Appendix B - Fire Support Planning

Fire support planning is the continual process of selecting targets on which fires are prearranged to support a phase of the scheme of maneuver. Fire support planning is accomplished concurrently with maneuver planning at all echelons. Leaders conduct fire support planning to suppress, isolate, obscure, neutralize, destroy, deceive, or disrupt known, likely, or suspected targets, and to support the actions of the maneuver forces. Fires are planned for all phases of an operation. This appendix addresses the lethal fires coming from Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) organic indirect fires, Army artillery and aviation assets, and joint and multinational artillery and aviation assets in support of the Infantry rifle platoon. (See ATP 3-21.10 and FM 3-09 for additional information.)

Fire Support Considerations

B-1. Fire support planning starts as soon as the leader receives a mission. Once begun, fire support planning continues through the operation’s completion. The primary aim of fire planning is to develop how fire is to be massed, distributed, and controlled to best support the leader’s scheme of maneuver.

Targeting Categories

B-2. The targeting process can be generally grouped into two categories: deliberate and dynamic. Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets. These targets are known to exist in the area of operations (AO) and have actions scheduled against them. Examples range from targets on target lists in the applicable order, targets detected in sufficient time to place in the joint air tasking cycle and get into the air tasking order, mission-type orders, or fire support plans. Dynamic targeting is targeting that prosecutes targets identified too late or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting (JP 3-60). Dynamic targeting (see ATP 3-60.1) prosecutes targets of opportunity and changes to planned targets or objectives. Targets of opportunity are targets identified too late, or not selected for action in time, to be included in deliberate targeting. Targets engaged as part of dynamic targeting are previously unanticipated, unplanned, or newly detected.

Target Types: Planned Targets And Targets Of Opportunity

B-3. Deliberate targeting prosecutes planned targets. These targets are known to exist in the AO and have actions scheduled against them. The two types of planned targets are scheduled and on-call:

Scheduled targets exist in the AO and are located in sufficient time so that fires or other actions upon them are identified for engagement at a specific, planned time.
On-call targets have actions planned, but not for a specific delivery time. The commander expects to locate these targets in sufficient time to execute planned actions.

B-4. Dynamic targeting prosecutes targets of opportunity and changes to planned targets or objectives. Targets of opportunity are targets identified too late, or not selected for action in time, to be included in deliberate targeting. Targets engaged as part of dynamic targeting are previously unanticipated, unplanned, or newly detected. The two types of targets of opportunity are unplanned and unanticipated:

Unplanned targets are known to exist in the AO, but no action has been planned against them. The target may not have been detected or located in sufficient time to meet planning deadlines. Alternatively, the target may have been located, but not previously considered of sufficient importance to engage.
Unanticipated targets are unknown or not expected to exist in the AO.

Targeting Priorities

B-5. Targeting priorities must be addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. Targeting priorities emphasize the identification of resources and activities the enemy can least afford to lose or that provide the greatest advantage (high-value target) and whose loss will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly COA (high-payoff target). Targeting links desired effects to activities and tasks involving specific fires. For example, a target area of interest is a point or area where the commander can acquire and engage high payoffs. The targeting decisions made are reflected in the following visual products:

The high-payoff target list is a prioritized list of high-payoff targets by phase of the operation.
A high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60).
A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60).

Concept Of Fires

B-6. Fire planning begins with the concept of fires. This essential component of the concept of operations complements the leader’s scheme of maneuver detailing the leader’s plan for direct and indirect preparatory and supporting fires. Fire planning requires a detailed knowledge of weapon characteristics and logistical capabilities of those providing the support. Although leaders may be augmented with personnel to assist in planning and controlling attached or supporting assets, the responsibility for planning and execution of fires lies with the leader. Leaders do not wait to receive the higher headquarters’ plan to begin their own fire planning but begins as soon as possible to integrate fires into concept of operations and concept of operations of the higher headquarters.

Fire Support Teams

B-7. Company fire support team (FIST) headquarters personnel and platoon forward observers (FOs) provide support to subordinate platoons to plan and coordinate all available supporting fires, including mortars, field artillery, naval surface fire support, Army aviation attack, and close air support (CAS) integration. When attached, FISTs provide the platoon with fire support coordination, targeting, input for terminal attack control, and assessment capabilities. FOs are trained to adjust ground or naval gunfire and pass back battlefield information. Effective fires require qualified observers to call for and adjust fires on located targets. FOs, forward air controllers, naval gunfire spotter teams, joint fires observers, and joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) train together and work effectively as a team to request, plan, coordinate, and place accurate fires on targets that create the desired effects. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)

B-8. Additional assets are allocated in either a command or support relationship. An example of a command relationship would be an attachment of a section from the weapons company (reference direct fire support, see note on page 3-39). The leader relies on the senior representative from the organization to provide expertise when planning. An example of a support relationship would be direct support from the artillery battalion or from an aviation attack company. When planning Army aviation attack fires(see paragraph B-64) or CAS from a supporting unit (see paragraph B-74), the leader normally receives someone from that organization to assist them. Attached FIST and JTACs are examples. Developing the concept of fire should be straightforward during deliberate operations because of the ability to conduct reconnaissance, planning, and preparation. However, during hasty operations the unit may have to rely on its internal SOPs and more hands-on control by the leader.

