective (reinforcing) obstacles offer close-in protection and are important to survivability.
• Offensive considerations when analyzing obstacles and restricted terrain:
  • How is the enemy using obstacles and restricted terrain features?
  • What is the composition of the enemy’s reinforcing obstacles?
  • How will obstacles and terrain affect the movement or maneuver of the unit?
  • If necessary, how can I avoid such features?
  • How do I detect and, if desired, bypass the obstacles?
  • Where has the enemy positioned weapons to cover the obstacles, and what type of weapons is he using?
  • If I must support a breach, where is the expected breach site and where will the enemy be overwatching the obstacle?
  • How will the terrain affect the employment of mortars, medium machine guns, and Javelin missiles?
• Defensive considerations when analyzing obstacles and restricted terrain:
  • Where does the enemy want to go? Where can I kill him? How do I get him to go there?
  • How will existing obstacles and restricted terrain affect the enemy?
  • How can I use these features to force the enemy into its engagement area, deny him an avenue, or disrupt his movement?
  • How will the terrain affect the employment of mortars, medium machine guns, and Javelin missiles?
• Categories of terrain, unrestricted—terrain free of restrictions to movement, so no actions are needed to enhance mobility. For armored forces, unrestricted terrain typically is flat or moderately sloped, with scattered or widely spaced obstacles such as trees or rocks. This terrain generally allows wide maneuver and offers unlimited travel over well-developed road networks. It allows the platoon and squads to move with little hindrance.
• Categories of terrain, restricted—terrain hindering movement somewhat. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility, but units might have to zigzag or make frequent detours. They could have a hard time maintaining optimum speed, moving in some types of combat formations, or transitioning from one formation to another. For armored forces, restricted terrain typically means moderate to steep slopes or moderate to dense spacing of obstacles such as trees, rocks, or buildings. Swamps and rugged ground are two examples of restricted terrain for Infantry forces. Poorly developed road systems may hamper logistical or rear area movement.
• Categories of terrain, severely restricted—terrain which severely hinders or slows movement in combat formations unless some effort is made to enhance mobility. Engineer forces might be needed to improve mobility or platoon and squads might have to deviate from doctrinal tactics. For example, they might have to move in columns rather than in lines. Or, they might have to move much more slowly than they would like. For armored forces, steep slopes, densely spaced obstacles, and absence of a developed road system characterize severely restricted terrain.

Avenues of Approach

A-43. An avenue of approach is an air or ground route of an attacking force leading to an objective or key terrain. Avenues of approach are classified by type (mounted, dismounted, air, or subterranean), formation, and speed of the largest unit traveling on it.

A-44. The leader groups mutually supporting mobility corridors to form an avenue of approach. If he has no mutually supporting mobility corridors, then a single mobility corridor might become an avenue of approach. Avenues of approach are classified the same as mobility corridors. After identifying these avenues, the leader evaluates each and determines its importance.

A-45. Offensive considerations the leader can include in his evaluation of avenues of approach:

• How can I use each avenue of approach to support my movement and maneuver?
• How will each avenue support movement techniques, formations and, once we make enemy contact, maneuver?
• Will variations in trafficability force changes in formations or movement techniques, or require clearance of restricted terrain?
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of each avenue?
• What are the enemy’s likely counterattack routes?
• What lateral routes could we use to shift to other axes, and which could the enemy use to threaten our flanks?
• How will each avenue of approach affect the rate of movement of each type force?

A-46. Defensive considerations the leader can include in his evaluation of avenues of approach:

• What are all likely enemy avenues into my area of operations?
• How can the enemy use each avenue of approach?
• What lateral routes could the enemy use to threaten our flanks?
• What avenues would support a friendly counterattack or repositioning of forces?

Key Terrain

A-47. Key terrain is locations or areas whose seizure, retention, or control gives a marked advantage to either combatant. It is a conclusion, usually arrived at after enemy analysis and COA development, rather than an observation.

A-48. A prominent hilltop overlooking an avenue of approach might or might not be key terrain. Even if it offers clear observation and fields of fire, it offers nothing if the enemy can easily bypass it, or if the selected course of action involves maneuver on a different avenue of approach. However, if it offers cover and concealment, observation, and good fields of fire on multiple avenues of approach, or on the only avenue of approach, then it offers a definite advantage to whoever controls it.

A-49. The leader must assess what terrain is essential to mission accomplishment. Another example of essential terrain for a platoon and squad in the attack is high ground overlooking the enemy’s reverse-slope defense. Controlling this area could prove critical in establishing a support-by-fire position to protect a breach force.

A-50. Decisive terrain. Leaders also must determine if terrain is decisive. This is key terrain which seizure, retention, or control is necessary for mission accomplishment. Some situations have no decisive terrain. If a leader identifies terrain as decisive, this means he recognizes seizing or retaining it is necessary to accomplish the mission.

A-51. Tactical considerations in analyzing key terrain. Terrain is important for friendly observation, both for commanding and controlling and for calling for fire? What terrain is important to the enemy and why? Is it important to me? What terrain has higher headquarters named as key? Is this terrain also important to the enemy? Is the enemy controlling this key terrain? How do I gain or maintain control of key terrain? What terrain is essential for communications nodes dictating the employment of digital communications equipment?

Observation and Fields of Fire

A-52. The leader identifies locations along each avenue of approach providing clear observation and fields of fire for both the attacker and defender. He analyzes the area surrounding key terrain, objectives, engagement area, and obstacles. He locates intervisibility lines (ridges or horizons which can hide equipment or personnel from observation). He assesses the ability of the attacking force to overwatch or support movement (with direct fire). An intervisibility line analysis enables the leader to visualize the profile view of terrain when only a topographic product (map) is provided.

A-53. In analyzing fields of fire, he considers the friendly and enemy potential to cover avenues of approach and key terrain, in particular, with direct fires. He also identifies positions where artillery observers can call for indirect fire. The observer must observe both the impact and effects of indirect fires. He analyzes if vegetation will affect the employment or trajectory of the Javelin, or 60-mm mortars. It can do this by masking the target or by reducing overhead clearance. When possible, the observer conducts a ground reconnaissance from both enemy and friendly perspectives. He might do it personally, by map, or with his subordinate units, or he can use the assets and information provided by the battalion reconnaissance platoon. This reconnaissance helps him to see the ground objectively and to see how it will affect both forces.

A-54. Offensive considerations in analyzing observation and fields of fire include:

• Are clear observation and fields of fire available on or near the objective for enemy observers and weapon systems?
• Where can the enemy concentrate fires?
• Where will the enemy be unable to concentrate fires?
• Where is the enemy vulnerable?
• Where can I support the movement of a friendly force with mortar, medium machine gun, or Javelin?
• Where can friendly forces conduct support by fire or assault by fire?
• Where are the natural target registration points?
• Where do I position indirect fire observers?

