Section 4 – Attack

4-89. An attack destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. The attack can be a hasty or deliberate operation depending upon the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. An attack incorporates coordinated movement supported by direct fires and fire support. An attack masses the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that cannot be matched by the enemy. The resulting combat should not be a contest between near equals. Attackers seek decisions on the ground of their choosing through the deliberate synchronization and employment of the combined arms team. Variations of an attack are ambush, counterattack, raid, and spoiling attack.

Hasty Versus Deliberate Operation

4-90. The primary difference between a deliberate operation and hasty operation is the extent of planning and preparation the attacking force conducts. A deliberate operation is an operation in which the tactical situation allows the development and coordination of detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels (ADP 3-90). A hasty operation is an operation in which a commander directs immediately available forces, using fragmentary orders, to perform tasks with minimal preparation, trading planning and preparation time for speed of execution (ADP 3-90). At one end of the continuum, an Infantry unit launches a hasty operation as a continuation of an engagement that exploits a combat power advantage and preempts enemy actions. At the other end, an Infantry unit conducts a deliberate operation from a reserve position or TAA with detailed knowledge of the enemy, a task organization designed specifically for attacking, and a fully rehearsed plan. Most attacks fall somewhere between the two extremes.

4-91. A deliberate operation normally is conducted when enemy positions are too strong to be overcome by a hasty operation. It is a fully synchronized operation employing every available asset against the enemy defense and is characterized by a high volume of planned fires, use of major supporting attacks, forward positioning of the resources needed to maintain momentum, and operations throughout the depth of enemy positions. Deliberate operations follow a preparatory period that includes planning, reconnaissance and surveillance, coordination, positioning of follow-on forces and reserve, preparation of troops and equipment, rehearsals, and operational refinement.

4-92. A hasty operation is conducted during movement to contact, as part of a defense, or when the enemy is in a vulnerable position and can be defeated quickly with available resources. This type of operation may cause the attacking force to lose a degree of synchronization. To minimize this risk, the leader maximizes use of standard formations and well-rehearsed, thoroughly understood battle drills and SOPs. A hasty operation is often the preferred option during continuous operations, enabling the leader to maintain momentum while denying the enemy time for defense preparations.

Organization Of Forces

4-93. The Infantry rifle platoon normally conducts an attack as part of a company in an independent operation or as part of the company within a battalion operation. Once the scheme of maneuver is determined, the company commander (when the platoon operates within company) task-organizes the force to ensure platoons have enough combat power to accomplish their assign missions. The company commander normally organizes a main body and reserve (a security force, main body, and reserve is normally established during a battalion or higher echelon attack) for the attack, which are all supported by some type of sustainment organization (for example, company or field trains [see paragraphs 8-22 to 8-25]). The commander and subordinate platoon leaders should complete all changes in task organization on time to allow units to conduct rehearsals with their attached and supporting elements. Based upon METT-TC (I), the platoon may conduct the attack (platoon assault) independently. As an example, the platoon may conduct an attack to seize an assault objective, key terrain, or other enemy position dependent on the size of the enemy force and/or terrain. (See ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 3-21.20 for additional information on an attack at the company and battalion echelons.)

Security Forces

4-94. The Infantry rifle platoon leader, as well as the Infantry rifle company commander, do not generally designate dedicated security forces for independent operations conducting an attack. During a platoon’s movement along its direction of attack, platoon leaders are responsible for 360-degree security, for ensuring each subordinate unit’s sectors of fire are mutually supporting, and for being able to transition the platoon rapidly upon contact with the enemy. Platoon leaders exercise command and control primarily through their subordinate leaders and move in the formation where they can best achieve this.

4-95. Along the platoon’s direction of attack, squad leaders and team leaders execute movement formations and movement techniques based on the platoon leader’s guidance. They adjust their formations and techniques as necessary while moving (see chapter 3). This determination is a result of the platoon’s mission, the nature of the threat, the closeness of terrain, and visibility. Subordinate elements perform their required actions, through training before combat and rehearsals during combat.

