Section 2 – Conduct of the March

2-32. The conduct of the march must be flexible to changing conditions and responsive to the commander. This section addresses the conditions surrounding the foot march, Soldier and leader engagement, march security, supporting enablers, and contingencies for reaction to enemy contact. It concludes with a discussion of cognitive load, the combination of the relevant, intrinsic, and extraneous information present during the execution of a Soldier’s or leader’s task.

Limited Visibility March

2-33. Tactical conditions surrounding a foot march may require a limited visibility march. Limited visibility marches are characterized by close formations, difficult control and reconnaissance, and a slower rate of march. Units routinely operate during limited visibility and must be prepared to maneuver against an enemy under all conditions. During limited visibility, increases in control and risk reduction measures enable the march. Though the same general techniques addressed above for tactical road marches and approach marches apply, the following paragraphs address conditions and activities unique to these marches.

Tactical Movement

2-34. Prior to tactical movement, commanders and staffs gather intelligence on the proposed march route. Commanders and staffs conduct mission analysis to determine the control, navigation, and security measures required to conduct the movement under limited visibility conditions.

Control

2-35. When visibility is poor, several methods aid in control during movement:

• Leaders move closer to the front.
• Units reduce speed.
• Units use luminescent tape on personnel and equipment.
• Leaders reduce the intervals between Soldiers and units.
• Leaders conduct headcounts often.
• Units increase the number of guides and CPs to ensure units remain on the correct route.

Navigation

2-36. While navigating during limited visibility, units use the same techniques as during daylight, but leaders exercise more care to keep the unit oriented. Leaders must be able to control and navigate the unit to maintain security and movement during limited visibility.

Security

2-37. As with any operation, leaders consider which security measures to employ and when to employ them to mitigate risk, such as—

• Using forward and flank security elements to provide early warning for the main body.
• Enforcing strict noise and light disciplines.
• Using radio silence when possible.
• Using camouflage.
• Using terrain to avoid detection by enemy surveillance or night-vision devices.
• Making frequent listening halts; conducting stop, look, listen, and smell.
• Masking sounds of movement by taking advantage of rain, wind, and nearby flowing water when possible.

Disadvantages

2-38. Disadvantages during a march under limited visibility may include—

• Difficulty in navigation.
• Slower rate of march.
• Difficulty in recognizing CPs.
• Difficulty in controlling subordinate units.
• Difficulty in maintaining the proper interval between units.
• Reduced support by aviation.
• Difficulty in reacting to enemy contact.
• Difficulty with MEDEVAC and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
• Ineffective unmanned aircraft system (UAS) coverage.

Advantages

2-39. Advantages during a march under limited visibility may include—

• Increased security.
• Tighter formations.
• Less traffic at night.
• Use of surprise and stealth.
• Better concealment.
• Cooler temperatures during hot and humid conditions.

Increased Control Measures

2-40. Unit SOPs should reflect increased control measures when movement is conducted during limited visibility. Items may include—

• Assigning colors to march units, may be used on flashlights, strobe lights, or other lighting means for recognition.
• Closing the intervals between elements of the column.
• Increasing the use of connecting files between march units in the serial.
• Monitoring radios closely.
• Increasing radio traffic during limited visibility to ensure shared understanding across echelons.

2-41. Control is increased by reducing distances between Soldiers and units. The number of guides can be increased, depending on suitability of roads, trails, or METT-TC (I). Consistent with light discipline, visual communication means such as flashlights, lanterns, luminous markers, lasers, and pyrotechnics are used.

Risk Reduction Measures

2-42. Depending on the mission variables of METT-TC (I) or unit SOPs, limited visibility marches may require risk reduction measures to reduce the level of risk. Risk reduction measures may include—

• Using friendly force identification marking SOPs to prevent fratricide.
• Using trails or routes not used by vehicles.
• Placing guards to the front and rear of columns and on flanks when vehicles could approach from those directions. Ensure road guards are equipped, marked, and informed of the enemy situation.
• Marking moving or static traffic guards and other key personnel, if the tactical situation permits, with reflective or luminescent materials such as reflective fabric or tape, vests, caps, mittens, helmet bands, and traffic ensembles.
• Warning vehicle operators of the presence of Soldiers on or near the roadway and limit speeds, as needed.
• Ensuring vehicles use limited visibility lights if mission requirements allow.
• Dictating ammunition ball-to-tracer ratio for aid in target acquisition during contact as per unit SOPs or mission requirements.
• Providing the exclusive use of selected routes by foot Soldiers. Enforcing safety measures when Soldiers are assigned exclusive use of routes that are negotiable by wheeled or tracked vehicles.

Soldier and Leader Engagement

2-43. Foot marches occur under conditions and in environments in which people live, increasing the likelihood of interactions with indigenous populations. Soldier and leader engagement is an information related capability at every unit’s disposal that seeks to ensure these interactions shape the current situation favorably and support the commander’s intent. More specifically, these interactions—

• Enable Soldiers to obtain combat information of immediate value.
• Build rapport, trust, and understanding with the populace.
• Increase understanding and situational awareness of the immediate surroundings.

2-44. Soldier and leader engagements require clear guidance in the form of SOPs on ways to effectively interact with the local populace, as well as thorough planning and preparation. For example, an important element of planning is determining whether an interpreter is required for the foot march. Preparation involves rehearsing Soldier and leader engagements using realistic and probable scenarios that the foot march may encounter. (See FM 3-53 for additional information.)

March Security

2-45. During the march, units maintain security through observation, orientation, dispersion, concealment, electromagnetic signature/emission control, noise, and light discipline, and camouflage. Leaders assign sectors of observation and orientation to Soldiers to create 360 degrees of coverage. Throughout the movement, elements are oriented on specific sectors. Lead elements of a march unit cover the front, following elements cover alternate flanks, and the last elements cover the rear. (See ATP 3-21.8 chapter 3 for additional information.)

Air and Missile Defense

2-46. March, as well as movement, air and missile defense planning considerations continue to apply to units during foot marches, like in any other operation. Air and missile defense sensors and command and control (C2) elements external to the unit provide early warning against aerial and missile attack and populate the unit’s common operational picture. Soldiers train in aircraft recognition and rules of engagement (ROE) due to multiple factions using the same or similar aircraft, to include international and private organizations employing their own or charter civilian aircraft and Group 1 and 2 UASs. (See ATP 3 01.8 for additional information on air and missile defense and ATP 3-01.81 for additional information on counter-UAS measures.)