A-55. Defensive considerations in analyzing observation and fields of fire:

• What locations have clear observation and fields of fire along enemy avenues of approach?
• Where will the enemy establish firing lines or support-by-fire positions?
• Where will I be unable to mass fires?
• Where is the dead space in my area of operations? Where am I vulnerable?
• Where are the natural target registration points?
• Where can I destroy the enemy? Can I observe and fire on his location with at least two-thirds of my combat power?
• How obvious are these positions to the enemy?
• Where do I position indirect fire observers?

Cover and Concealment

A-56. Leaders look at the terrain, foliage, structures, and other features along avenues of approach (and on objectives or key terrain) to identify sites offering cover (protection from the effects of direct and indirect fire) and concealment (protection from observation). In the defense, weapon positions must be both lethal to the enemy and survivable to the Soldier. Cover and concealment is just as vital as clear fields of fire. Cover and concealment can be either part of the environment or something brought in by the unit to create the desired effect. Both offensive and defensive considerations must be made:

• Offensive considerations include:
  • What axes afford both clear fields of fire and cover and concealment?
  • Which terrain provides bounding elements with cover and concealment while increasing lethality?
• Defensive considerations include:
  • What locations afford cover and concealment as well as good observation and fields of fire?
  • How can friendly and enemy forces use the available cover and concealment?

CONCLUSIONS FROM TERRAIN ANALYSIS

A-57. Terrain analysis should produce several specific conclusions:

• Battle, support by fire, and assault by fire positions.
• Engagement areas and ambush sites.
• Immediate and intermediate objectives.
• Asset locations such as enemy command posts or ammunition caches.
• Assembly areas.
• Observation posts.
• Artillery firing positions.
• Air defense artillery system positions.
• Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition positions.
• Forward area arming and refueling points.
• Landing and drop zones.
• Breach locations.
• Infiltration lanes.

FIVE MILITARY ASPECTS OF WEATHER

A-58. The five military aspects of weather are visibility; winds; precipitation; cloud cover; and temperature and humidity. Consideration of the weather’s effects is an essential part of the leader’s mission analysis. The leader goes past observing to application. He determines how the weather will affect the visibility, mobility, and survivability of his unit and that of the enemy. He reviews his commander’s conclusions and identifies his own. He applies the results to the friendly and enemy COA he develops.

Visibility

A-59. The leader identifies critical conclusions about visibility factors such as light data, fog, and smog; and about battlefield obscurants such as smoke and dust. He considers light data and identifies critical conclusions about BMNT, sunrise, sunset, EENT, moonrise, moonset, and percentage of illumination. Some additional visibility considerations include:

• Will the sun rise behind my attack or in my eyes? Will I attack toward the sunrise?
• How can I take advantage of the limited illumination?
• How will this affect friendly and enemy target acquisition?
• Will the current weather favor the use of smoke to obscure during breaching?
• When are night vision devices effective?

Winds

A-60. Winds of sufficient speed can reduce the combat effectiveness of a force downwind as the result of blowing dust, obscurants, sand, or precipitation. The upwind force usually has better visibility. CBRN operations usually favor the upwind force. Windblown sand, dust, rain, or snow can reduce the effectiveness of radar and other communication systems. Strong winds also can hamper the efficiency of directional antenna systems by inducing antenna wobble. Strong winds and wind turbulence limit airborne, air assault, and aviation operations.

A-61. Evaluation of weather in support of these operations requires information on the wind at the surface as well as at varying altitudes. Near the ground, high winds increase turbulence and may inhibit maneuver. At greater altitudes, it can increase or reduce fuel consumption. Wind always is described as “from…to” as in “winds are from the east moving to the west.” The leader must answer these questions:

• Will wind speed cause obscurants to dissipate quickly?
• Will wind speed and direction favor enemy use of obscurants?
• Will wind speed and direction affect the employment of available mortars?
• What is the potential for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear contamination?

Precipitation

A-62. Precipitation affects soil trafficability, visibility, and functioning of many electro-optical
systems. Heavy precipitation can reduce the quality of supplies in storage. Heavy snow cover can reduce the efficiency of many communication systems as well as degrade the effects of many munitions and air operations. The leader identifies critical factors such as type, amount, and duration of precipitation. Some precipitation questions to answer include:

• How will precipitation (or lack of it) affect the mobility of the unit or of enemy forces?
• How can precipitation (or lack of it) add to the unit achieving surprise?

Cloud Cover

A-63. Cloud cover affects ground operations by limiting illumination and solar heating of targets. Heavy cloud cover can degrade many target acquisition systems, infrared guided munitions, and general aviation operations. Heavy cloud cover often canalizes aircraft within air avenues of approach and on the final approach to the target. Partial cloud cover can cause glare, a condition attacking aircraft might use to conceal their approach to the target. Some types of clouds reduce the effectiveness of radar systems. The leader identifies critical factors about cloud cover, including limits on illumination and solar heating of targets. Some cloud cover questions include?

• How will cloud cover affect unit operations at night? How will it affect the enemy?
• How will cloud cover affect the target acquisition of the command launch unit?
• How will cloud cover affect helicopter and close air support?

Temperature and Humidity

A-64. Extremes of temperature and humidity reduce personnel and equipment capabilities and may require the use of special shelter or equipment. Air density decreases as temperature and humidity increase. This can require reduced aircraft payloads. Temperature crossovers, which occur when target and background temperatures are nearly equal, degrade thermal target acquisition systems. The length of crossover time depends on air temperature, soil and vegetation types, amount of cloud cover, and other factors. The leader identifies critical factors about temperature, including high and low temperatures, infrared crossover times, and effects of obscurants and CBRN. Some temperature considerations include:

• How will temperature and humidity affect the unit’s rate of march?
• How will temperature and humidity affect the Soldiers and equipment?
• Will temperatures and humidity favor the use of nonpersistent chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear?

ANALYSIS OF ENEMY

A-65. The second mission variable to consider is the enemy. Leaders analyze the enemy’s dispositions, compositions, strengths, doctrine, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable COA. The line between enemy combatants and civilian noncombatants is sometimes unclear. This requires the leader to understand the laws of war, the ROE, and local situation.

Questions

A-66. Analyzing the enemy answers the question, “What is the enemy doing and why?” Leaders also answer—

• What is the composition and strength of the enemy force?
• What are the capabilities of his weapons? Other systems?
• What is the location of current and probable enemy positions?
• What is the enemy’s most probable course of action? (DRAW-D [defends, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or delay]).

Assumptions

A-67. Leaders must understand assumption the battalion S-2 uses to portray the enemy’s COA. Furthermore, their own assumptions about the enemy must be consistent with those of their higher commander. Leaders must continually improve their situational understanding of the enemy and update their enemy templates as new information or trends become available. Deviations or significant conclusions reached during their enemy analysis could positively or negatively affect the battalion’s and company’s plan should be shared immediately with the battalion, company commander and S-2.

A-68. In analyzing the enemy, the leader must understand the IPB. Although he usually does not prepare IPB products for his subordinates, he must be able to use the products of the higher headquarters’ IPB.