Tactical Uses of Planned Fires

B-9. Fires are used for many different tactical reasons. They include:

Preparatory fire, delivered before an attack to weaken the enemy position. (See ADP 3-90 for additional information.)
Supporting fires (covering fires). Supporting fires enable the friendly maneuver element to move by destroying, neutralizing, or suppressing enemy fires, positions, and observers.
Final protective fire is an immediately available, prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas (JP 3-09.3).
Suppression—temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force of the performance of a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives (JP 3-01). Suppression—in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, renders a target ineffective for a short period of time producing suppression of enemy air defenses at least 3-percent casualties or materiel damage (FM 3-09).
Obscuration—the employment of materials into the environment that degrade optical and/or electro-optical capabilities within select portions of the electromagnetic spectrum in order to deny acquisition by or deceive an enemy or adversary (ATP 3-11.50).
Counterfire (indirect fires only). Counterfire is fire to destroy or neutralize enemy artillery/mortars. These missions normally are controlled at higher level headquarters. Counterfire radars are positioned to maintain radar coverage to ensure continuous coverage during rapid movement forward.
Harassing fire is observed or predicted (unobserved) fire intended to disrupt enemy troop and vehicle movement, disturb their rest, and lower their morale.
Illumination. While obscuration smoke hides friendly movements, illumination exposes enemy formations at night. Utilizing illumination rounds can be effective; however, friendly positions should remain in shadows, and enemy positions should be highlighted.

Echelonment of Fires

B-10. Echelonment of fires is the schedule of fire ranging from the highest caliber munitions to the lowest caliber munitions. The purpose of echeloning fires is to maintain constant fires on the enemy while using the optimum delivery system. As distances between friendly and enemy forces close, echeloning of fires is the principle of reducing the caliber of fires employed, reducing the associated risk. Leaders use risk estimate distance, surface danger zones, and minimum safe distance as per ATP 3-09.32, to manage associated risks. In the defense, triggers are tied to the progress of the enemy as it moves through the AO, enabling the leader to engage the enemy throughout the depth of the AO. In the offense, triggers are tied to the progress of the maneuver element as it moves toward the objective protecting the force and facilitating momentum up to the objective.

Defensive Echelonment

B-11. In defensive missions, echeloning fires are scheduled based on their optimum ranges to maintain continuous fires on the enemy, disrupting the formation and maneuver. Echelonment of fires in the defense places the enemy under increasing volumes of fire as they approach a defensive position. Aircraft and long-range indirect fire rockets and artillery deliver deep supporting fires. Close supporting fires, such as final protective fires (FPFs), are integrated closely with direct fire weapons such as Infantry weapons, tank support, and antiarmor weapon systems. Figure B-1 illustrates an example of defensive echelonment.

Figure B-1. Defensive echelonment of fires

Offensive Echelonment

B-12. In the offense, weapons are scheduled based on the point of a predetermined safe distance away from maneuvering friendly troops. When scheduled, fires provide protection for friendly forces as they move to and assault an objective. They also allow friendly forces to get in close with minimal casualties and prevent the defending enemy from observing and engaging the assault by forcing the enemy to take cover. The overall objective of offensive scheduled fires is to allow the friendly force to continue the advance unimpeded. (See figure B-2 on page B-6.)

Figure B-2. Offensive echelonment of fires

B-13. As an example of echelonment of fires use during the conduct of a mission, consider an operation in which a platoon assaults an enemy position. (See figures B-3 through B-6 on pages B-7 through B-10.) As the lead elements of the unit approach the designated phase line en route to the objective, the leader orders the fire support officer to begin the preparation. Observers track friendly movement rates and confirm them. Other fire support officers in the chain of command may need to adjust the plan during execution based on unforeseen changes to anticipated friendly movement rates.

B-14. As the unit continues its movement toward the objective, the first weapon system engages its targets. It maintains fires on the targets until the unit crosses the next phase line corresponding to the risk estimate distance of the weapon system being fired.

B-15. To maintain constant fires on the targets, the next weapon system begins firing before the previous weapon system ceases or shifts. This ensures no break in fires, enabling the friendly forces’ approach to continue unimpeded. However, if the unit rate of march changes, the indirect fire support system must remain flexible to the changes.

B-16. The fire support officer shifts and engages with each delivery system at the prescribed triggers, initiating the fires from the system with the largest risk estimate distance to the smallest. Once the maneuver element reaches the final phase line, the fire support officer ceases the final indirect fire system or shifts to targets beyond the objective to cease all fires on the objective. Direct fire assets in the form of supporting fires also are maintained until the final assault, then ceased or shifted to targets beyond the objective.