Note. See ATP 3-01.15 for information on the tactics, techniques, and procedures for an integrated air defense system. See ATP 3-01.50 for information on the operations of the air defense and airspace management cell within the brigade combat team fire support cell. (See FM 3-96 for additional information.)

2-47. Counter-rocket and artillery batteries, and counter-mortar firing elements may be located in or near the unit’s AO to support its operations. Battery sensors detect incoming rockets, artillery, and mortar shells and may be used to detect Group 1 and 2 UASs. The battery’s fire control system predicts the flight path of incoming rockets and shells, prioritizes targets, and activates the supported AO’s warning system according to the established ROE. Exposed elements within the AO can then take cover and provide cueing data that allow the battery’s weapon system to defeat the target before the target impacts the area. The commander clearly defines command and support relationships between counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar elements and the unit during planning. (See ATP 3-01.60 for additional information on counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar fires and ATP 3-01.81 for additional information on counter-UAS measures.)

2-48. Commanders and subordinate leaders ensure all passive and active air defense measures are well planned and implemented, to include scanning for any hostile small-unmanned aircraft systems. (See Battle Drill-React to Aircraft While Dismounted-Platoon [07-PLT-D8015].). Passive measures include use of concealed routes and assembly areas, movement on secure routes, marches at night, increased intervals between elements of the columns, dispersion between Soldiers, using terrain to mask movement, and slowing or stopping movement to eliminate dust signature. Air guard duties assigned to specific Soldiers during dismounted (or mounted) movements and marches give each a specific search area. For movements and marches, seeing the enemy first gives the unit time to react. Leaders understand that scanning for long periods decreases the Soldier’s ability to identify enemy aircraft. During extended or long marches and movements, Soldiers are assigned air guard duties in shifts. Units take passive measures unless or until threat aircraft are within range of assigned or attached weapons, at which time when threatened they take active measures. Active measures primarily involve engaging threat aircraft with a high volume of fires with the appropriate lead applied. Active measures include use of organic and attached weapons according to the operation order and unit SOP. (See ATP 3-21.8, ATP 3-21.10, and ATP 3-21.20 for additional information on movements.) Additional passive air defense measures include—

• Use of cover and concealment for stationary vehicles.
• Use of camouflage to conceal reflective surfaces.
• Use of cover and concealment during temporary stops and extended halts.
• Nonengagement of passing aircraft unless it assumes an attack profile.
• Establishment of air warning system.
• Establishment of immediate action drills.

Countering Unmanned Aircraft System Threats

2-49. Companies and below take the concept of protection developed at battalion and implement it. Their main focus during troop leading procedures is reacting to air contact battle drills. Leaders at company and below conduct rehearsals and examine their unit’s active and passive measures. Rehearsals check things such as air guard locations, assigned sectors, UAS reporting procedures, communication plans, air defense warning status, weapons control status (WCS), engagement criteria, and threat UAS identification.

Note. The company commander and its subordinate leaders should assume the company is being observed by the enemy through reconnaissance forces, surveillance assets, and targeting systems, and not assume they are under a protective umbrella of friendly air and missile defense units. UASs (both military and civilian off the shelf) are everywhere and accessible to any one individual or organization. While not all hostile air threats require engagement using air defense measures from air and missile defense units, there is still a requirement to detect, identify and be prepared to counter and defeat all classes of UASs. (See ATP 3-01.81 for classifications and additional information on counter-UASs.)

2-50. Understanding that planning is the first step toward effectively countering UAS threats. Neutralizing the UAS threat requires a combined arms approach that employs capabilities from all the warfighting functions. Effective planning synchronizes activities across echelons and warfighting functions to ensure complementary and redundant capabilities. Planning considerations are part of a coherent planning structure that includes—

• Layered approach.
• ROE.
• Airspace control.
• Air defense warning condition.
• WCS.
• Early warning network.
• Prioritized protection list.
• Warnings.

Layered Approach

2-51. A layered defense provides multiple engagement opportunities, ideally beginning at the maximum range from friendly forces and areas, and before any attacking UAS can release its weapons. A layered defense normally includes support by necessary space, surface, and airborne early warning, detection and tracking assets.

Rules of Engagement

2-52. Commanders have the responsibility to take whatever action is necessary to protect their forces and equipment against attack and ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with established ROE. A unit can push engagement authority of threat system UAS lower, but they balance the risks of a quicker response with the potential for fratricide.

Airspace Control

2-53. Divisions and brigades distribute the airspace coordination order, the unit airspace plan, and the current air picture via C2 systems that subordinate units have access to. This includes systems such as the CP computing environment or the joint battle command-platform. Not all brigades and battalions have access to the tactical airspace integration system which is the C2 system that manages the air picture, forward area air defense C2, or air and missile defense early warning systems. Subordinate units without air defense and air management cells or access to these systems, are not capable of maintaining awareness of the current friendly air picture and rely on those echelons with those systems to share and create products they can use.

Air Defense Warning Conditions

2-54. Air defense warning condition is an air defense warning given in the form of a color code corresponding to the degree of air threat probability. Warning conditions are a procedural control used to prepare units based on the assessed threat. Different conditions can be provided for different air threats. Commanders may issue higher, but not lower, conditions for their assigned area. Leaders ensure that every Soldier knows the current air defense warnings.

Weapons Control Status

2-55. WCS is a control measure that establishes the conditions under which air defense weapons (including small arms and crew served weapons) are permitted to engage threats. WCSs can apply to weapon systems, volumes of airspace, or types of air platforms. The tactical situation normally determines the degree or extent of control necessary over weapon systems. The brigade air and missile defense cell either establishes separate WCSs for various air threats, including fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, and UASs or an overall control status for any threat air engagement. The three WCSs for counter-UASs are—

• Weapons free.
  • Engage any UAS that is not positively identified in accordance with ROE as friendly.
  • This is the least restrictive weapon control status.
• Weapons tight—UASs are engaged only when identified as hostile in accordance with ROE.
• Weapons hold.
  • Units may fire only in self-defense or when ordered by proper higher authority.
  • This is the most restrictive weapon control status.

Early Warning Network

2-56. As part of their counterreconnaissance efforts, all units establish an air threat early warning network. This network is usually over frequency modulation (FM) and is a means of sharing air threat situational understanding for units without dedicated air defense C2 systems. These networks alert everyone. Units practice relaying information using this network to reduce the time required to notify everyone.

Prioritized Protection List

2-57. Normally, the company receives a prioritized protection list (developed at brigade and battalion echelons) to help prioritize the use of assigned or allocated protection capabilities. The prioritized protection list provides focus on defending critical assets such as C2 nodes or logistics areas as part of the overall protection plan. Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, or materials.