Doctrinal Analysis (How Enemy Will Fight)

A-69. Leaders must know more than just the number and types of vehicles, Soldiers, and weapons the enemy has. The leader must thoroughly understand when, where, and how the enemy prefers or tends to use his assets. A situation template is a visual illustration of how the enemy force might look and act without the effects of weather and terrain. The leader looks at specific enemy actions during a given operation and uses the appropriate situation template to gain insights into how the enemy may fight. Likewise, he must understand enemy doctrinal objectives. In doctrinal terms, he asks—“Is the enemy oriented on the terrain, example, a reconnaissance force, his own force (assault force, terrorists, or insurgent forces), civilian forces or critical infrastructure (terrorist or insurgent forces, sabotage), or other supporting or adjacent friendly forces (as in a disruption zone)? What effect will this have on the way the enemy fights?”

A-70. However, as the global situation changes, the possibility of fighting threat who lack a structured doctrine increases. In such a situation, a leader must rely on information provided by battalion or higher echelon R&S assets and, most importantly, his and his higher headquarters’ pattern analysis and deductions about the enemy in his area of operation. He also may make sound assumptions about the enemy, human nature, and local culture.

Composition

A-71. Leader’s analysis must determine the types of vehicles, Soldiers, and equipment the enemy could use against his unit. He should be familiar with the basic characteristics of the units and platforms identified.

Disposition

A-72. Higher headquarters’ information, he determines how the enemy is (or might be) arrayed. If the information is available, he determines the echelon force where the enemy originated. He determines the disposition of the next two higher enemy elements. From this analysis, he might be able to determine patterns in the enemy’s employment or troops and equipment.

Strength

A-73. Identifies the enemy’s strength by unit. He can obtain this information by translating percentages given from higher headquarters to the actual numbers in each enemy element or from information provided the COP.

Capabilities

A-74. Based on the S-2’s assessment and enemy’s doctrine and current location, the leader must determine the enemy’s capabilities. This includes studying the maximum effective range for each weapon system, the doctrinal rates of march, and timelines associated with the performance of certain tasks. One technique is to use the warfighting functions as a checklist to address every significant element the enemy brings to the fight. The leader also determines the capabilities of the next higher enemy element. These capabilities should include reasonable assets the next higher element, or other higher enemy headquarters, may provide. This should include at least the employment of reserves, CBRN weapons, artillery or mortar locations and ranges, and reconnaissance assets.

Recent Activities

A-75. Gaining complete understanding of the enemy’s intentions can be difficult when his situation templates, composition, and disposition are unclear. In all cases, the enemy’s recent activities must be understood, because they can provide insight into his future activities and intentions. If time permits, the leader might be able to conduct a pattern analysis of the enemy’s actions to predict future actions. In the operational environment, this might be the most important analysis the leader conducts and is likely to yield the most useful information to the leader.

Enemy Situation Template

A-76. Identifies how the enemy may potentially fight; the leader weighs the result of his analysis of terrain and weather against the higher headquarters’ situation template. The refined product is a platoon situation template, a graphic showing how he believes the enemy will fight under specific operational conditions. This situation template is portrayed one echelon lower than developed by the higher headquarters’ S-2. For example, if a battalion situation template identifies a platoon-size enemy element on the company’s objective and squad-size enemy elements on the platoon’s objective, the leader, using his knowledge of both the enemy’s doctrine and terrain, develops a situation template positioning squad-size battle positions, crew-served weapons positions, or defensive trenches.

A-77. He includes in this situation template the likely sectors of fire of the enemy weapons and tactical and protective obstacles, either identified or merely templated, which support defensive tasks. Table A-1 (page A-20) shows recommended situation template items. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more information.)

Table A-1. Recommended enemy situation template items

A-78. The leader must avoid developing his situation template independently of the higher commander’s guidance and S-2’s product. The product must reflect the results of reconnaissance and shared information. Differences between the situation templates must be resolved before the leader can continue analyzing the enemy. Finally, given the scale with which the leader often develops his situation template, on a 1:50,000 maps, the situation template should be transferred to a graphic depiction of terrain for briefing purposes, as the situation allows. This is not for analysis, but to show subordinates the details of the anticipated enemy COA. Once he briefs the enemy analysis to his subordinates, he must ensure they understand differences between what he knows, what he suspects, and what he just templates (estimates). Unless given the benefit of information collection, his situation template is only an estimate of how the enemy might be disposed. He must not take these as facts. This is why the leader must develop a tactically sound and flexible plan. It is also why he must clearly explain his intent to his subordinates. This allows them to exercise initiative and judgment to accomplish the unit’s purpose. Reconnaissance is critical in developing the best possible enemy scenario.

Information Requirements

A-79. The CCIRs identify and filter information needed by leaders to support their vision and to make critical decisions, especially to determine or validate COA. CCIRs also helps focus the efforts of subordinates and aids in the allocation of resources. Commanders should limit their CCIRs to essential information. The two key elements are friendly forces information and priority intelligence requirements.

A-80. Priority intelligence requirements are information a leader needs to know about terrain or enemy to make a critical decision. PIR are best expressed in a question being answered yes or no.

A-81. Friendly forces information requirements include information leaders need to know about their units or about adjacent units to make critical decisions.

A-82. Although EEFIs are not part of the CCIRs, they still become priorities when the leader states them. EEFI are the critical aspects of a friendly operation if known by the enemy, that subsequently would compromise or lead to failure of the operation. Consequently, this information must be protected from identification by the enemy.

ANALYSIS OF TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE

A-83. Leaders study their task organization to determine the number, type, capabilities, and condition of available friendly troops and other support. Analysis of troops follows the same logic as analyzing the enemy by identifying capabilities, vulnerabilities and strengths. Leaders should know the disposition, composition, strength, and capabilities of their forces one and two levels down. This information can be maintained in a checkbook-style matrix for use during COA development (specifically array forces). They maintain understanding of subordinates’ readiness, including maintenance, training, strengths and weaknesses, leaders, and logistic status. Analysis of troops and support answers the question: What assets are available to accomplish the mission? Leaders also answer these questions:

• What are the strengths and weaknesses of subordinate leaders?
• What is the supply status of ammunition, water, fuel (if required), and other necessary items?
• What is the present physical condition of Soldiers (morale, sleep)?
• What is the condition of equipment?
• What is the unit’s training status and experience relative to the mission?
• What additional Soldiers or units will accompany?
• What additional assets are required to accomplish the mission?

A-84. Perhaps the most critical aspect of mission analysis is determining the combat potential of one’s own force. The leader must realistically and unemotionally determine all available resources and new limitations based on level of training or recent fighting. This includes troops who are either attached to or in direct support of his unit. It also includes understanding the full array of assets in support of the unit. He must know, how much indirect fire, by type, is available and when it will become available.

A-85. Because of the uncertainty always present in operations at the small unit level, leaders cannot be expected to think of everything during their analysis. This fact forces leaders to determine how to get assistance when the situation exceeds their capabilities. Therefore, a secondary product of analysis of troops and support available should be an answer to the question, how do I get help?