Figure B-3. 81-millimeter mortars begin firing

Figure B-4. 81-millimeter mortars shift, 60-millimeter mortars and supporting fires begin

Figure B-5. 60-millimeter mortars shift

Figure B-6. Supporting fires cease

Fire Planning for the Defense

B-17. In the defense, fires are generally planned in three locations-in front of the unit positions, on the position’s FPFs, and behind positions. To develop a defensive fire plan, the platoon leader within the company defense—

Redefines designation of unit point or area targets and other control measures, such as TRPs, to coordinate the fire when more than one subordinate is firing into the same engagement area or AO.
Masses fires on choke points and key terrain (for example, obstacles, water crossings, and dead space) to canalize, slow, and block the enemy’s movements.
Ensures fires are integrated into the obstacle plan.
Considers the use of obscurants to support the obstacle plan.
Refines and bases fire plans on the commander’s guidance for fires and allocation of resources.
Identifies requirements for positioning primary and alternate observers forward of friendly maneuver forces. Ensures that extraction guidelines are established and understood.
Develops alternate plans in case these FOs are forced to withdraw prior to execution of fire support tasks.
Determines the time needed for all fire support systems to be ready based on the scheme of maneuver. Ensure that these times are met.
Determines how and recommend when to shift the priority of fires. Determine what will be the trigger to shift the priority of fires.
Plans for the use of obscurants during periods of limited visibility to degrade enemy night vision capabilities.
Receives target information from subordinates (normally provided on sector sketches or individual weapon standard range cards).
Reviews target information to ensure fires are equally distributed across the entire unit’s AO and sufficient control measures are established.
Completes the unit’s fire plan and gives sector sketch to the higher headquarters.

Final Protective Line and Final Protective Fire

B-18. Final protective line (FPL) is a line of fire selected where an enemy assault is to be checked by interlocking fire from all available weapons and obstacles. The defending unit reinforces this line (see paragraph A-51) with protective obstacles and with FPFs whenever possible. The FPL consists of all available measures, to include protective obstacles, direct fires, and indirect fires. The FPFs target the highest type of priority targets and takes precedence over all other fire targets. The FPFs differ from a standard priority target in that fire is conducted at the maximum rate until the mortars are ordered to stop, or until ammunition is depleted. If possible, the FPFs should be registered.

B-19. If Soldiers are in well-prepared defensive positions with overhead cover (known as OHC), FPFs can be adjusted close to the friendly positions, just beyond bursting range. If the threat situation warrants it (for example, in the event the friendly position is over run), the unit leader can call for artillery fires right on the unit’s position using proximity or time fuzes for airbursts. Table B-1 on page B-12 shows indirect fire mortar weapon system characteristics being used when planning the FPF.

Table B-1. Normal final protective fires dimensions for each number of mortars

Platoon Fire Planning

B-20. Squad leaders prepare their sketches and submit them to the platoon leader. The platoon leader combines all sectors of fire and sector sketches (and possibly separate standard range cards) to prepare a platoon sector sketch. A platoon sector sketch is drawn as close to scale as possible including a target list for direct and indirect fires. One copy is submitted to the company commander, one copy is given to the platoon sergeant, and one copy is maintained by the platoon leader. At a minimum, the platoon sector sketch should show the elements contained in figure B-7.

Figure B-7. Platoon sector sketch

Squad Fire Planning

B-21. Squad leaders make two copies of their sector sketches. One copy goes to the platoon leader; the other remains at the position. Squad leaders draw sector of fire sketches as close to scale as possible, showing the elements contained in figure B-8 on page B-14.

Figure B-8. Squad sector sketch

Fire Planning for the Offense

B-22. Offensive fire planning follows the same methodology as defensive fire planning within constraints of the situation. The presence of a friendly element requires a baseline of fire support planning and control throughout the entire mission (specifically movement and maneuver) to ensure indirect fire support is effective and efficient.

B-23. Leaders must plan how they will engage known or suspected enemy targets, where friendly suppressive fire may be needed, and how they will control their units’ fires against both planned targets and targets of opportunity. Fire planning should include a thorough analysis of the type of threat expected. This will aid the supporting friendly element in tailoring the weapon and ammunition requirements to suit the situation.

B-24. Offensive fire planning supports four phases: planning and preparation, approach to the objective, actions on the objective, and follow through. The degree of completeness and centralization of offensive fire planning depends on the time available to prepare the offensive. Fires are planned in four locations on the battlefield short of the line of departure (LD)/line of contact (known as LC), LD/LC to the objective, on the objective, and beyond the objective. Table B-2 lists planning considerations for each of the four locations.

Table B-2. Planning considerations

B-25. Offensive fire planning is divided into two categories—preparatory and supporting fires. The concept of fires has artillery and mortars in support of an attack to gain and maintain fire superiority on the objective until the last possible moment. When this indirect fire ceases, the enemy should be stunned and ineffective for a few moments. Take full advantage of this period by executing any or all the following:

Maintaining fire superiority. Small-arms fire from local and internal support by fire is continued as long as possible.
Maneuver elements. Assaulting Soldiers must try to fire as they advance. Troops must observe fire discipline, as in many cases fire control orders will not be possible. They must arrive at the objective with ammunition.
Audacity. Where the ground and vegetation do not prohibit movement, leading sections should move quickly over the last 30 or 40 meters to the enemy positions to minimize exposure.
Combat vehicles. Vehicles used in the attack, or as direct fire support, continue to give close support.