Warnings

2-58. Once an air threat is detected, all friendly forces need to be quickly warned. This can happen by two methods-a top-down approach, or a bottom-up approach. Small UAVs are typically detected by forward units first, so rehearsing the use of the unit early warning net and rehearsals from the bottom-up are critical. No matter which approach is used, the information is passed using the size, activities, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) report format. Receipt of this report should trigger additional follow-on actions for all units. These follow-on actions could be for units to freeze in place or engage with lethal or non-lethal means. When possible, units detecting air threats alert adjacent units. Table 2-1 on page 38 shows some additional information to collect on unknown UAS and to include in a SALUTE report. (See ATP 3-01.81 for additional information.)

Halts

2-59. During extended marches, halts are necessary to rest personnel, adjust movement schedules, reorganize march elements, and if applicable service vehicles. The movement order or OPORD or unit SOPs regulate(s) when to take halts and addresses actions for various types of scheduled and unscheduled halts for security, rest, and maintenance. During halts, march elements normally clear the march route and move to a previously selected assembly area to prevent route congestion and to avoid being a lucrative target. March elements establish local security and take additional measures as required to protect the force.

Scheduled Halts

2-60. The commander schedules halts generally with all units in the column halted at the same time. Preplanned halts along march routes are scheduled for maintenance and rest or to follow higher headquarters’ movement order. A scheduled halt is located on concealed and defensible terrain. During scheduled halts, Soldiers move off to the sides of the road while maintaining march dispersion. Local security, including at least one observation post for each platoon, is established immediately. Observation posts should not be established outside small arms range and should be readily retrievable, so the unit is ready to move at a moment’s notice.

2-61. Extended marches during daylight hours should end early enough to provide Soldiers with rest and time to prepare for the next day’s activities. Midday heat or enemy action can require units to make long day halts or night marches. At long halts, each unit moves to a planned location near the march route and follows guidelines given in the movement order or OPORD or unit SOPs. Leaders inspect Soldiers and equipment during halts, and medics or combat lifesavers (CLSs) administer medical treatment to those who need it. Regardless of what happens, all-around security must be maintained.

2-62. Under normal conditions, a 15-minute halt provides an opportunity for Soldiers to adjust loads after the first 45 minutes of marching. Depending on the situation, following the first halt, a 10-minute halt maybe enforced for every 50 minutes of marching. Commanders, in conjunction with higher headquarters, determine when halts are required based on terrain, enemy contact, and combat effectiveness due to fatigue. Variations of time schedules are required if a halt occurs when passing through built-up areas, or when cover and concealment are required but not available. Variations in the time schedules should be kept to a minimum if possible.

Note. Depending on the situation, at the halfway point through an extended march, a 15-minute stop may be taken in which all Soldiers alternate changing socks and powdering feet. Soldiers may also alternate removing or loosening gear and sitting or lying with their feet elevated.

Unscheduled Halts

2-63. Unscheduled halts may be caused by unforeseen actions or developments such as obstacles, traffic congestion, or equipment failure. During short halts, the march column’s initial priority is to establish local security. Short halts typically take 1 or 2 minutes. Soldiers seek immediate cover and concealment and take a knee. Long halts typically take more than 2 minutes. Soldiers should assume prone positions behind cover and concealment. Leaders ensure Soldiers have clear fields of fire and assign sectors of fire. When an extended halt is anticipated, the march column establishes a hasty perimeter defense.

Obstacles

2-64. If possible, obstacles reported by reconnaissance, or another forward element are bypassed. If an obstacle cannot be bypassed, the lead march unit assumes a hasty defense to provide overwatch while the obstacle is reduced. Follow-on march units move slower or move off the road establishing a hasty perimeter with 360-degree security, then closely monitors the command net for further orders.

Overwatch

2-65. Overwatch positions are identified during mission planning. Key terrain identified to provide overwatch, often located at higher elevations, enables security through areas of possible enemy contact. To compensate for the increased vulnerability of compressed formations, units make maximum use of multiple routes coupled with the security provided by an overwatching element. Overwatch elements provide security from potential ambushes along routes whenever possible and when danger to the march is imminent. Return march routes should be varied to increase security, to include the return movement of the overwatch element.

Camouflage, Noise, and Light Discipline and Emission Control

2-66. The march is visible to enemy forces and target acquisition capabilities on every spectrum, including visible light, sound, and across the electromagnetic spectrum. The march commander and subordinate leaders must take steps to eliminate or minimize all these signatures to prevent targeting. Natural or artificial materials may be used as camouflage to confuse, mislead, or evade the enemy. Leaders ensure all elements abide by strict execution of noise (this includes carried equipment) and light discipline and emissions control (for example, thermal and electronic). Infrared lights can provide additional illumination when necessary; however, peer threat forces can easily detect it. Radios and other C2 systems all emit detectable signatures and must be used carefully; for instance, minimizing transmissions, reduced power settings, masking signals with terrain, and so forth, can help reduce the likelihood of detection. Cell phones must not be used under any circumstances. (See ATP 3-21.8 for a detailed discussion.)

Communications

2-67. The ability to communicate during the march is essential. Radio nets must be established to link the march commander with higher headquarters, fire support, reconnaissance, quartering party, main body march units, and trail party. Within the march column or serial, each march element may utilize its own control net. Commanders and subordinate leaders ensure Soldiers follow the movement order or OPORD and unit SOPs. Communications techniques, such as voice and signal, must be established and rehearsed. (See ATP 6-02.53 for additional information.)

2-68. C2 systems are the primary means of communication during marches, but messengers and visual signals may be used. Messengers pass information from one march unit to another. Visual communication means include flashlights, lasers, luminous markers, panel sets, flags, pyrotechnics, smoke, and arm and hand signals. The use and meaning of visual signals are standardized to avoid misunderstandings. The movement order or OPORD and unit SOPs contain(s) instructions for their use in specific situations.

2-69. When radio silence is in effect, guides are needed to control rate of march, units, and their intervals. When used, road guides should be given enough information to control movement. Sound communications used by road guides and other leaders include voice, whistles, and horns, which can be used to assemble Soldiers upon the completion of halts or to warn Soldiers of an enemy air attack or CBRN hazards. Sound signals normally are standardized and can be included in unit SOPs. If units are operating in a communication degraded environment, they may become necessary.