ANALYSIS OF TIME AVAILABLE

A-86. The fifth mission variable of METT-TC is time available. Time refers to many factors during the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). The four categories the leader considers include:

• Planning and preparation.
• Operations.
• Next higher echelon’s timeline.
• Enemy timeline.

A-87. During all phases, leaders consider critical times, unusable time, the time it takes to accomplish activities, the time it takes to move, priorities of work, and tempo of operations. Other critical conditions to consider include visibility and weather data, and events such as higher headquarters tasks and required rehearsals. Implied in the analysis of time is leader prioritization of events and sequencing of activities.

A-88. As addressed in step 1 of the TLP, time analysis is a critical aspect to planning, preparation, and execution. Time analysis is often the first thing a leader does. The leader must not only appreciate how much time is available, but he also must be able to appreciate the time/space aspects of preparing, moving, fighting, and sustaining. He must be able to see his own tasks and enemy actions in relation to time. Most importantly, as events occur, he must adjust the time available to him and assess its impact on what he wants to accomplish. Finally, he must update previous timelines for his subordinates, listing all events affecting the platoon and its subordinate elements.

ANALYSIS OF CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

A-89. Civil considerations include the influences of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes, activities of civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operation, with regard to the conduct of military operations. Civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on operations in progress. Civil considerations of the environment can either help or hinder friendly or enemy forces; the difference lies in which leader has taken time to learn the situation and its possible effects on the operation. Analysis of civil considerations answers three critical questions:

• How do civilian considerations affect the operation?
• How does the operation affect the civilians?
• How do our forces build national will in our area of operations?

A-90. Higher headquarters provides the leader with civil considerations affecting the next echelon’s mission. The memory aid the higher headquarters may use to analyze and describe these civil considerations is ASCOPE. (Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for more information.)

Areas

A-91. The population within a prescribed area of operation comprises several different groups, both ethnically and politically. Leaders must understand each group’s perceptions about the United States, the Army, and specific units operating within that area. Population statuses overlays can best describe groups and define what feelings the group has toward American forces. This is extremely important in understanding when and where to commit combat power, what relationships can be reinforced with certain groups versus what relationships need to start or cease, and ultimately what second and third order effects our actions will have in the area of operation. Information related capabilities also can be properly focused with a healthy understanding of the perceptions of the civilian population.

A-92. This characteristic addresses terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Analyze how vital civilian areas affect the missions of respective forces and how military operations affect these areas. Factors to consider include political boundaries, locations of government centers, by-type enclaves, special regions such as mining or agricultural, trade routes, and possible settlement sites.

Structures

A-93. Include traditional high-payoff targets, protected cultural sites, and facilities with practical applications. The analysis is a comparison of how a structure’s location, functions, and capabilities as compared to costs and consequences of such use.

Capabilities

A-94. Assess capabilities in terms of those required to save, sustain, or enhance life, in that order. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authorities to provide essential functions and services. These can include areas needed after combat operations and contracted resources and services.

Organizations

Consider all nonmilitary groups or institutions in the area of operation. These may be indigenous, come from a third country or U.S. agencies. They influence and interact with the populace, force, and each other. Current activities, capabilities, and limitations are some of the information necessary to build situational understanding. This often becomes a union of resources and specialized capabilities.

People

A-95. People is a general term describing all nonmilitary personnel military forces encountered in the area of operation. This includes those personnel outside the area of operation whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the mission. Identify the essential communicators and formal and informal processes used to influence people. In addition, consider how historical, cultural, and social factors shape public perceptions beliefs, goals, and expectations.

Events

A-96. Routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities which significantly affect organizations, people, and military operations, including seasons, festivals, holidays, funerals, political rallies, and agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles and paydays. Other events, such as disasters and those precipitated by military forces, stress and affect the attitudes and activities of the populace and include a moral responsibility to protect displaced civilians. Template events and analyze them for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

A-97. The leader also must identify civil considerations affecting his mission. Civil considerations are important when conducting operations against terrorist or insurgent forces in urban areas. Most terrorists and insurgents depend on the support or neutrality of the civilian population to camouflage them. Leaders must understand impact of their actions as well as their subordinate’s actions􀊊on the civilian population, and effects will have on current and future operations. Considerations may include:

• Ethnic dynamics.
• Organizations of influence.
• Patterns.
• Leaders and influencers.
• Economic environment.

A-98. Ethnic dynamics include religion, cultural mores, gender roles, customs, superstitions, and values certain ethnic groups hold dear which differ from other groups. Leaders who analyze the ethnic dynamics of their area of operation can best apply combat power, shape maneuver with information related capabilities, and ultimately find the common denominator all ethnic varieties have in common and focus unit efforts at it. Gaining local support can best be accomplished by the leader who demonstrates dignity and respect to the civilian population he is charged to protect and train.

A-99. Organizations of influence force the leader to look beyond preexisting civilian hierarchical arrangements. By defining organizations within the community, leaders can understand what groups have power and influence over their own smaller communities and what groups can assist our forces. After these groups have been defined, analyzing them and determining their contributions or resistance to friendly operations is easier. Many Eastern cultures rely upon religious organizations as their centers of power and influence, whereas Western culture’s power comes from political institutions by elected influence, whereas Western culture’s power comes from political institutions by elected information collection.

A-100. Every culture, every group of people, has patterns of behavior. Whether it is set times for prayer, shopping or commuting, people follow patterns. Understanding these patterns helps leaders plan and execute information collection, combat operations, and logistical resupply. Also, unit leaders who study the history of civic culture can better understand and explain to others how and why the people have fought previous wars and conflicts. Starting with a baseline pattern and keeping a mission analysis on how the population is responding or have responded in the past under similar circumstances will assist leaders in using patterns to the unit’s advantage.

A-101. Know who is in charge and who can influence and enable unit leaders to exercise governance and monitor security within a prescribed area. Many times, the spiritual leader is not necessarily the decision maker for a community, but the spiritual leader must approve the decision maker’s actions. Commanders and staff officers who make link-diagrams of leadership including religious, political, and criminal personnel allow focused planning and decentralized execution which bolsters legitimacy within the population. Using the targeting methodology of D3A (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) may prove useful in determining whether a leader or influencer would best facilitate an operation, when to engage them, and what to expect.

A-102. Money and resources drive prosperity and stability. Leaders who identify the economic production base of their area of operation can execute civil-military campaigns within their area of operation bolstering the economic welfare of the people. These campaigns include infrastructure rebuild projects, creation of labor opportunities, and education. By focusing on the motivations for civilian labor and creating essential services and prosperity where there was none, unit leaders/commanders can win the support of the civilian who now can feed and clothe his family and now has clean running water. This aspect of civil considerations reinforces the security of the community against poverty and other enablers to instability.