4-96. When the platoon is designated as a security force (flank and/or rear) within the Infantry battalion’s organization of forces for the attack, under normal circumstances, the commander resources dedicated security forces during an attack only if the attack uncovers one or more flanks, or the rear of the attacking force as it advances. In this case, the commander designates a flank or rear security force and assigns it a guard or screen mission, depending on METT-TC (I).

Note. Normally an attacking unit does not need extensive forward security forces as most attacks are launched from positions in contact with the enemy, which reduces the usefulness of a separate forward security force. The exception occurs when the attacking unit is transitioning from defense to offense and had previously established a security area as part of the defense.

Main Body

4-97. During an attack (platoon assault, see figure 4-7 on page 4-40), conducted independently of the company, the platoon leader establishes a main effort and supporting effort within the platoon. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success(ADP 3-0). The platoon leader usually weights the main effort with the preponderance of platoon’s combat power, or the operation is designed where the effort is singularly focused. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource allocation. The platoon leader may shift the main effort during execution. A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort (ADP 3-0). The platoon leader resources the supporting effort(s) with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission. The platoon often realizes success of the main effort through the success of the supporting effort(s).

4-98. During a deliberate operation, the platoon leader’s main effort accomplishes the destruction of the enemy force, seizure of a terrain objective, or the defeat of the enemy’s plan. The platoon’s scheme of maneuver identifies the focus of the main effort. Because the potential for obstacles always exists, the platoon leader should designate an assault, breach, and support element within the platoon to conduct a breach during the attack.

4-99. During a hasty operation, the platoon leader retains flexibility by arranging forces in-depth and maintains more of a centralized control of subordinate elements, direct and indirect fires, and fire support systems. As soon as the tactical situation develops enough to allow the platoon leader to identify the decisive point(s), the platoon leader focuses available resources to support the designated main effort’s achievement of its objective.

Reserve

4-100. The reserve is used to exploit success, defeat enemy counterattacks, or restore momentum to a stalled attack. The Infantry rifle platoon leader does not generally designate a dedicated reserve for platoon missions, whether conducted independent of the company or not. For a company mission, the dedicated reserve (when designated) is usually a squad-size element. For a battalion mission, the dedicated reserve (when designated) is usually a platoon-size element. The reserve is not a committed force and is not used as a follow and support force, or a follow and assume force. Follow and assume is a tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation and continues mission if lead force cannot continue (FM 3-90). Follow and support is a tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation (FM 3-90). Once committed, the reserve’s actions normally become or reinforce the echelon’s main effort. Once the reserve is committed, every effort is made to reconstitute another reserve from units made available by the revised situation. Often a commander’s most difficult and important decision concerns the time, place, and circumstances for committing the reserve.

Control Measures

4-101. Units conducting an attack operate within an assigned AO. Regardless of whether the attack takes place in a contiguous or noncontiguous assigned area, the owner of the AO normally designates control measures.

4-102. The owner uses only the control measures necessary to control the attack. Short of the LD or line of contact (LC), the leader may designate TAA and attack positions where the unit prepares for the mission or waits for the establishment of required conditions to initiate the attack. Beyond the LD or LC, leaders may designate checkpoints, phase lines, PLD, lateral boundaries, assault positions, and direct and indirect fire support coordination measures. Between the PLD and objective, a final coordination line, assault positions, support by fire and attack by fire positions, and time of assault to better control the final stage of attack can be used. Beyond the objective, the Infantry leader can impose an LOA or forward boundary. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)

Sequence of Events, Example

4-103. An attack at the platoon level is normally conducted as part of a larger force and is an offensive action characterized by close combat. Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets (ADP 3-0). The following sequence of events is typical of an attack, regardless of echelon; however, specifics will vary due to the mission variables and the higher scheme of maneuver. Additionally, some elements may occur simultaneously. (See ATP 3-21.10for additional information.) Events include:

  • TAA.
  • Reconnaissance and surveillance.
  • Movement to the LD.
  • Movement to the PLD.
  • Actions on the objective (platoon assault).
  • Follow through (consolidate, reorganization, and transition).