2-70. In an environment where every transmission is potentially targeted, the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (also called PACE) plan enables both mission success and survivability. To be effective, the PACE plan must be understood and rehearsed by every participant. The PACE plan is a communication plan that exists for a specific mission or task, not a specific unit, as the plan considers both intra- and inter unit sharing of information. The march commander’s ability to exercise C2 during a movement can suffer due to communication systems not working properly or otherwise unavailable.

Scheme of Fires

2-71. Scheme of fires is the detailed, logical sequence of targets and fire support events to find and engage targets to support the commander’s objectives (JP 3-09). The march commander and staffs integrate and synchronize indirect fires, Army aviation attack and reconnaissance units (manned and unmanned) and/or organic or tasked echelon-specific UAS firing platforms, and close air support (CAS) to support the march. The march commander ensures targets and fire support events are planned for each march unit to counter likely enemy obstacles and ambushes and support planned engagement areas. Depending on what other mission is being supported, the march column or serial may not have priority of fires during movement. Internal fire support means are always planned for regardless of external fire support. The scheme of fires is rehearsed to ensure coverage throughout movement.

Indirect Fire

2-72. Indirect fire targets along the route are planned on probable locations of enemy attempts to attack the movement. Call for fire is a standardized request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target (FM 3-09). Table 2-2 contains the data necessary for obtaining the required artillery and mortar fire on a target. The ability for artillery and mortars to engage targets on reverse slopes and areas of defilade is a tremendous advantage, especially during marches in adverse terrain. As with other operations, employing indirect fires in adverse terrain and climate does have its challenges. (See FM 3-09 for additional information.) Unique challenges include—

• Unpredictable weather conditions affecting accuracy of rounds.
• Targets located on peaks and steep terrain, making adjustments difficult.
• Intervening crests requiring placement of observers on dominating heights for overwatch.
• Limited terrain suitable for firing positions to cover a particular movement.
• Artillery and mortar locations ideal for range and coverage unsuitable due to intervening adverse terrain features.
• Locations tactically positioned but in an area with difficult or limited access.
• Shifting artillery mortar assets to alternate locations requiring significant time and engineering and logistical efforts.
• Marches typically take place in rear areas or in AO assigned to units other than the march unit.
• When marches are held in rear areas or other AOs, march units must be aware of extra steps and adjacent unit coordination’s required to execute clearance of fires drills.

Army Aviation

2-73. Army aviation attack targets are planned on probable locations of enemy attack along the march route. Army aviation call for fire is a coordinated attack by Army attack aircraft against enemy forces in close proximity to march units. Army aviation call for fire (see figure 2-4 on page 42) is not synonymous with CAS flown by joint and multinational aircraft. Terminal control from ground units or controllers is not required due to aircraft capabilities and enhanced situational understanding of the aircrew. Depending on the enemy situation, Army aviation attack units can be on station during times when contact is most likely to occur. Air-ground integration ensures frequencies are known and markings are standardized to prevent fratricide. (See ATP 3-04.1 for additional information.)

2-74. During call for fire, the flight lead must have direct communication with the on-scene ground commander to provide direct fire support. After receiving the call for fire brief from ground forces, pilots must be able to positively identify friendly location before engagement. Once the crew has identified enemy and friendly locations, flight leads formulate an attack plan and brief the supported commander and their other attack team members.

Limitations

2-75. Major limitations for use of attack aircraft include—

• Number of aircraft available: sorties are often limited and in high demand in combat operations.
• Time needed to get aircraft on station: available aircraft may be too far away or have to take a lengthy indirect route to be effective.
• Weather conditions: current or pending adverse weather conditions may ground aircraft.
• Elevation restrictions:
  • High mountain ridges may be at an elevation restricting movement of rotary-wing aircraft across them.
  • Simply getting aircraft to target areas may be restricted if available aircraft are on the other side of mountains with ridges above certain altitudes.
• Rearming and refueling.
  • Travel time to locations may be lengthy and use substantial amounts of fuel.
  • This reduces time on station for the aircraft and requires refueling.
  • Locations for rearming and refueling may be some distance away.

Marking and Identifying Locations and Targets

2-76. Ground units must ensure aircraft have positive identification of friendly unit locations and enemy targets. There are various ways to mark locations or targets. The effectiveness of vision systems on helicopters compared to those found on ground vehicles may differ. During the day, vision systems of the AH 64 allow accurate identification of targets.

2-77. During periods of limited visibility, resolution is greatly degraded, requiring additional methods of verification. This situation requires extra efforts from both ground units and aviation elements. Thermal, optical, and radar acquisition devices enable positive identification. Both aviation and ground forces might become overloaded with tasks in battle. Simple, positive identification must be established and known to all.

Marking of Friendly Forces

2-78. A method of target identification is direction and distance from friendly forces. Friendly forces can mark their own positions with infrared strobes, infrared tape, night-vision goggle lights, smoke, signal panels, body position, meal, ready to eat (MRE) heaters, chemical lights, and mirrors. Marking friendly positions is the least desirable method of target location information because it can reveal friendly positions to the enemy.

Marking of Enemy Forces

2-79. Target marking aids aircrews in locating targets the unit in contact desires to attack. The ground commander provides target marking whenever possible. Methods for marking targets include, but are not limited to, laser handover, tracer fire, marking rounds (flares or mortars), or laser target marker. To be effective, marking must be timely, accurate, and easily identifiable. Target markings might be confused with other fires on the battlefield, suppression rounds, detonations, and marks on other targets. Although marking is not mandatory, it improves aircrew accuracy, enhances situational awareness, and reduces risk of fratricide.

Unmanned Aircraft System Employment

2-80. When feasible, echelon-specific UAS employment provides an information collection (specifically reconnaissance and surveillance) capability prior to the march. UAS employment enables situational awareness during the march and can monitor and track movement in areas of key interest. Commanders use a UAS prior to and during the march—

• To gain knowledge on known or suspected enemy locations.
• To reconnoiter an area, route, or zone.
• To observe or monitor otherwise unobservable areas (such as defilade, cracks, crevices, and other concealed areas).
• To provide security and fires (echelon-specific UAS [to include firing] platform).
• To disrupt enemy radio communications.
• To deceive or divert the enemy.

2-81. UAS capabilities from higher echelons may be available for battalion-level and below operations, though coordination is generally required well in advance. Often these systems are used for preplanned operations rather than opportunity type missions and require 72- to 96-hour pre-coordination. The employment of echelon specific UAS platforms (for example, organic or tasked to the Infantry rifle company) depends on the situation. Employment advantages and disadvantages at each echelon, as with any capability, determine the system’s employment

2-82. Conditions affecting UAS employment include rain, fog, snow, wind, and other weather-related situations. Systems are easily detected and are prone to interference from enemy jamming. When other aviation assets are operating in the area, ground forces must alert aerial platforms controllers to the current location and altitude of tactically operated UASs. Coordination and communication with higher headquarters ensure aircrews are alerted to airspace restrictions as they arise for UAS use.