B-26. When planning fires for the offense, leaders verify the fire element’s task organization and ensure their plans coordinate measures for the attack, site exploitation, pursuit, and contingency plans. Leaders develop or confirm with the responsible level authority supporting systems are positioned and repositioned to ensure continuous fires throughout the operation. Mutual support of fire systems promotes responsive support and provides the commanders of maneuver units freedom of action during each critical event of the engagement or battle.

B-27. There exists a diverse variety of munitions and weapon systems, direct and indirect, to support close offensive missions. To integrate direct and indirect fire support, the leader must understand the mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations, and critical tasks to be accomplished. Leaders plan fires to focus on enemy capabilities and systems being neutralized. Critical tasks include:

Softening enemy defenses by delivering preparatory fires.
Suppressing and obscuring enemy weapon systems to reduce enemy standoff capabilities.
Scheduling indirect fires with direct fires to provide protection for friendly forces as they move to and assault an objective.
Deconflicting fires during the approach and assault through the use of restrictive fire lines (RFLs), restrictive fire area, or no fire area.
Continuous in-depth fire support (accomplished by proper positioning of systems), including support by fire and attack by fire positions.
Interdicting enemy counterattack forces, isolating the defending force, and preventing its reinforcement and resupply.

Mortar And Field Artillery

B-28. The majority of fire support to an Infantry rifle platoon is provided by indirect fire support systems of the Infantry rifle company. Indirect fire support systems include mortars and field artillery cannon and rocket fires. (See ATP 3-09.32 for a detailed listing of indirect fire system capabilities and characteristics.) Indirect fire support systems may be under direct command of the maneuver battalion/company or may be in a supporting role. Indirect fire targets during movement are planned on probable locations of enemy attempts to attack the movement. (See ATP 3-21.90 and ATP 3-09.42 for additional information.)

Call For Fire

B-29. Call for fire (see table B-3) is the request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required mortar and artillery fire on a target. The ability for mortars and artillery to engage targets from reverse-slopes and areas of defilade is a tremendous advantage, especially in adverse terrain. As with other operations, employing indirect fires in adverse terrain and climate does have its challenges. (See ATP 3-21.10, ATP 3-09.32, and FM 3-09 for additional information.) Unique challenges include—

Unpredictable weather conditions affecting accuracy of rounds.
Targets located on peaks and steep terrain, making adjustments difficult.
Intervening crests requiring placement of observers on dominating heights for overwatch.
Limited terrain suitable for firing positions to cover a particular movement.
Mortar and artillery locations ideal for range and coverage unsuitable due to intervening adverse terrain features.
Locations tactically positioned but in an area with difficult or limited access.
Shifting mortar and artillery assets to alternate locations requiring significant time and engineering and logistical efforts.

Table B-3. Artillery and mortar call for fire

B-30. Indirect fires must be integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose over the entire concept of operations. Integration means all available assets are planned and used throughout an operation. Synchronization means these assets are sequenced in time, space, and purpose in an optimal manner, producing complementary and reinforcing effects of the maneuver element.

Target Effects Planning

B-31. Not only must indirect fire support planners determine what enemy targets to hit, and when, but also must decide how to attack each enemy target. Leaders should consider all the aspects of target effects when planning fires. Although this section is specific to mortars, the following concepts generally apply to most indirect fires. (See ATP 3-09.32 for additional information.)

High Explosive Ammunition

B-32. When mortar rounds impact, they throw fragments in a pattern never truly circular, and may even travel irregular, based on the round’s angle of fall, the slope of the terrain, and type soil. However, for planning purposes, each mortar high explosive (HE) round is considered to have a circular lethal bursting area. Figure B-9 shows a scale representation of the lethal bursting areas of mortar rounds.

Figure B-9. Comparison of lethal bursting area for U.S. mortar rounds

Note. The bursting radius is the standard method to compare the effectiveness of shells. It is defined as the distance from the bursting point within 50 percent of standing targets will become casualties. The bursting diameter is therefore twice the bursting radius. The above mortar-bursting areas (diameters) are estimations since the type of round, fuze, range, and target surface all affect the mortar’s bursting diameter.

Fuze Setting

B-33. The decision concerning what fuze setting to use depends on the position of the enemy. Exposed enemy troops standing up are best engaged with impact or near surface burst fuze settings. The round explodes on, or near, the ground. Shell fragments travel outward perpendicular to the long axis of the standing target. (See figure B-10.)

Figure B-10. Standing targets

B-34. If exposed enemy troops are lying prone, the proximity fuze setting is most effective. The rounds explode high above the ground, and fragments coming downward are traveling once again perpendicular to the long axis of the targets. (See figure B-11.)