Tactical Assembly Area

4-104. The platoon leader and subordinate leaders within the TAA direct and supervise mission planning and preparation for the attack. Additional activities include coordination, PCCs and PCIs, rehearsals, and sustainment preparations for the mission. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

4-105. Higher echelon reconnaissance and surveillance collection efforts provide combat information on the enemy situation and terrain in the platoon’s AO. The collection effort may begin prior to occupying the TAA and continues throughout the operation. The platoon may still receive current reports as it occupies the assault position. Reconnaissance and surveillance activities provide the platoon leader with the information needed to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the mission. The situation and available time may limit the ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities prior to crossing the LD. Leaders balance the benefits of reconnaissance forces and surveillance assets providing combat information with the level of risk involved with them compromising the operation.

Movement To The Line Of Departure

4-106. When attacking from positions not in contact with the enemy, the platoon often stages in a rear TAA or moves to an attack position behind friendly units in contact with the enemy, then conducts passage of lines to begin the attack. When attacking from a position in direct contact, the LD may also be the line of contact, a general trace delineating the locations where friendly and enemy forces are engaged (ADP 3-90). In certain circumstances, there may not be an LD, for example, an operation in a noncontiguous assigned area. Additionally, commanders may designate PDs for their attacking units instead of an LD for units attacking on foot using infiltration and stealth.

4-107. The tactical situation and order in which the platoon leader wants subordinate elements to arrive at their attack position(s) (if necessary) and/or LD/PD govern the march formation. The platoon leader typically executes a planned movement through a start point(s), along a route(s) and through a release point(s), into an attack position(s)(if necessary) short of the LD/PD after which the leader will deploy into the appropriate movement formation and movement technique. The platoon leader develops an order of movement and timeline (by squad) to the attack position and/or LD/PD. Lead elements of the attacking force cross the LD/PD at the time specified in the OPORD or FRAGORD. Before movement, a small patrol from the platoon (see chapter 7) can be tasked to reconnoiter and mark the route and check the time it takes to move to the LD/PD. (See chapter 6 section III for additional information on the passage of lines prior to crossing the LD/PD.)

Movement To The Probable Line Of Deployment

4-108. The platoon moves rapidly through their attack position(s) and across the LD/PD controlled by friendly forces. The platoon uses its designated attack position only by exception, for example, to adjust the march timing of the unit’s movement or when the conditions required to ensure the success of the planned maneuver is not yet established. The platoon should minimize the time it remains stationary in the attack position. Generally, the platoon should initiate actions to protect itself and increase survivability every 10 to 15 minutes. This includes such actions as deploying local security, improving cover and concealment, and starting the construction of fighting and survivability positions. The platoon leader considers the mission variables of METT-TC (I) when choosing the actions within an attack position which best balances firepower, tempo, security, and control.

4-109. When crossing the LD controlled by a stationary unit, battle handover occurs along a general trace line designated as the BHL (see paragraph 5-18). A battle handover is a coordinated mission between two units that transfers responsibility for fighting an enemy force from one unit to another (FM 3-90). The stationary unit commander determines the location of the line, generally a phase line forward of the stationary unit. The BHL is the FLOT in the offense or forward edge of the battle area in the defense. The line is drawn where the direct fires of forward combat elements of the stationary unit can effectively support the passing unit until completion of the passage of lines (see chapter 6 section III). The area between the BHL and the stationary force belongs to the stationary unit commander. The BHL is within direct fire range and observed indirect fire range of the stationary force. During the passage of lines, the stationary force commander may employ security forces, obstacles, and fires in the area.