RISK ASSESSMENT

A-103. Risk assessment is the identification and assessment of hazards allowing a leader to implement measures to control hazards. Leaders assess risk to protect the force and aid in mission accomplishment. The leader must consider two kinds of risk: tactical and accident. Tactical risk is associated with hazards existing due to the enemy’s presence. The consequences of tactical risk take two major forms:

• Enemy action where the leader has accepted risk such as an enemy attack where the friendly leader has chosen to conduct an economy of force.
• Lost opportunity, such as movement across terrain severely restricts the speed of traverse. This then would restrict the unit’s ability to mass the effects of combat power.

A-104. Accident risk includes all operational risk other than tactical risk and can include hazards concerning friendly personnel, equipment readiness, and environment. Fratricide is an example of an accident risk.

A-105. The leader must identify risks based on the results of his mission analysis. Once identified, risk must be reduced through controls. For example, fratricide is a hazard categorized as an accident risk; surface danger zones and risk estimate distance are used to identify the controls, such as TRP and phase lines, to reduce this accidental risk. When the leader decides what risks he is willing to accept, he also must decide in his COA how to reduce risk to an acceptable level.

IDENTIFY TENTATIVE DECISIVE POINTS

A-106. Identifying a tentative decisive point and verifying it during COA development is the most important aspect of the TLP. Visualizing a valid decisive point is how the leader determines how to achieve success and accomplish his purpose. The leader develops his entire COA from the decisive point. Without determining a valid decisive point, the leader cannot begin to develop a valid or tactically sound COA. The leader, based on his initial analysis of METT-TC, his situational awareness, his vision, and insight into how such factors can affect the unit’s mission, should visualize where, when, and how his unit’s ability to generate combat power (firepower, protection, maneuver, leadership, and information) can overwhelm the enemy’s abilities to generate combat power. The decisive point might orient on terrain, enemy, time, or a combination of these. The decisive point might be where or how, or from where, the unit will combine the effects of combat power against the enemy. The decisive point might be the event or action (with respect to terrain, enemy, or time, and generation of combat power) will ultimately and irreversibly lead to the unit achieving its purpose.

A-107. The decisive point does not simply restate the unit’s essential task or purpose; it defines how, where, or when the unit will accomplish its purpose. The unit’s decisive operation always focuses at the decisive point, and always accomplishes the unit’s purpose. Designating a decisive point is critical to the leader’s vision of how he will use combat power to achieve the purpose, how he will task-organize his unit and how his shaping operations will support the decisive operation, and how the decisive operation will accomplish the unit’s purpose. This tentative decisive point forms the basis of his planning and COA development; it also forms the basis of communicating the COA to his subordinates. The leader should clearly explain what the decisive point is to his subordinate leaders and why it is decisive; this objective, in conjunction with his commander’s intent, facilitates subordinate initiative. A valid decisive point enables the leader to clearly and logically link how the application of combat power elements with respect to terrain, enemy, and time allows the unit to accomplish its purpose. If the leader determines his tentative decisive point is not valid during COA development or analysis, then he must determine another decisive point and restart COA development.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

A-108. From developing a strategy to analyzing, refining, and rehearsing the plan, a leader should be knowledgeable in the following areas detailed under this subheading to construct a solid COA. The purpose of COA development is to determine one or more ways to accomplish the mission consistent with the immediate higher commander’s intent. A COA describes how the unit might generate the effects of overwhelming combat power against the enemy at the decisive point with the least friendly casualties. Each COA the leader develops must be detailed enough to clearly describe how he envisions using all of his assets and combat multipliers to achieve the unit’s mission-essential task and purpose.

A-109. To develop a COA, he focuses on the actions the unit must take at the decisive point and works backward to his start point. The leader should focus his efforts to develop at least one well-synchronized COA; if time permits, he should develop several. The result of the COA development process is paragraph 3 of the OPORD. A COA should position the unit for future operations and provide flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also should give subordinates the maximum latitude for initiative.

SCREENING CRITERIA

A-110. A COA should be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete:

• Suitable. If executed, the COA accomplishes the mission consistent with the higher commander’s concept and intent.
• Feasible. The unit has the technical and tactical skills and resources to accomplish the COA, with available time, space, and resources.
• Acceptable. The military advantage gained by executing the COA must justify the cost in resources, especially casualties. This assessment is largely subjective.
• Distinguishable. If more than one COA is developed, it must be sufficiently different from the others to justify full development and consideration.
• Complete. The COA covers the operational factors of who, what, when, where, and how, and must show from start to finish how the unit will accomplish the mission. The COA must address the doctrinal aspects of the mission. For example, in an attack against a defending enemy, the COA must address the movement to, deployment against, assault of, and consolidation upon the objective.

Note. Leaders assess risk continuously throughout COA development.

ACTIONS

A-111. Next, the leader analyzes relative combat power, generates options, arrays his forces, develops a concept of the operation, assigns responsibility, and prepares a COA statement and sketch.

Analyze Relative Combat Power

A-112. During the first step of COA development, analyzing relative combat power, leaders compare and contrast friendly combat power with the enemy. There four goals include:

• Identify an enemy weakness to exploit.
• Identify friendly strengths to exploit the enemy weakness.
• Identify enemy strengths to mitigate.
• Identify friendly weaknesses to protect.

A-113. The purpose of this step is to compare the combat power of friendly and enemy forces. It is not merely a calculation and comparison of friendly and enemy weapons numbers or units with the aim of gaining a numerical advantage. Using the results of all previous analyses done during mission analysis, the leader compares his unit’s combat power strengths and weaknesses with those of the enemy. He seeks to calculate the time and manner in which his force (and enemy) can maximize the effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, and information in relation to the specific terrain, disposition, and composition of each force. The leader also determines how to avoid enemy strengths or advantages in combat power. In short, he strives to determine where, when, and how his unit’s combat power (the effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, and information) can overwhelm the enemy’s ability to generate combat power. An analysis of the ability to generate combat power will help the leader confirm or deny his tentative decisive point.

Generate Options

A-114. Most missions and tasks can be accomplished in more than one way. The goal of this step, generating options, is to determine one or more of those ways quickly. First, leaders consider TTP from doctrine, unit SOPs, history, or other resources to determine if a solution to a similar tactical problem exists already. If it does, the leader’s job is to take the existing solution and modify it to his unique situation. If a solution does not exist, the leader must develop one. Second, leaders confirm the mission’s decisive point. Then, using doctrinal requirements as a guide, the leader assigns purposes and tasks to decisive, and shaping, and sustaining operations.

A-115. This doctrinal requirement provides a framework for the leader to develop a COA. For example, a breach requires an assault element, support element, breach element, security element, and possibly a reserve. Beginning with the decisive point identified during mission analysis, the leader identifies the decisive operation’s purpose and purposes of his shaping and sustaining operations. The decisive operation’s purpose is nested to his unit’s overall purpose and is achieved at his decisive point. The shaping operation’s purposes are nested to the decisive operation’s purpose by setting the conditions for success of the decisive operation. The sustaining operation’s purposes are nested to the decisive and shaping operation’s purposes by providing sustainment, operational area security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure. The leader then determines the tactical mission tasks for the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. These tasks must be accomplished to achieve the subordinate unit’s purpose.