2-83. In mountainous terrain, where weather conditions can vary abruptly and easily crash UASs, commanders may decide the risk of loss is too great to warrant their employment. Depending on mission requirements, downed systems may have to be recovered. The recovery of a downed UAS in adverse terrain can be slow and arduous and expose recovery teams to enemy actions. (See ATP 3-04.1 for additional information.)

Close Air Support

2-84. Close air support is air action by aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (JP 3-09.3). Units with a reasonable expectation of conducting terminal attack control need to have certified joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) available. In rare circumstances, the ground movement commander might require CAS when a JTAC or forward air controller (airborne) is not available, but detailed integration with friendly forces’ fire and movement is still required. Aircrew executing CAS under these circumstances bear increased responsibility for the detailed integration required to minimize fratricide normally done by a JTAC/forward air controller (airborne). In these circumstances, the CAS aircrew assists the ground movement commander to the greatest extent possible to bring fires to bear. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)

Note. Although Army aviation does not consider its aircraft a CAS system, it can conduct attacks employing CAS joint tactics, techniques, and procedures when operating in support of non-U.S. Army forces.

Scheme of Engineer Operations

2-85. Engineers review the movement order or OPORD to assist in conveying the scheme of engineer operations required to support the march. Assignment of engineering tasks prior to the march effectively addresses classification of the route and provides information useful in the engineer estimate. Similarly, the engineer estimate effectively addresses efforts to provide information useful in classification of the route. (See FM 3-34 for additional information.)

2-86. Geospatial engineering is focused on improving the march commanders understanding of the terrain the route covers. Geospatial engineering is the foundation that supports the combat and general engineering and the lines of engineer support for the march. Geospatial engineering teams can provide information on soil conditions, vegetative concealment, and terrain masking along march routes to facilitate movement and the survivability of the force.

2-87. Engineer reconnaissance includes tactical and technical engineer support to the march. Engineer reconnaissance, like CBRN and other technical applications, is the focused application of unique capabilities supporting reconnaissance operations and is applicable to the march. Engineer reconnaissance generated from and organized by engineer lines of efforts provides a range of technical reconnaissance capabilities. Each line supports varying degrees of technical expertise and efforts to the march. (See ATP 3-34.81 for additional information.)

En Route Sustainment

2-88. Based on the march method and route used, the commander may have to pre-position sustainment assets to conduct rapid and efficient resupply and maintenance. Generally, a column formation is the easiest march technique to support. Any other formation requires increased sustainment planning. Movements during limited visibility require special preparations to include marking units and Soldiers, and equipment for easy identification by friendly forces and positioning units and Soldiers more closely together. The march commander can relieve sustainment shortfalls by using aerial resupply or ordering external forces to establish support areas along the route when feasible. The following paragraphs address specific en route sustainment considerations for the march.

Messing En Route

2-89. While on the march Soldiers can be fed by their organizational field feeding capabilities or by transient messes. For organizational mess, the march commander uses organic capabilities to feed, such as battlefield kitchens or MREs. According to unit SOPs, units may establish transient field feeding sites along the march route. Units must maintain local security and be prepared to react to contact when establishing field feeding sites in the event of an enemy attack.

Disposing of Human Waste

2-90. During short halts, Soldiers use a brief relief bag or cathole latrine. The cathole latrine is dug about 1 foot (30 centimeters) deep and wide, and it is completely covered and packed down after use. In temporary assembly areas (1 to 3 days), the straddle trench latrine is used unless permanent facilities are provided. When setting up a temporary camp or operating base, a deep pit latrine and urine soakage pits are usually constructed. Alternate devices, which may be used to dispose of human waste on marches, are burnout, mound, bored-hole, or pail latrines. The burnout latrine is the preferred method for improvised devices. If possible, urinals should be provided in these facilities to prevent soiling toilet seats. The number of latrines is based on one commode or urinal per 25 male Soldiers and one commode per 17 female Soldiers.

2-91. Human waste disposal facilities are required when discussing proper disposal of human waste during movements. The two categories of human waste disposal facilities are latrines and urinals. The type of human waste disposal facility selected for use depends upon how long the unit remains in one place. The primary human waste disposal type is a chemical toilet. When chemical toilets are not available, improvised facilities are used. Usually the longer the stay, the more sophisticated the facility. However, other considerations such as the tactical situation, weather, ground conditions, and local environmental laws apply. (See ATP 4-25.12 for additional information.)

Maintenance En Route

2-92. En route maintenance for vehicles (when required) is performed by the driver and by mechanics in the trail party during a tactical road march. When repairs are beyond a driver’s capability maintenance elements in the trail party or within the main body are available for assistance. Drivers always perform normal preventive maintenance at halts. Maintenance personnel in trail party elements are used to carry out all unit level repairs on vehicles during the march. If vehicles can be repaired quickly, then repairs should be attempted. If they cannot be repaired quickly vehicles are towed or recovered. Vehicles undergoing repairs or those being abandoned or destroyed are moved off the road. When vehicles are disabled during a march—

• Driver pulls the disabled vehicle off the road and signals other vehicles to pass.
• Assistant driver and passengers dismount and take-up defensive positions.
• Driver tries to repair vehicle.
• Trail party officer notifies the march commander of disabled vehicles and recovers or destroys them depending on the tactical situation.
• Recovery crew limits vehicle recovery operations to those situations where tow bars may not work (use tow bars when possible).
• Recovery crew does not obstruct roads during recovery operations.
• Recovery crew does not destroy equipment unless directed to do so through command channels or as a last resort to prevent enemy capture.

Note. All sensitive items and equipment must be recovered before the destruction of the vehicle.

Refueling En Route

2-93. Requirements for refueling are based on the normal operating range of march vehicles. The operating range is the normal distance vehicles can travel on a full tank of fuel. The operating range varies according to terrain, vehicle, and load. Heavily loaded vehicles operating on poor roads in hilly terrain get less fuel mileage than lightly loaded vehicles operating on ideal roads in fairly level terrain. Use vehicles with the worst fuel operating range to determine when to refuel. This practice prevents vehicles with the worst fuel operating range in the march from running out of fuel.