4-110. Probable line of deployment is a phase line that designates the location where the commander intends to deploy the unit into assault formation before beginning the assault (ADP 3-90). The attacking platoon splits into one or more assault force (generally the main effort) and support forces (generally the supporting effort) as it reaches the PLD, if not already accomplished. (See figure 4-7 on page 4-40 for an example platoon assault [conducted as the lead platoon for an independent company operation].) All forces supporting the assault should be set in their support by fire position, or other position, before the initiation of the attack by the assault force. The assault force maneuvers against or around the enemy to take advantage of the support force’s efforts to suppress targeted enemy positions.

Note. As necessary, the platoon conducts a breach. The preferred method of fighting through a defended obstacle is to conduct an in-stride breach. However, the leader must be prepared to conduct a deliberate breach. (See chapter 6 section I for additional information.)

Figure 4-7. Sequence of events (platoon assault), example

Actions On The Objective (Platoon Assault)

4-111. The platoon maintains the pace of its advance and deploys into one or more assault forces before or upon reaching the PLD. The platoon leader synchronizes the occupation of support by fire and/or attack by fire positions with the maneuver of the assault force to limit the vulnerability of the forces occupying these positions. The platoon leader maximizes of direct fires and fire support to destroy and to suppress the enemy, and to sustain the momentum of attack.

Support by Fire

4-112. Platoon support forces (supporting effort) occupy support by fire positions that, ideally, afford unobstructed observation, clear fields of fire, and cover and concealment. Selection of support by fire positions are based on a study of the terrain, knowledge of enemy locations, or likely enemy locations, and refined in execution through leader reconnaissance when possible. If the enemy situation is vague or unknown, positions are selected to place effective fire on terrain that dominates the area the assault force will traverse and seize. Once in position, support forces are responsible for both suppressing known enemy forces and for scanning assigned sectors of observation to identify previously unknown enemy elements to suppress them. The protection provided by support forces allow the assault force to continue movement and to retain the initiative even when under enemy observation or within range of enemy weapons.

Assault

4-113. The platoon leader retains the assault force in covered and concealed positions until the support force has set necessary conditions. The assault force must be prepared to deal with unanticipated protective obstacles in/around the objective area, particularly in buildings or fortified areas. Once committed, the platoon’s assault is short, violent, and well ordered. The assault force seizes or secures a geographic objective, or destroys, defeats, or disrupts a designated enemy force. From the PLD, the assault force maneuvers against or around the enemy to take advantage of support fires. The assault force must closely follow these supporting fires to gain ground that offers a positional advantage. Depending on the size and preparation of enemy forces, it may be necessary to isolate and destroy portions of the enemy in sequence. It may also be necessary to reposition support forces to continue to engage the depth of, or beyond, the objective area.

4-114. Between the PLD and the objective, an assault position(s) and a final coordination line may be established to control the final stages of the assault. Assaulting forces usually plan to pass through the assault position and deploy to their final assault formation at final coordination line. Stopping at the assault position may allow the enemy to react to the assault and may make it difficult for the assault force to regain the momentum of the assault once the force halts in a covered position. When used, the assault force pauses at the assault position only to—

  • Make final equipment preparations, such as to make final preparations for demolitions.
  • To ensure all assault forces are in their planned order.
  • Wait for preparatory fires to finish.
  • Ensure conditions are set for the assault (for example, sufficient suppression, obscuration, or a necessary breach).

4-115. The objective for the assault force may vary from operation to operation. In every case, the assault force’s actions on the objective are critical. Assault forces maneuver through fire and movement. Supporting fires must immediately gain fire superiority on the objective in coordination with fires around and beyond the objective to disrupt enemy reinforcement. As the assault closes on the objective, fires shift just forward of the assault force as it moves across the objective or until ordered to stop or shift to other target beyond the assault force or LOA.

Note. The key is to minimize the time between the shifting of fires and the maneuver of the assault force on the objective. The enemy must be suppressed during this time when the assault force is most vulnerable.