Array Forces

A-116. Using the product from generating options, the leader then determines what combinations of Soldiers, weapons, and other systems are needed to accomplish each task. This is known as “arraying forces” or “assigning troops to task.” This judgment call is unique to the specific METT-TC conditions the leader faces. He then must task organize his forces specific to the respective essential tactical tasks and purposes assigned to his subordinate elements. He determines the specific quantity of squads, weapons (by type), and fire support necessary to accomplish each task against the enemy array of forces. He allocates resources required for the decisive operation’s success first and determines the resources needed for shaping operations in descending order of importance.

Develop a Concept of Operations

A-117. The concept of the operation describes how the leader envisions the operation unfolding, from its start to its conclusion or end state. Operations/actions consist of numerous activities, events, and tasks. The concept of the operation describes the relationships between activities, events, and tasks, and explains how the tasks will lead to accomplishing the mission. The concept of the operation is a framework to assist leaders, not a script. The normal cycle for an offensive mission is tactical movement, actions on the objective, and consolidation and reorganization. The normal cycle for defensive missions is engagement area development and preparation of the battle positions, actions in the engagement area, counterattack, and consolidation and reorganization. In developing the concept of the operation, the leader clarifies in his mind the best ways to use the available terrain and to employ the unit’s strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses. He includes the requirements of indirect fire to support the maneuver. He then develops the maneuver control measures necessary to convey his intent, enhance the understanding of the schemes of maneuver, prevent fratricide, and clarify the tasks and purposes of the decisive shaping, and sustaining operations. He also determines the sustainment aspects of the COA.

Assign Responsibilities

A-118. Leaders assign responsibility for each task to a subordinate. Whenever possible and depending on the existing chain of command, they avoid fracturing unit integrity. They try to keep their span of control between two to five subordinate elements. The leader ensures every unit in his command is employed, every asset is attached and adequate mission command is provided for each element. The leader must avoid unnecessary complicated mission command structures and maintain unit integrity where feasible.

Prepare a Course of Action Statement and Sketch

A-119. Leaders in small units primarily use the COA statement and COA sketch to describe the concept of the operation. These two products are the basis for paragraph three of the OPORD. The COA statement specifies how the unit will accomplish the mission. The first three steps of COA development provide the bulk of the COA statement. The COA statement details how the unit’s operation supports the next higher leader’s operation, the decisive point and why it is decisive, the form of maneuver or type of defensive mission, and operational framework. The COA sketch is a drawing or series of drawings to assist the leader in describing how the operation will unfold. The sketch provides a picture of the maneuver aspects of the concept. Leaders use tactical mission task graphics and control measures (Refer to ADRP 1-02 for more information.) to convey the operation in a doctrinal context. Both the COA statement and sketch focus at the decisive point. The COA statement should identify—

• Decisive point and what makes it decisive.
• Form of maneuver or type of defensive mission.
• Tasks and purposes of the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations.
• Reserve planning priorities.
• Purposes of critical warfighting functions elements.
• The end state.

A-120. The COA sketch should identify how the unit intends to focus the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive point. When integrated with terrain, the refined product becomes the unit’s operations overlay.

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

A-121. COA analysis begins with both friendly and enemy COA and, using a method of action-reaction-counteraction war game, results in a synchronized friendly plan, identified strengths and weaknesses, and updated risk assessment. After developing the COA, the leader analyzes it to determine its strengths and weaknesses, visualizes the flow of the battle, identifies the conditions or requirements necessary to enhance synchronization, and gains insights into actions at the decisive point of the mission. If he has developed more than one COA, he applies this same analysis to each COA developed. He does this analysis through war gaming or “fighting” the COA against at least one enemy COA. For each COA, the leader thinks through the operation from start to finish. He compares their COA with the enemy’s most probable COA. At small-unit level, the enemy’s most probable COA is what the enemy is most likely to do. During the war game, the leader visualizes a set of enemy and friendly actions and reactions. War gaming is the process of determining “what if?” factors of the overall operations. The object is to determine what can go wrong and what decision the leader likely will have to make as a result. COA analysis allows the leader to synchronize his assets, identify potential hazards, and develop a better understanding of the upcoming operation. It enables him—

• To determine how to maximize the effects of combat power while protecting friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.
• To anticipate events within the area of operations.
• To determine conditions and resources required for success.
• To identify additional control requirements.
• To identify friendly coordination requirements.

A-122. COA analysis (war gaming) brings together friendly and enemy forces on the actual terrain to visualize how the operation will unfold. It is a continuous cycle of action, reaction, and counteraction. This process highlights critical tasks, stimulates ideas, and provides insights rarely gained through mission analysis and COA development alone. War gaming is a critical step in the planning process and should be allocated more time than the other steps. War gaming helps the leader fully synchronize friendly actions, while considering the likely reactions of the enemy. The product of this process is the synchronization matrix. War gaming, depending on how much time is devoted to planning, provides—

• An appreciation for time, space, and triggers needed to integrate direct and indirect fire support, obscurants, engineers, air defense artillery, and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear with maneuver platoons (Infantry, antiarmor, or tank) to support unit tasks and purposes identified in the scheme of maneuver.
• Flexibility built into the plan by gaining insights into possible branches to the basic plan.
• The need for control measures, such as checkpoints, contact points, and target registration points, aid in control, flexibility, and synchronization.
• Coordinating instructions to enhance execution and unity of effort, and to ease confusion between subordinate elements.
• Information needed to complete paragraphs three, four, and five of the OPORD. Assessments regarding on-order and be-prepared missions.
• Projected sustainment expenditures, friendly casualties, and resulting medical requirements.

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND SELECTION

A-123. If the leader has developed more than one COA, he must compare them by weighing the specific advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses of each as noted during the war game. These attributes may pertain to the accomplishment of the unit purpose, the use of terrain, the destruction of the enemy or other aspect of the operation he believes is important. He uses these factors, gained from his relational combat power analysis matrix, as his frame of reference in tentatively selecting the best COA. He makes the final selection of a COA based on his own judgment, the start time of the operation, the area of operation, the scheme of maneuver, and subordinate unit tasks and purposes.

STEP 4 – INITIATE MOVEMENT

A-124. Leaders initiate movements necessary to continue mission preparation or to posture the unit for starting the mission. This step can be executed anytime throughout the sequence of the TLP. It can include movement to an AA, battle position, or new area of operation, or the movement of guides or quartering parties.

STEP 5 – CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE

A-125. To exploit the principles of speed and surprise, leaders should weigh the advantages of reconnoitering personally against the combat multiplier in the form of supplied information from battalion information systems. They realistically consider the dangers of reconnoitering personally, and time required to conduct them. Leaders might be able to plan their operations using the unprecedented amount of combat information provided by the higher echelon information collection assets. However, if time permits, leaders should verify higher headquarters’ intelligence by reconnoitering visually. They should seek to confirm the PIR supporting their tentative plans. These PIR usually consists of assumptions or critical facts about the enemy. This can include strength and location, especially at templated positions. It also can include information about the terrain. For example, verification of a tentative support-by-fire position can suppress the enemy, or an avenue of approach is useable.