Figure B-11. Prone targets

B-35. The proximity setting is the most effective if the enemy is in open fighting positions without OHC. Even proximity settings will not always produce effects if the positions are deep. (See figure B-12.)

Figure B-12. Targets in open fighting positions

B-36. The delay fuze setting is most effective when the enemy is below triple canopy jungle or in fighting positions with OHC. Light mortars will have little effect against OHC. Even medium mortars have limited effect. Heavy mortars can destroy a bunker, or enemy troops beneath jungle canopy with a hit or near miss. (See figure B-13.)

Figure B-13. Targets beneath triple canopy jungle

Effects of Cover on High Explosive Rounds

B-37. Enemy forces normally will be either standing or prone. They maybe in the open or protected by varying degrees of cover. Each of these changes the target effects of mortar fire.

B-38. Surprise mortar fire is always more effective than fire against an enemy who has been warned and is seeking cover. Recent studies have shown a high casualty rate can be achieved with only two rounds against an enemy platoon standing in the open. The same studies required 10 to 15 rounds to duplicate the casualty rate when the platoon was warned by adjusting rounds and sought cover. If the enemy soldiers merely lay prone, they significantly reduce the effects of mortar fire. Mortar fire against standing enemy forces is almost twice as effective as fire against prone targets.

B-39. Proximity fire is usually more effective than surface-burst rounds against targets in the open. The effectiveness of mortar fire against a prone enemy is increased by about 40 percent by firing proximity-fuzed rounds rather than surface-burst rounds.

B-40. If the enemy is in open fighting positions without OHC, proximity-fuzed mortar rounds are about five times as effective as impact-fuzed rounds. When fired against troops in open fighting positions, proximity-fuzed rounds are only 10 percent as effective as they would be against an enemy in the open. The greatest effectiveness against troops in open fighting positions, the charge with the lowest angle of fall should be chosen. It produces almost two times as much effect as the same round falling with the steepest angle.

B-41. If the enemy has prepared fighting positions with OHC, only impact-fuzed and delay-fuzed rounds will have much effect. Proximity-fuzed rounds can restrict the enemy’s ability to move from position to position, but they will cause few, if any, casualties. Impact-fuzed rounds cause some blast and suppressive effect. Delay-fuzed rounds can penetrate and destroy a position but must achieve a direct hit. Only the 120-mm mortar with a delay-fuze setting can damage a fighting position with 18 inches of OHC (see chapter 5 section VI). This type of fighting position cannot be destroyed by light or medium mortar rounds. Consider use of white phosphorous (WP) to drive enemy personnel out of fighting positions.

Suppressive Effects of High Explosive Mortar Rounds

B-42. Suppression from mortar is not as easy to measure as the target effect. It is the psychological effect produced in the mind of the enemy preventing the enemy from returning fire or carrying on their duties. Inexperienced or surprised Soldiers are more easily suppressed than experienced, warned Soldiers. Soldiers in the open are much more easily suppressed than those with OHC. Suppression is most effective when mortar fires first fall; as they continue, their suppressive effects lessen. HE rounds, when used, are the most suppressive and have a great psychological effect on the enemy. WP is used to ignite and suppress enemy materiel. (See figure B-14 on page B-22.) Examples include if a—

60-mm mortar round lands within 20 meters of a target, the target probably will be suppressed, if not hit.
60-mm mortar round lands within 35 meters of a target, there is a 50 percent chance it will be suppressed. Beyond 50 meters, little suppression takes place.
81-mm mortar round lands within 30 meters of a target, the target probably will be suppressed, if not hit.
81-mm mortar round lands within 75 meters of a target, there is a 50 percent chance the target will be suppressed. Beyond 125 meters, little suppression takes place.
120-mm mortar round (proximity-fuzed) lands within 65 meters of target, the target probably will be suppressed, if not hit. Within 125 meters of a target, there is a 50 percent chance the target will be suppressed. Beyond 200 meters, little suppression takes place.

Note. Because the effects of suppression end almost immediately after the enemy realizes the suppression mission has stopped, friendly forces must be prepared to act (for instance assault) immediately upon achieving suppression of enemy forces.

Figure B-14. Suppressive effects of common U.S. mortar rounds

B-43. Obscuration fires use smoke and WP ammunition to degrade the enemy by obscuring their view of the battlefield. (High explosive ammunition may also obscure their view with dust and fires, but the unit should not rely on it as the primary means.)Mortars only have WP or red phosphorous while artillery has smoke, WP, and red phosphorous. Obscurants are subject to changes in wind direction and terrain contours; therefore, its use must be coordinated with other friendly units affected by the mission. Used properly, obscuration fires can—

Slow enemy vehicles to blackout speeds.
Obscure the vision of enemy direct fire weapon crews.
Reduce accuracy of enemy-observed fires by obscuring observation posts and command posts.
Cause confusion and apprehension among enemy Soldiers.
Limit the effectiveness of the enemy’s visual command and control signals.