Follow Through (Consolidate, Reorganize, and Transition)

4-116. The platoon and squad consolidate and reorganize as required by the situation and mission. During consolidate and reorganization, the platoon may use protective obstacles (see paragraphs 5-56 to 5-58) to aid in flank security and to protect against enemy counterattacks. Additionally, echelons above the platoon may use tactical obstacles (see paragraphs 5-52 to 5-55) to shape enemy routes of withdrawal and to cut off enemy reinforcements.

4-117. Once the platoon takes an enemy position, it consolidates on that position if doing so is tactically necessary or advantageous. Consolidate is to organize and strengthen a captured position to use it against the enemy (FM 3-90). Normally, the attacking platoon tries to exploit its success; however, in some situations the platoon may have to pause to consolidate its gains. Consolidated may vary from a rapid repositioning of forces and security elements on the objective, to a reorganization of the attacking force, or to the organization and detailed improvement of the position for defense. Additional actions taken to consolidate include—

  • Seeking out and eliminating enemy pockets of resistance (on and off the objective)/secure enemy detainees.
  • Searching and marking positions to indicate to other friendly forces that they have been cleared.
  • Establishing local security (see paragraph 6-79) and hasty defensive fighting positions (see paragraphs 5-229 to 5-232) while utilizing existing obstacles (see paragraph 5-45) if possible.
  • Using security patrols, observation posts/combat outposts, and early warning devices to provide protection and situational awareness.
  • Establishing indirect fire targets, FPF, and final protective line (FPL).
  • Establishing mutual support between individual fighting positions, adjacent squads/adjacent platoons, to include:
    • Automatic weapons (man position and assign principal direction of fire[known as PDF] to Soldiers manning automatic weapons).
    • Fields of fire (establish sectors of fire and other direct fire control measures for each subunit/Soldier).
    • Protection requirements such as defining type fighting position and building fighting positions.

4-118. Reorganization is all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or return it to a specified level of combat capability (ATP 3-94.4). While combat effectiveness is the ability of a unit to perform its mission, factors such as ammunition, personnel, status of fuel, and weapon systems are assessed and rated (see paragraph 2-80). Reorganization actions can include cross-leveling ammunition and ensuring key weapon systems are manned and vital leadership positions are filled if the operator or crew became casualties. Additional actions include—

  • Reestablishing the chain of command.
  • Manning key weapon systems.
  • Maintaining communications and reports, to include:
    • Restoring communication with any unit temporarily out of communication.
    • Sending situation reports (at a minimum, subordinates report status of mission accomplishment).
    • Identifying and requesting resupply of critical shortages.
  • Resupplying and redistributing ammunition and other critical supplies.
  • Performing special team actions such as—
    • Processing, and evacuating causalities, enemy prisoners of wars, enemy weapons, noncombatants/refugees, and damaged equipment (not necessarily in the same location).
    • Evacuating friendly killed in action.

4-119. The platoon executes follow-on orders/missions as directed by the company commander. For example, to reposition the force on the objective and establish security observation posts forward of the objective to prepare for a counterattack, or to organize the force and conduct detailed improvement of fighting positions for defensive missions. A likely mission may be to continue the attack against the enemy within the AO. Regardless of the situation, the platoon and subordinate squads’ posture and prepare for continued offensive missions.

Operations Process

4-120. During an attack, the platoon leader seeks to place the enemy in a position where the enemy can be defeated or destroyed easily. The platoon leader seeks to keep the enemy off-balance while continually reducing the enemy’s options. The platoon leader employs movement and maneuver supported by other warfighting capabilities to prevent the enemy from accomplishing its mission and objectives. The amount of time available for planning and preparation will determine whether the attack is conducted as a hasty or deliberate operation. Though a platoon may be tasked to conduct a hasty attack as a continuation of an ongoing engagement, it is always best to plan and prepare for a deliberate attack from a TAA or reserve position.