A-126. If possible, leaders should include their subordinate leaders in their reconnaissance efforts. This allows the subordinates to see as much of the terrain and enemy as possible. The reconnaissance also helps subordinate leaders gain insight into the leaders’ visions of the operation.

A-127. The leaders’ recons might include moving to or beyond the LD, reconnaissance of an area of operation, or walking from the forward edge of the battle area back to and through the platoon area of operation or battle position along likely enemy avenues of approach. If possible, leaders should select vantage points with the best possible view of the decisive point. In addition to the leaders’ reconnaissance efforts, units can conduct additional reconnaissance operations. Examples include surveillance of an area by subordinate elements, patrols to determine enemy locations, and establishment of observation posts to gain additional information. Leaders also can incorporate Javelin CLUs as surveillance tools (day or night), based on an analysis of METT-TC.

A-128. The nature of the reconnaissance, including what it covers and how long it lasts, depends on the tactical situation and time available. The leader should use the results of the COA development process to identify information and security requirements of the unit’s reconnaissance operations.

A-129. The leader must include disseminating results and conclusions arrived from reconnaissance into his time analysis. He also must consider how to communicate changes in the COA to his subordinates and how these changes affect his plans, actions of the subordinates, and other supporting elements.

STEP 6 – COMPLETE THE PLAN

A-130. During this step, leaders expand their selected (or refined) COA into complete OPORD. They prepare overlays, refine the indirect fire list, complete sustainment and mission command requirements and, of course, update the tentative plan based on the latest reconnaissance or information. They prepare briefing sites and other briefing materials they might need to present the OPORD directly to their subordinates.

A-131. Using the five-paragraph OPORD format helps them to explain all aspects of the operation: terrain, enemy, higher and adjacent friendly units, unit mission, execution, support, and mission command. The format also serves as a checklist to ensure they cover all relevant details of the operation. It also gives subordinates a smooth flow of information from beginning to end.

STEP 7 – ISSUE OPERATIONS ORDER

A-132. The OPORD precisely and concisely explains both the leader’s intent and concept of how he envisions the unit accomplishing the mission. The order does not contain unnecessary information. The OPORD is delivered quickly and in a manner allowing subordinates to concentrate on understanding the leader’s vision and not just copying what he says verbatim. The leader must prepare adequately and deliver the OPORD confidently and quickly to build and sustain confidence in his subordinates.

A-133. When issuing the OPORD, the leader must ensure his subordinates understand and share his vision of what must be done and when and how it must be done. They must understand how all the platoon elements work together to accomplish the mission. They also must understand how the platoon mission supports the intentions of the immediate higher commander. When the leader has finished issuing the order, subordinate leaders should leave with a clear understanding of what the leader expects their elements to do. The leader is responsible for ensuring his subordinates understand.

A-134. In many respects more importantly, the leader must issue the order in a manner instilling subordinates with confidence in the plan and a commitment to do their best to achieve the plan. Whenever possible, he must issue the order in person. He looks into the eyes of his subordinate leaders to ensure each one understands the mission and what the element must achieve.

A-135. Complete the order with a confirmation brief. At a minimum, each subordinate leader should be able to back brief the unit mission and intent, the immediate higher commander’s intent, his own tasks and purpose, and time he will issue his unit’s OPORD. Each subordinate should confirm he understands the commander’s vision and how the mission is accomplished with respect to the decisive point. This confirmation brief provides an opportunity to highlight issues or concerns.

A-136. The five-paragraph OPORD format (see figure A-4, page A-34), helps the leader paint a picture of all aspects of the operation, from the terrain to the enemy, and finally to the unit’s own actions from higher to lower. The format helps him decide what relevant details he must include and in providing subordinates with a smooth flow of information from beginning to end. At the same time, the leader must ensure the order is not only clear and complete but also as brief as possible. If he has already addressed an item adequately in a previous WARNORD, he can simply state “No change,” or provide necessary updates. The leader is free to brief the OPORD in the most effective manner to convey information to his subordinates.

Figure A-4. Operations order format

STEP 8 – SUPERVISE AND REFINE

A-137. This final step of the TLP is crucial. After issuing the OPORD, the leader and his subordinate leaders must ensure the required activities and tasks are completed in a timely manner prior to mission execution. Supervision is the primary responsibility of all leadership. Both officers and NCOs must check everything important for mission accomplishment. This includes, but is not limited to—

• Conducting numerous back briefs on all aspects of the platoon and subordinate unit operations.
• Ensuring the second in command in each element is prepared to execute in his leaders’ absence.
• Listening to subordinates’ OPORD.
• Observing rehearsals of subordinate units.
• Checking load plans to ensure they are carrying only what is necessary for the mission or what the OPORD specified.
• Checking the status and serviceability of weapons.
• Checking on maintenance activities of subordinate units.
• Ensuring local security is maintained.

REHEARSALS

A-138. Rehearsals are practice sessions conducted to prepare units for an upcoming operation or event. They are essential in ensuring thorough preparation, coordination, and understanding of the commander’s plan and intent. Leaders should never underestimate the value of rehearsals.

A-139. Rehearsals require leaders and, when time permits, other platoon Soldiers to perform required tasks, ideally under conditions as close as possible to those expected for the actual operation. At their best, rehearsals are interactive; participants maneuver their actual vehicles or use vehicle models or simulations while verbalizing their elements’ actions. During every rehearsal, the focus is on the how element, allowing subordinates to practice the actions called for in their individual scheme of maneuver.

Note. Rehearsals are different from a discussion of what is supposed to happen during the actual event. Leaders can test subordinates understanding of the plan by ensuring they push the rehearsal forward rather than waiting to dictate each step of the operation.

A-140. The leader uses well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following:

• Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks.
• Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan, leading to more refinement of the plan or development of additional branch plans.
• Integrate the actions of subordinate elements.
• Confirm coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent units.
• Improve each Soldier’s understanding of the concept of the operation, the direct fire plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various situations may arise during the operation.
• Ensure seconds-in-command are prepared to execute in their leaders’ absence.

REHEARSAL TYPES

A-141. Leaders may use several types of rehearsals, which include:

• Backbrief.
• Combined arms rehearsal.
• Support rehearsal.
• Battle drill or standard operating procedure rehearsal.

Backbrief

A-142. A backbrief is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to accomplish their mission. Normally, subordinates perform backbriefs throughout preparation. These briefs allow commanders to clarify the commander’s intent early in subordinate planning. Commanders use the backbrief to identify problems in the concept of the operation.

Combined Arms Rehearsal

A-143. A combined arms rehearsal is a rehearsal in which subordinate units synchronize their plans with each other. A maneuver unit headquarters normally executes a combined arms rehearsal after subordinate units issue their operation order. This rehearsal type helps ensure subordinate commanders’ plans achieve the higher commander’s intent.