B-44. Screening fires are closely related to obscuration fires; they also involve the use of smoke and WP. However, screening fires mask friendly maneuver elements to disguise the nature of their missions. Screening fires may assist in consolidate by placing smoke in areas beyond the objective. They may also be used to deceive the enemy to believe that a unit is maneuvering when it is not. Screening fires require the same precautions as obscuration fires.

B-45. The WP round is used mainly to produce immediate, close point obscuration. It can be used to screen the enemy’s field of fire for short periods, which allows the unit to maneuver against the enemy. The 60-mm WP round is not sufficient to produce along-lasting, wide-area obscurants screen, but the much larger WP round from the heavy mortar is.

B-46. WP rounds generally should not be used solely to produce casualties due to the law of war principle of humanity, which forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose. Unnecessary suffering would be implicated because of the persistent burning WP causes in the wounds it produces and the availability of a superior round for producing casualties, the HE round. While the bursting WP round can produce casualties among exposed enemy troops the casualty producing radius of the WP round is much less than that of the HE round. Generally, more casualties can be produced by firing HE ammunition than by firing WP. A few WP rounds mixed into a fire mission of HE rounds for a valid purpose (that is target marking) may increase the suppressive effect of the fire because of the significant psychological effect a WP burst may have on exposed troops.

B-47. As with other weapons, it is prohibited to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians, or civilian objects, the object of attack by WP. Although bursting WP rounds are not designed to cause casualties, the fragments of the shell casing and bits of burning WP can cause injuries. Inhalation from WP is also a primary hazard once the smoke screen is going in. Feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians must be taken. (See FM 6-27.)

B-48. The WP rounds can be used to mark targets, especially for attack by aircraft. Base-ejecting obscurants’ rounds, such as the 81-mm M819 red phosphorous round, produce a dispersed obscurant cloud, normally too indistinct for marking targets.

B-49. The effects of atmospheric stability can determine whether mortar obscurants are effective at all or, if effective, how much ammunition will be needed:

During unstable conditions, mortar obscurants and WP rounds are almost ineffective the obscurant does not spread but often climbs straight up and quickly dissipates.
Under moderately unstable atmospheric conditions, base-ejecting obscurants’ rounds are more effective than bursting WP rounds. The M819 red phosphorous round of the M252 mortar screens for over 2 and a half minutes.
Under stable conditions, both red phosphorous and WP rounds are effective.
The higher the humidity, the better the screening effects of mortar rounds.

B-50. The M819 red phosphorous round loses up to 35 percent of its screening ability if the ground in the target area is covered with water or deep snow. During extremely cold and dry conditions over snow, up to four times the number of obscurant’s rounds than expected may be needed to create an adequate screen. The higher the wind velocity, the more bursting WP rounds are needed, and less effective burning obscurant’s rounds become.

B-51. If the terrain in the target area is swampy, rain-soaked, or snow-covered, then burning obscurant’s rounds may not be effective. These rounds produce obscurants by ejecting felt wedges soaked in red phosphorous. These wedges then burn on the ground, producing a dense, long-lasting cloud. If the wedges fall into mud, water, or snow, they can be extinguished. Shallow water can reduce the obscurants produced by these rounds by as much as 50 percent. Bursting WP rounds are affected little by the terrain in the target area, except deep snow and cold temperatures which can reduce the obscurant cloud by about 25 percent.

Illumination

B-52. Illumination missions are important functions for mortars. Atmospheric stability, wind velocity, and wind direction are the most important factors when planning target effects for illumination mortar rounds. The terrain in the target area also affects illumination rounds. Illumination rounds can be used to disclose enemy formations, to signal, or to mark targets. There are illumination rounds available for all mortars.

B-53. The 60-mm illumination round available now is the standard cartridge, illuminating M83A3. This round has a fixed time of delay between firing and start of the illumination. The illumination lasts for about 25 seconds, providing moderate light over a square kilometer.

B-54. The 60-mm illumination round does not provide the same degree of illumination as do the rounds of the heavier mortars and field artillery. However, it is sufficient for local, point illumination. The small size of the round can be an advantage where illumination is desired in an area, but adjacent friendly forces do not want to be seen. The 60-mm illumination round can be used without degrading the night vision devices of adjacent units.

B-55. The medium and heavy mortars can provide excellent illumination over wide areas. The 120-mm mortar illumination round provides 1 million candlepower for 60 seconds.

B-56. The M320 40-mm grenades, as well as all mortars have the capability to deliver infrared illumination rounds in addition to the more common white light.

Special Illumination Techniques

B-57. Illumination is always planned for attacks to be conducted in limited visibility. The following are three mortar special illumination techniques.

B-58. An illumination round fired extremely high over a general area will not always alert an enemy force that it is being observed. However, it will provide enough illumination to optimize the use of image intensification (starlight) scopes such as night vision devices.

B-59. An illumination round fired to burn on the ground will prevent observation beyond the flare into the shadow. This is one method of countering enemy use of image intensification devices. A friendly force could move behind the flare with greater security.