4-121. In addition to accomplishing the mission, the platoon leader’s concept of operations must contain provisions to exploit successes and all advantages that arise during the operation. The platoon leader exploits success and maintains the advantage by continually assessing the process throughout planning and preparation, and by aggressively executing the plan, promoting subordinate leader initiative, and putting subordinate units in a position of advantage. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)

Note. The operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) is the major command and control activities performed during combat operations. The operations process (specific to TLP) is a platoon leader-led activity. (See chapter 2 for additional information on TLP.)

Plan

4-122. During the planning process, the platoon leader integrates the scheme of fires with the scheme of maneuver. The scheme of fires is the detailed, logical sequence of targets and fire support events to find and engage targets to support the commander’s objectives (JP 3-09). The leader identifies the desired effect of fires on enemy weapon systems, such as suppression or destruction, as part of developing the scheme of fires. The scheme of fires identifies critical times and places where the platoon leader needs the maximum effects from fire-support assets. Leaders combine movement with fires to mass effects, achieve surprise, destroy enemy forces, and obtain decisive results.

4-123. The platoon leader assigns subordinate squad leaders and attached element leaders their missions and imposes only those control measures necessary to synchronize and maintain control over the operation. Using the enemy situational and weapons templates, previously developed, the leader determines the probable LC and enemy trigger lines (see paragraph 5-208). As the leader arrays subordinate elements to shape the battlefield, friendly weapon systems are matched against the enemy to determine the PLD. Once the leader determines the PLD, the leader establishes how long it takes subordinates to move from the LD to the PLD and establish all necessary support by fire positions. The leader establishes when and where the force must maneuver into enemy direct-fire range.

4-124. The platoon leader seeks to surprise the enemy by choosing an unexpected direction, time, type, or strength for attacking. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses enemy command and control, induces psychological shock in the enemy, and reduces the coherence of the enemy’s defensive operations. The leader achieves tactical surprise by attacking in bad weather and over seemingly impassible terrain, maintaining a high tempo, and employing sound operations security. The leader may plan different attack times for main and supporting efforts to mislead the enemy and allow the shifting of supporting fires. However, simultaneous attacks provide a means to maximize the effects of mass in the initial assault. They also prevent the enemy from concentrating defensive fires against successive attacks.

4-125. In planning, the platoon leader and subordinate leaders focus on the routes, formations, and navigational aids they will use to traverse the ground from the LD or PLD to the objective. Some terrain locations may require the attacking platoon to change its movement formation, direction of movement, or movement technique when it reaches those locations. The platoon can post guides at these critical locations to ensure maintaining control over the movement.

4-126. To employ the proper capabilities and tactics, the platoon leader and subordinate leaders must have detailed knowledge of the enemy’s organization, equipment, and tactics. They must understand enemy strengths and weaknesses. The platoon leader may need to request information to answer platoon information requirements.

4-127. Generally, if the platoon leader does not have timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence products and assessments, and does not know where the overwhelming majority of the enemy’s units and systems are located, the leader cannot conduct a deliberate operation. The attacking unit must conduct a movement to contact, then conduct a hasty operation once contact is made, or collect more combat information.

4-128. Leaders within the platoon may find themselves as the observer (and executor) of company- and battalion-level fires or exploiting the success of higher echelon military deception operations (for example, feints and demonstrations [see chapter 6 section V]). Understanding the concept of echelon fires is critical for indirect fire planning to be synchronized with the maneuver plan. The purpose of echeloning fires (see appendix B) is to maintain constant fires on a target while using the optimum delivery system up to the point of its risk-estimate distance in combat operations or minimum safe distance in training. Echeloning fires provides protection for friendly forces as they move to and assault an objective, allowing them to close with minimal casualties. It prevents the enemy from observing and engaging the assault by forcing the enemy to take cover, allowing the friendly force to continue the advance unimpeded.