2-94. Drivers and vehicle commanders always should know their vehicle fuel level and consumption. If their vehicle loads permit, extra full gas cans should be carried on vehicles. As a general rule, every vehicle in the march should have at least one full 5-gallon gas can as part of its load. Unit SOPs might dictate otherwise. If vehicles are used during the march, refueling is a vital area covered in the movement order or OPORD.

Medical Support En Route

2-95. The march commander must consider medical support based on the mission, distance of the march, and likelihood of enemy contact. Medical support can be provided by organic medical personnel assisted by trained CLSs or by attachment of medical teams to march units by higher headquarters. Normally, MEDEVAC frequencies are established in the movement order or OPORD.

2-96. Always transport casualties to the nearest medical treatment facility, casualty collection point, or other site where medical personnel are located. Over evacuation occurs routinely unless controls are implemented to manage casualties by patient category. Responsive evacuation is extremely important but must be executed following MEDEVAC precedence criteria and available resources. (See ATP 4-02.2 for additional information.)

Actions on Contact

2-97. Actions on contact a process to help leaders understand what is happening and to take action (FM 3-90). Leaders plan and prepare for actions Soldiers take after any form of contact. Restrictive terrain often causes deviations from actions normally taken on ideal terrain where maneuverability is easier, and options are greater. March units plan for actions on contact that include options for maneuver based on restrictive or severely restrictive terrain along the route. During marches in restrictive or severely restrictive terrain, protection from unexpected contact can be enhanced through employment of an overwatch element when possible and conditions allow. Actions on contact are—

• React.
• Develop the situation.
• Choose an action.
• Execute and report.

Note. Contacts occur when a unit encounters any situation during the march that requires an active or passive response to a threat or potential threat. The nine forms of contact are: direct, indirect, nonhostile, obstacle, CBRN, aerial, visual, electromagnetic, and influence. (Electromagnetic contact includes contact in cyberspace.) Units may experience all forms of contact simultaneously. Leaders always assume that they are in contact with peer threats, particularly electromagnetic contact.

2-98. Leaders should use all available information and intelligence to enhance march operations and unit protection. By planning for actions on contact and changing unit march or movement techniques, when necessary, leaders increase their units’ protection and chances for success. For example, leaders use terrain analysis and intelligence products to determine where and when an enemy ambush is likely to occur to avoid surprise engagements and to gain an offensive advantage.

2-99. When contact is made, leaders need to quickly analyze each situation to determine immediate follow-on actions. Battle drills should be well planned and practiced in advance to reduce the amount of time needed for deciding follow-on actions. Delays in taking appropriate actions unnecessarily increases risk to Soldiers. Because it is extremely important to maintain momentum during the movement, the enemy may attempt to slow or stop friendly unit movement and maneuver by employing ambushes, obstacles, and fires. By developing and refining specific battle drills and tactical SOPs, units can respond quickly and decisively to contact in any terrain. Additional planning considerations and coordination will need to be made prior to the execution of a march when a unit is transiting an AO that is assigned or controlled by a higher echelon or different unit. Depending on the circumstances, coordination with host-nation fire support teams may decrease the response time for fires. (See ATP 3-21.8 for additional information.)

Nonhostile Contact

2-100. Marches create effects in the operational and informational environments. While these effects may be intended for the enemy, they will likely also send a message to the local populace and, possibly, audiences external to the local populace. Therefore, they must be planned and executed so that these effects fully support the commander’s intent.

2-101. Effectively supporting the commander’s intent requires that Soldier actions during a foot march align with the unit’s overall narrative-the sum of all it does, says, and conveys. In some situations, a misspoken word, an uncontrolled action, or an offensive image can ultimately work against the commander’s objective.

Enemy Ambush

2-102. Restrictive or severely restrictive terrain is well suited for enemy ambushes. Enemy ambush sites often include low-lying areas with easily defended entry and exit locations. When planning for the march, leaders need to pay particular attention to terrain that canalizes forces into potential enemy ambush sites. Narrow passes and valleys are often the only routes to travel between locations without using long, indirect routes. An indigenous enemy is particularly aware of these areas and may use them to its advantage. The enemy may observe unit movements on routes used during particular missions and emplace an ambush on the same route if the unit returns.

2-103. The best counterambush technique is to destroy the enemy before friendly forces are exposed in the kill zone. This requires leaders to anticipate possible ambush positions and plan counteractions. Soldiers should be constantly alert for the enemy and any signs of enemy activity such as wires, recently disturbed earth, and movement. If reconnaissance elements identify an enemy ambush site prior to initiation, leaders can plan and call for fires to destroy the enemy or establish support by fire positions to maneuver against the enemy. Considerations for avoiding an enemy ambush include—

• Having an overwatch unit observe friendly movement.
• Using available reconnaissance and surveillance assets, including manned and unmanned aircraft, to monitor enemy activities along the march route.
• Using alternate return routes when possible.
• Avoiding routines or setting patterns.
• Using noise and light disciplines.

Note. Enemy forces may avoid decisive engagements when there is overt CAS.

2-104. While dismounted, counterambush techniques usually consist of actions based on battle drills followed by specific actions quickly planned and executed. Leaders plan and rehearse counterambush actions before the operation. During movement, leaders constantly anticipate enemy contact and visualize their units’ actions on contact. While properly executed battle drills have Soldiers seek cover, return direct fire, and maneuver against the enemy, battle drills usually are not sufficient to destroy a well-prepared enemy. In these cases, initial actions by the Soldiers allow leaders time to develop and execute specific plans to destroy the enemy in detail when necessary. In anticipating reaction to an ambush, leaders should understand—

• Maneuver space may be limited.
• Attempting to break contact may further expose personnel.
• Terrain may restrict follow-on actions.

2-105. When a portion of the march force is mounted, unit actions may be more restricted. Leaders should consider when ambushed, the best course of action may be to return direct fire and break contact. The time it takes to dismount and transition combat power to maneuvering dismounted Soldiers is often more detrimental than breaking contact. Engaging the enemy may expose additional dismounted Soldiers in the kill zone. Ambushes often are initiated from distances or higher elevations. Dismounting and maneuvering on foot to engage enemy forces over steep difficult terrain takes time; gives the enemy chances to escape; and may increase risk to Soldiers. Leaders should consider using indirect fire, Army aviation attack, or CAS to attack the enemy as vehicles move out of contact, when possible.

Enemy Indirect Fire

2-106. Enemy indirect fires may range from mortars to large-caliber artillery, and enemy target acquisition assets may range from hidden observers to small UASs. Enemy forces will use indirect fires to create long range standoff to quickly engage friendly forces and then quickly displace before becoming decisively engaged by friendly direct and indirect fires.