B-60. An illumination round fired to burn on the ground can be used to mark targets during day or night. Illumination rounds have an advantage over WP as target markers during high winds. The obscurant cloud from a WP round will be blown quickly downwind. The obscurants from the burning illumination round will continue to originate from the same point, regardless of the wind. Multiple illumination rounds are used to spread the illumination over the width and depth of the illuminated area.

Considerations When Using Thermal Sights

B-61. Although illumination rounds may aid target acquisition when friendly forces are using image intensification devices (such as night vision devices), this is not so when thermal sights are used. As the illumination flares burn out and land on the ground, they remain as a distinct hot spot seen through thermal sights for several minutes. This may cause confusion, especially if the flare canisters are between the enemy and friendly forces. WP rounds also can cause these hot spots which can make target identification difficult for gunners using thermal sights (for example, Javelin).

Air-Ground Operations

B-62. Air-ground operations are the simultaneous or synchronized employment of ground forces with aviation maneuver and fires to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative (FM 3-04). Employing the combined and complementary effects of air and ground maneuver and fires through air-ground operations presents the enemy with multiple dilemmas and ensures that aviation assets are positioned to support ground maneuver. Air-ground operations increase the overall combat power, mission effectiveness, agility, flexibility, and survivability of the entire combined arms team. Air-ground operations ensure that all members of the combined arms team, whether on the ground or in the air, work toward common and mutually supporting objectives to meet the higher commander’s intent.

Army Aviation

B-63. Army aviation attack and reconnaissance units use maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power at critical times and places to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces. During the planning process, Army aviation attack and reconnaissance units are integrated into the Infantry unit’s scheme of maneuver to ensure responsiveness, synergy and agility during actions on the objective or upon contact with the enemy. Pre-mission development of control measures provides a foundation for the successful integration of Army aviation into Infantry operations. Among these control measures are engagement criteria; the triggers and conditions for execution; target control measures, such as TRPs or point targets; fire support coordination measures, such as no-fire area or restrictive fire area; engagement areas; and airspace coordinating measures, such as aerial ingress and egress routes and restricted operations zones.

Army Aviation Attack Call for Fire

B-64. Call for fire is a standardized request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target (FM 3-09). Army aviation attack targets are planned on probable enemy locations. Army aviation attack call for fire is a coordinated attack by Army aviation attack against enemy forces in close proximity to friendly units. Army aviation attack call for fire (see figure B-15) is not synonymous with CAS flown by joint and multinational aircraft. Terminal control from ground units or controllers is not required due to aircraft capabilities and enhanced situational understanding of the aircrew. Depending on the enemy situation, Army aviation attack can be on station during times when contact is most likely to occur. Air-ground integration ensures frequencies are known and markings are standardized to prevent fratricide.

B-65. Coordination between ground maneuver units and aviation attack units maximizes the capabilities of the combined arms team while minimizing the risk of fratricide and friendly fire. To ensure adequate air-ground integration, the following major problem areas should be addressed:

Ensure aircrews understand ground tactical plan and unit commander’s intent.
Ensure adequate common control measures are used to allow both air and ground unit’s maximum freedom of maneuver.
Ensure aircrews and ground forces understand methods of differentiating between enemy and friendly forces on the ground.
Ensure aircrews understand ground force methods of designating or marking targets.

Figure B-15. Army aviation attack request call for fire format

Employment Considerations

B-66. Mission success in Army aviation attack call for fire employment depends on leaders conducting detailed planning and coordination between the aerial attack team and ground unit already engaged in close combat. Once execution begins, there must be integration of the fires and movement of both maneuver and aerial elements.

B-67. During call for fire, the flight lead must have direct communication with the on-scene ground force commander to provide direct fire support. After receiving the call for fire brief from ground forces, pilots must be able to positively identify friendly locations before engagement. Once the crew has identified both enemy and friendly locations, flight leads formulate an attack plan and brief the supported commander and their other attack team members. (See ATP 3-09.32 for Army aviation attack call for fire capabilities.)

B-68. Planning for attack reconnaissance helicopter support usually begins at the battalion level or above. The aviation battalion provides the aviation brigade and Infantry battalion with information on locations, routes, and communications before the attack team’s departure from its assembly area (AA). As part of this effort, Infantry companies and platoons usually provide information for aviation attack call for fire employment. All platoon Soldiers should familiarize themselves with the procedures used to call for attack reconnaissance helicopter support. If attack reconnaissance helicopter assets are working for their battalion, the platoon and company provide suppressive fires on any known or suspected threat air defense artillery locations.

B-69. Critical elements of the planning process are the procedures and resources used in marking and identifying targets and friendly positions. Leaders consider these factors thoroughly, regardless of the time available to the ground and air commanders.

B-70. The aerial attack team coordinates directly with the lowest-level unit in contact on the Infantry platoon and company radio command nets. Whenever practicable, before the attack team launches the aviation attack call for fire operation, the leader or commander conducts final coordination with the attack reconnaissance helicopters in a concealed position known as the aerial holding area. The holding area is a point in space within the supported unit’s AO oriented toward the threat; it allows the attack team to receive requests for immediate aviation attack call for fire and expedite the attack. The aerial holding area could be an alternate battle position positioned out of range of the threat’s direct fire and indirect fire weapons ranges.