Support Rehearsal

A-144. The support rehearsal helps synchronize each warfighting function with the overall operation. This rehearsal supports the operation so units can accomplish their missions. Throughout preparation, units conduct support rehearsals within the framework of a single or limited number of warfighting functions. These rehearsals typically involve coordination and procedure drills for aviation, fires, engineer support, or casualty evacuation. Support rehearsals and combined arms rehearsals complement preparations for the operation. Units may conduct rehearsals separately and combine them into fulldress rehearsals. Although these rehearsals differ slightly by warfighting function, they achieve similar results.

Battle Drill or Standard Operating Procedure Rehearsal

A-145. A battle drill or SOP rehearsal ensures all participants understand a technique or a specific set of procedures. Throughout preparation, units and staffs rehearse battle drills and SOPs. These rehearsals do not need a completed order from higher headquarters. Leaders place priority on those drills or actions they anticipate occurring during the operation. All echelons use these rehearsal types; however, they are most common for platoons, squads, and sections. They are conducted throughout preparation and are not limited to published battle drills.

METHODS OF REHEARSALS

A-146. Rehearsals should follow the crawl-walk-run training methodology whenever possible. This prepares the platoons and subordinate elements for increasingly difficult conditions. (Refer to FM 6-0 for more information).Units can conduct these forms of rehearsals if mission variables permit—

• Full-dress rehearsal.
• Reduced-force rehearsal.
• Terrain-model rehearsal.
• Digital terrain-model rehearsal.
• Sketch-map rehearsal.
• Map rehearsal.
• Network rehearsal.

Full-Dress Rehearsal

A-147. A full-dress rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the operation. It includes every participating Soldier and system. Leaders rehearse their subordinates on terrain similar to area of operation, initially under good light conditions, and then in limited visibility. Leaders repeat small unit actions until executed to standard. Full-dress rehearsals help Soldiers clearly understand what commanders expect of them. It helps them gain confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission. Supporting elements, such as aviation crews, meet and rehearse with Soldiers to synchronize the operation.

Reduced-Force Rehearsal

A-148. Circumstances may prohibit a rehearsal with all members of the unit. A reduced-force rehearsal involves only key leaders of the organization and subordinate units. It normally takes fewer resources than a full-dress rehearsal. Terrain requirements mirror those of a full-dress rehearsal, even though fewer Soldiers participate. The commander first decides the level of leader involvement. Then selected leaders rehearse the plan while traversing actual or similar terrain. Often commanders use this technique to rehearse fire control measures for an engagement area during defensive operations. Commanders often use a reduced-force rehearsal to prepare key leaders for a full-dress rehearsal. It may require developing a rehearsal plan mirroring the actual plan but fits the rehearsal terrain.

Terrain-Model Rehearsal

A-149. The terrain-model rehearsal is the most popular rehearsal technique. It takes less time and fewer resources than a full-dress or reduced-force rehearsal. (A terrain-model rehearsal takes a platoon between one to two hours to execute to standard.) An accurately constructed terrain model helps subordinate leaders visualize the commander’s intent and concept of the operation. When possible, commanders place the terrain model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operation. However, if the situation requires more security, they place the terrain model on a reverse slope within walking distance of a point overlooking the area of operation. The model’s orientation coincides with the terrain. The size of the terrain model can vary from small (using markers to represent units) to large (on which the participants can walk). A large model helps reinforce the participants’ perception of unit positions on the terrain.

Digital Terrain-Model Rehearsal

A-150. With today’s digital capabilities, users can construct terrain models in virtual space. Units drape high-resolution imagery over elevation data thereby creating a flythrough or walk-through. Holographic imagery produces views in three dimensions. Often, the model hot links graphics, detailed information, unmanned aircraft systems, and ground imagery to key points providing accurate insight to the plan. Digital terrain models reduce the operations security risk because they do not use real terrain. The unit geospatial engineers or imagery analysts can assist in digital model creation. Detailed city models exist for many world cities.

Sketch-Map Rehearsal

A-151. Commanders can use the sketch-map technique almost anywhere, day or night. The procedures are similar to a terrain-model rehearsal except the commander uses a sketch map in place of a terrain model. Large sketches ensure all participants can see as each participant walks through execution of the operation. Participants move markers on the sketch to represent unit locations and maneuvers. Sketch-map rehearsals take less time than terrain-model rehearsals and more time than map rehearsals.

Map Rehearsal

A-152. A map rehearsal is similar to a sketch-map rehearsal except the commander uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale used to plan the operation. The map rehearsal itself consumes the most time. A map rehearsal is normally the easiest technique to set up since it requires only maps and graphics for current operations. Units gear a map rehearsal’s operation overlay to the echelon conducting the rehearsal. Multi-echelon rehearsals using this technique are difficult. This rehearsal can present operations security risks if the area around the rehearsal site is not secured. This technique requires the least terrain of all rehearsals. A good site ensures participants can easily find it yet stay concealed from the enemy. An optimal location overlooks the terrain where the unit will execute the operation.

Network Rehearsal

A-153. Units conduct network rehearsals over wide-area networks or local area networks. Commanders and staffs practice these rehearsals by talking through critical portions of the operation over communications networks in a sequence the commander establishes. The organization rehearses only critical parts of the operation. These rehearsals require all information systems needed to execute portions of the operation. All participants require working information systems, operation order, and overlays. Command posts can rehearse battle tracking during network rehearsals.

PRECOMBAT CHECKS AND INSPECTIONS

A-154. PCCs and PCIs are critical to the success of missions. These checks and inspections are leader tasks and cannot be delegated below the team leader level. They ensure the Soldier is prepared to execute the required individual and collective tasks supporting the mission. Checks and inspections are part of the TLP protecting against shortfalls endangering Soldiers’ lives and jeopardize the execution of a mission.

A-155. PCCs and PCIs must be tailored to the specific unit and mission requirements. Each mission and each patrol may require a separate set of checklists. Each element will have its own established set of PCCs and PCIs, but each platoon within its element should have identical checklists. Weapons squads will have a different checklist than line squads, but each weapon squad within an organization should be the same.

A-156. One of the best ways to ensure PCCs and PCIs are complete and thorough is with full-dress rehearsals. These rehearsals, run at combat speed with communication and full battle-equipment, allow the leader to envision minute details, as they will occur in the area of operation. If the operation is to be conducted at night, Soldiers should conduct fulldress rehearsals at night as well. PCCs and PCIs should include back briefs on the mission, the task and purpose of the mission, and how the Soldiers’ role fits into the scheme of maneuver. The Soldiers should know the latest intelligence updates, ROE, be versed in medical and casualty evacuation procedures and sustainment requirements.

A-157. Table A-2 (page A-40) lists sensitive items, high dollar value items, issued pieces of equipment, and supplies. This table should spur thought it’s not a final list. Follow your own unit SOP guidelines.

Table A-2. Precombat checks and precombat inspection checklist example