2-107. The enemy may intend to use the same firing positions repeatedly which is both an advantage and a disadvantage. An enemy without adequate indirect fire control can fire accurately from previously used positions. By using the same positions, the enemy can become accustomed to setting up quickly and directly aiming its fires. A disadvantage for the enemy is friendly forces targeting these areas with quick counterfire. As these positions are identified, they should be recorded, templated, and reported as potential enemy firing positions. Leaders can attach mortar sections or squads to units, which makes immediately responsive fires available to leaders on the ground.

2-108. Leaders plan and rehearse actions to counter enemy indirect fires prior to any movement to include using radar zones on likely enemy artillery locations/azimuths, limiting communication windows and electromagnetic signatures, and keeping large formations dispersed along routes to limit exposure to enemy indirect fires. For example, when the situation allows, the march elements in contact immediately counter enemy indirect fires by taking cover and returning direct fire to suppress the firing position when visible. As quickly as possible, the march commander then determines whether to maneuver to attack by assault, attack with air assets or counterfire mortar/artillery, or break contact. (See ATP 3-01.60 for additional information.)

Enemy Sniper

2-109. Based on a sound knowledge of enemy sniper operations and a detailed mission analysis, march units develop sniper countermeasures along the march route. Reaction to enemy sniper fire generally follows the same steps and performance measures for react to direct fire contact (see ATP 3-21.8). The element in contact seeks cover, locates the enemy, and places well-aimed fire on the known enemy sniper position. The element leader assesses the situation and then maneuvers the portion of the element not in contact to kill the sniper or to break contact. March units develop, practice, and enforce use of countersniper immediate action drills, blending both active and passive countermeasures.

Active Countermeasures

2-110. Active countermeasures are those actions march units can initiate to defeat, disrupt, or destroy an enemy sniper. Active countermeasures are largely the same type of operations involved in counter improvised explosive device (IED) measures with additional techniques added as needed. Some include (when possible)—

• Establishing and maintaining observation posts to overwatch the route:
  • To be effective, snipers move into a firing position without detection.
  • Establishing these observation posts prior to movement and briefing observers to watch for anyone with weapons.
  • Pointing out obvious sniper positions.
  • Making sure each observation post is equipped with binoculars, night-vision devices, and thermal sights reduces chances of an enemy sniper moving into a position along the route.
• Clearing and occupying all buildings around CPs and if possible, directly along the route to eliminate potential enemy sniper positions.
• Supplementing ground observation with available manned and unmanned aircraft.
• Maintaining active patrols, especially in areas covering dead space along the route.
• Patrols watching for armed personnel and evidence of personnel moving into and from possible firing positions.

2-111. Active countersniper operations include—

• Engaging enemy sniper.
• Forcing the enemy sniper, once spotted, to displace, surrender, or be killed.
• Using organic or supporting fires to kill, suppress, and obscure the enemy sniper.
• Using smoke or riot control agents to obscure and suppress hostile sniper fires.
• Using organic fires (for example, mortar fires) to overmatch, outrange, or preempt hostile sniper fires.

Passive Countermeasures

2-112. Passive countermeasures protect against an enemy sniper, though the rule when engaging an enemy sniper is to use maximum force against the sniper. Passive countermeasures are used when the engaged force must balance the use of force against collateral damage or ROE. Passive countermeasures employed by the commander include—

• Limiting exposure.
  • Not establishing obvious routines such as issuing equipment or rations in manners causing Soldiers to line up for extended periods or grouping large portions of the chain of command in one area.
  • Not saluting, removing rank insignia, camouflaging, and operating during limited visibility conditions are other helpful actions.
• Wearing protective equipment and wearing it properly, for body armor and advanced combat helmets do not work unless they are worn properly.
• Using armored vehicles when applicable.
• Erecting screens and shields, prior to and after movement, or during extended halts, when applicable.
  • Construct barriers and shields around CPs and observation posts to protect Soldiers.
  • Shields and screens can be used in cantonment areas to block a sniper’s vision to scan for information and targets.
• Denying an enemy sniper use of key terrain.
• Using obscuration employed to screen (blankets, hazes, and curtains) whenever possible.
• Avoiding public displays of leadership functions such as saluting, staff huddles, or having important personnel groups in open areas whenever possible.

Enemy Explosive Device Threats

2-113. Explosive hazards can be a major threat to the march. March commanders should brief personnel on the latest explosive ordnance threat types, usage, and locations along similar routes. Explosive threats can include munitions such as cluster munitions, unexploded ordnance, deliberately placed mines, and IEDs. All Soldiers maintain situational awareness by looking for explosive threats and potential hiding places along the march route. Units should expect to encounter explosive hazards at any time during the march and expect an ambush immediately after the detonation of an explosive. (See ATP 3-34.20 and TM 3-34.82 for more information.)

Planning

2-114. Leaders develop plans to counter explosive hazards. Plans should include pattern analysis of explosive hazards (both friendly and enemy), and allocate enablers to—

• Coordinate with the intelligence officer concerning enemy employment of explosive hazards (to include dud rates).
• Coordinate with the fires officer concerning friendly use of explosives (to include dud rates) and planning for clearing.
• Maintain common operation picture (specifically route status) depicting known and suspected explosive hazards (friendly and enemy).
• Enable engineer planning for clearing explosive hazards.
• Deconflict support requirements and available explosive hazard sweeps.
• Coordinate counter-explosive hazards and route-clearing activities for movement.
• Enable explosive ordnance planning for rendering safe explosive hazards.
• Coordinate the plan with the staff to include the intelligence, operations, protection, sustainment, and electromagnetic warfare sections.
• Recommend movement formations and movement techniques, including preplanned battle drills to react to explosive hazards.
• Identify suspicious or possible explosive hazard employment sites.
• Recognize that identifying explosive hazards will be challenging during darkness and periods of reduced visibility.

Categorization

2-115. Leaders categorize levels of suspicion to determine appropriate responses and resources needed in accordance with the following levels:

• Level 1 (Low)—explosive hazards are unlikely.
• Level 2 (Medium)—explosive hazards are possible, but no evidence exists.
• Level 3 High)—evidence of explosive hazards exists, and unit contact is highly likely.
• Level 4 (Imminent)—explosive hazards have been reported or employed in the AO and contact is expected to be imminent.