B-71. Final coordination between the ground and helicopter units must include agreement on methods of identifying and marking friendly and threat positions. This should take advantage of the equipment and capabilities of the attack team, including the forward-looking infrared system (when equipped), the thermal imaging system, and night vision devices. Final coordination should identify limitations of the attack team as well. For example, ground units must understand that without a forward-looking infrared system attack helicopters will not be able to identify infrared light sources. In this case the ground unit may mark friendly positions with smoke or an enemy position with tracer fire.

B-72. Coordination also should cover the battle position, and assault by fire, or support by fire positions used by the attack reconnaissance helicopters. The leader should offset these positions from the ground maneuver unit and the gun-target line of supporting fires to maximize the effects of the attack team’s weapons and to minimize the risk of fratricide. To prevent indirect fires within the AO or zone from posing a danger to the helicopters, the commander informs direct support artillery and organic mortars of the aerial positions. (See ATP 3-09.32 for additional information.)

Close Air Support

B-73. Infantry battalions’ allocated CAS sorties may allocate assets to individual rifle companies. Close air support is air action by aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (JP 3-09.3). CAS can be employed to blunt an enemy attack; to support the momentum of the ground attack; to help set conditions for Infantry operations as part of the overall counterfire fight; to disrupt, delay and destroy enemy second echelon forces and reserves; and to provide cover for friendly movements. The effectiveness of CAS is related directly to the degree of local air superiority attained. Until air superiority is achieved, competing demands between CAS and counterair operations may limit sorties apportioned for the CAS role. CAS is the primary support given to committed battalions and IBCT by Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft.

Mission

B-74. The IBCT normally plans and controls CAS. However, this does not preclude the battalion from requesting CAS, receiving immediate CAS to support a company-level operation, or accepting execution responsibility for a planned CAS mission. CAS is another means of fire support available to the battalion. In planning CAS missions, the commander must understand the capabilities and limitations of CAS and synchronize CAS missions with both the battalion fire plan and scheme of maneuver. CAS capabilities and limitations such as windows for use, targets, observers, and airspace coordination present some unique challenges, but the commander must plan CAS with maneuver the same way indirect artillery and mortar fires are planned. When executing a CAS mission, the battalion must have a plan that synchronizes CAS with maneuver and the scheme of fires of maneuver companies.

Preplanned Close Air Support

B-75. Battalion planners, in coordination with maneuver companies, forward CAS requests as soon as they can be forecasted. These requests for CAS normally do not include detailed timing information because of the lead time involved. Preplanned CAS requests involve any information about planned subordinate schemes of maneuver, even general information, which can be used in the apportionment, allocation, and distribution cycle.

Immediate Close Air Support

B-76. Immediate requests are used for air support mission requirements identified too late to be included in the current air tasking order. Those requests initiated below battalion level are forwarded to the battalion main command post by the most rapid means available. At battalion level, the commander, fire support officer, air liaison officer, and battalion operations staff officer consider each request. Approved immediate CAS requests are transmitted by the tactical air control party over the Joint Air Request Net directly to the air support operations center who works with the division Joint Air Ground Integration Center to execute the air tasking order, integrate airspace use and users, and control CAS and other air support missions in the division AO.

Executing Close Air Support

B-77. Units having a reasonable expectation of utilizing CAS will need to have a qualified JTAC, forward air controller (airborne) (FAC[A]), or JFC available. In the extreme circumstance that CAS is needed and a JTAC, (FAC[A]) or joint fires observer is not available, then aircrews executing CAS under these circumstances must be in contact with the ground commander (or the commander’s designated representative). Aircrews bear increased responsibility for the detailed integration required to minimize fratricide normally done by a JTAC/FAC (A)/joint fires observer. In these rare circumstances, the aircrews providing CAS assist the ground movement commander to the greatest extent possible to bring fires to bear.

B-78. The flow and prosecution of CAS targets normally begins with a check-in briefing between the aircrew and the JTAC or the FAC(A). The JTAC will give a ground situation update followed by a game plan and a CAS 9-line brief (see figure B-16). (See ATP 3-09.32 for information on check-in brief, situation update briefing.) A game plan is a concise situational awareness-enhancing tool to inform all players of the flow of the CAS mission. At a minimum, the game plan will contain the type of control and method of attack. The type of terminal attack control—the authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft (JP 3-09.3)—and method of attack are separate and independent constructs. The method of attack is broken down into two categories: bomb on target and bomb on coordinate. The method of attack conveys the JTAC’s/FAC(A)’s intent for the aircraft prosecution of the target; either the aircraft will be required to acquire the target (bomb on target) or not (bomb on coordinate). These two categories define how the aircraft will acquire the target or mark the target. Any type of control can be utilized with either method of attack, and no type of control is attached to one particular method of attack. (See ATP 3-21.10 appendix D for additional information.)

Figure B-16. Game plan and 9-line close air support brief

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