Protection and Reporting Explosive Hazards

2-116. Consider enemy positions, areas where friendly fires have been employed and choke points as high-risk areas for explosive hazards. Mark the explosive hazard and establish an exclusion area to protect the force. Submit a 9-line report to request EOD support to render safe the explosive hazard (see FM 6-99).

Counter Improvised Explosive Devise Operations

2-117. Recognition and identification of suspicious activities and objects are critical planning consideration during counter IED operations. Paragraphs 2-117 and 2-118 address key recognition, identification, and protection considerations during the conduct of the march.

Suspicious Activities and Objects

2-118. Suspicious activities and objects that may indicate the presence of an IED include—

• Abandoned or disabled vehicle parked on or near the route.
• Animal-drawn carts or wagons moving on or near the route.
• Signs of tampering, exposed wires, or objects fastened to the back of guardrails.
• Fresh concrete or asphalt work or repair patches on or around route surfaces.
• Suspicious packages, containers, or other foreign objects on or near the route.
• Markings warning locals of IEDs (for example, a blue X painted on a rock).
• Third-party personnel or vehicles attempting to pass or enter the march formation.

Identification

2-119. Leaders identify explosive threats or IEDs and possible emplacement locations by the following characteristics:

• March techniques.
  • Varying routes and times, entering overpasses on one side of the road and exiting out the other.
  • Training weapons on overpasses as the march passes under.
  • Avoiding chokepoints to reduce risk.
• Visibility—early mornings and periods of reduced visibility are especially dangerous since the enemy has better opportunities to emplace explosive devices without being detected.
• Construction methods.
  • Explosive threats may be constructed using mortar shells, artillery projectiles, antitank mines, diesel fuel, rockets, black powder, fertilizer, and chemical explosives.
  • Construction is limited by the enemy’s imagination.
• Camouflage—disguised as loose trash or debris, trash bags, soda cans, milk cans, buckets, burlap bags, and MRE bags.
• Detonation.
  • Command-detonated, victim-activated, or timed.
  • Car alarms, battery powered remote doorbell devices, remote controlled light switches, and cordless and cellular telephones are common means of detonation.
• Communications—insulated wire or detonation cords to connect detonators to explosives.
• Delivery.
  • Dropped from a UAS.
  • Dropped from or attached to underside of overpasses.
  • Soldiers should watch for suspicious activity on overpasses and never stop under one.
• Hiding places.
  • Potholes, abandoned vehicles, dead animal carcasses, or secured to telephone poles and guardrails.
  • Sides of roads, shoulders, median strips, or in numerous other areas.
  • Enemy hide positions usually have line of sight to the kill zone and an easy escape route.

Note. Obtain the latest IED update/indicators during the pre-march brief.

Enemy Air Attack

2-120. When the march makes visual contact first with a hostile aircraft, march elements immediately attempt to conceal themselves from the aircraft. If attacked by hostile aircraft, the march unit in contact quickly assumes a defensive posture, mainly dependent upon the terrain, and immediately engages attacking aircraft with all available weapons. Any portion of the march not in contact occupies covered and concealed positions, assumes a defensive posture, and prepares to support the element in contact. (See ATP 3 21.8 for additional information.)

Chemical Hazards

2-121. When a chemical attack hazard is identified, Soldiers conducting the march immediately perform the following actions:

• Don their protective mask.
• Sound the vocal or nonvocal alarm.
• Conduct immediate decontamination of any exposed contaminated skin with the skin decontamination kit and eyes by flushing with water.
• Assume mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) four.

2-122. Individuals, buddies, crews and unit then conduct—

• Personal wipe down of individual mission essential equipment with the M295 individual equipment decontamination kit.
• Check of their gear for contamination and conduct operator wipe down with a joint service equipment wipe or a sorbent decontamination system of contaminated surfaces that must be touched.
• Identification of the chemical agent using M8 chemical detector paper and M256 detector kit.
• Reporting of the chemical hazard to higher headquarters using the CBRN 1 report.
• Request (if necessary) of operational decontamination support for contaminated equipment.
• Exchange of contaminated mission oriented protective posture gear when a second set of gear and other supplies are available.
• Marking of the contaminated area if contamination is present.
• Request for guidance from higher headquarters.

Note. See ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 3-21.8 for additional information on CBRN hazards and protection.

Cognitive Load

2-123. Cognitive load is the combination of the relevant, intrinsic, and extraneous information present during the execution of a Soldier’s/leader’s task. It is the mental factors that affect the performance of a leader to make sound judgements during an operation. Leaders receive multiple cognitive inputs during the course of a mission, such as the environment, radio traffic, digital inputs, personal interactions, and other stressors that all produce a cumulative cognitive load on leaders. This requires leaders to receive, balance, and filter these inputs.

2-124. Much like the physical load a Soldier/leader carries, the cognitive load a Soldier/leader can handle at any given time varies. The cognitive load capacity cannot be easily measured as opposed to the physical aspect. Many leaders fail to consider its cumulative effects on their Soldiers. (See FM 7-22 for additional information.)

Cognitive Overload

2-125. With the ever-growing presence of technology on the battlefield increasing situational awareness, leaders must be more conscious of the impact those information inputs have on performance. The ability to communicate via multiple voice and data devices is a combat multiplier to a certain point; however, every leader reaches a point where the ability to manage and process incoming and outgoing information begins to impair the leader’s ability to conduct the operation effectively. The number, type, and timing of information flowing to and from the leader should not detract from the leader’s performance on the battlefield.

2-126. Implementing brevity codes, communications windows, and practicing battle drills and SOPs are methods to reduce cognitive load on Soldiers and leaders to enable them to focus more on the mission. It is important to understand the unit’s ability to engage the enemy with maximum effects, while understanding that decision-making, situational awareness, and communications will continue to degrade as fatigue during long movements and/or carrying heavier physical loads affect the unit.

Impacts of Cognitive Load on the Mission

2-127. Impacts of cognitive load on the mission can be excessive cognitive inputs that cause Soldiers and leaders to miss critical information required to accomplish the mission. A decrease in cognitive performance can have dire impacts on the integration and synchronization of critical activities and events. Decreased cognitive performance can increase the risk level of a mission. Maintaining awareness of the Soldier’s cognitive load is critical to ensuring the unit can efficiently and effectively accomplish its mission. While the ability to perform under extreme conditions with reduced rest and rations is admirable, leaders should always consider the physical and cognitive status of the unit when planning and conducting missions under combat conditions to optimize performance on the battlefield. Leaders combine physical and mental aspects that encompass load factors of the unit to accomplish the mission.

Next Page : Section 3 – Duties and Responsibilities for the March