4-129. The goal of the platoon leader’s attack criteria is to focus fires on seizing the initiative. The leader emphasizes simple and rapidly integrated direct fires and fire support plans. This is done using quick-fire planning techniques (see ATP 3-21.10 for additional information) and good SOPs. Leaders integrate fire assets as far forward as possible in the movement formation to facilitate early emplacement. Leaders concentrate combat powers at decisive points and times on forward enemy elements to enable maneuver efforts to close with the enemy positions.

Note. Subordinate company fire support officers develop quick-fire plans to support their respective commander’s mission. In quick-fire planning the fire support officer assigns targets (and possibly a schedule of fires) to the most appropriate fire support means available to support the mission. In this type of fire support planning, the available time usually does not permit evaluation of targets on the target list and consolidation with targets from related fire support agencies. (See ATP 3-09.42 for additional information on quick-fire planning.)

4-130. The platoon leader and subordinate leaders plan for sustainment to ensure the platoon’s freedom of action and prolong endurance through unit trains (for example, company trains and battalion field trains). (See chapter 8 for additional information on unit sustainment operations during the attack.)

4-131. Protection increases a platoon’s survivability and their ability to maintain combat power. Planning for protection involves identifying enemy capabilities (for example, fires, aviation, and CBRN) and the necessary actions to counter or mitigate those threats. Emphasis on protection increases during preparation and continues throughout execution. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to protect the force before, during, and after the attack. (See paragraphs 4-40to 4-47 on the challenges to protect the force during the offense.)

Prepare

4-132. During preparation for the attack, the platoon leader and subordinate leaders must continue to analyze the most current information from organic and higher echelon information collection efforts. When possible, even in the most fluid of situations, attacks are best organized and coordinated in a currently established TAA, or one that is hastily established due to a change of mission.

4-133. Unless already in a TAA or patrol base, the attacking platoon moves into one to prepare for future operations. The unit moves with as much secrecy as possible, normally at night and along routes preventing or degrading the enemy’s capabilities to visually observe or otherwise detect the movement. It avoids congesting its TAA or patrol base and occupies it for the minimal possible time. While in the TAA or patrol base, the platoon is responsible for its own protection activities, such as local security and electromagnetic emissions control and masking. (See chapter 7 for additional information on establishing a patrol base.)

4-134. The platoon leader and subordinate leaders continue their TLP and priorities of work to the extent the situation and mission allow before moving towards their attack position(s) and/or LD and if established their LC. These preparations include but are not necessarily limited to:

  • Protecting the force.
  • Conducting task organization.
  • Performing reconnaissance.
  • Refining the plan.
  • Briefing the troops.
  • Conducting rehearsals, to include test firing (test firing dependent on the situation, though not conducted past the LD) of weapons.
  • Moving logistics and medical support forward.
  • Promoting adequate rest for both leaders and Soldiers.
  • Positioning the force for subsequent action.
  • PCCs and PCIs.

4-135. Preparation for an attack against a moving enemy force is limited because the opportunity to attack the enemy at the appropriate time and place depends on the enemy’s movement. This forces the platoon to focus the preparation on executing fires and movement and maneuver actions regarding the enemy’s location, or possible locations, and disposition when engaged. The platoon leader prioritizes each location to ensure the platoon prepares for the most likely engagements first. The platoon leader ensures all subordinate leaders understand their role at each location and the decision point for execution at each location. Leaders rehearse actions, as possible, in each location against various enemy conditions to promote flexibility and initiative consistent with the commander’s intent. Battle drills, SOPs, and rehearsals against likely enemy actions are essential for success in preparation for an attack.

4-136. As part of TLP, a leader’s reconnaissance (see paragraph 7-15) of the actual terrain should be conducted with all key leaders when this will not compromise the attack or result in excessive risk to the leaders on the reconnaissance. Modern information systems can enable leaders to conduct a virtual reconnaissance when a physical reconnaissance is not practical. If a limited-visibility attack is planned, they should reconnoiter the terrain at night.

Execute

4-137. During execution, the platoon leader maneuvers the platoon to close with and destroy or defeat enemy forces, seize, and secure terrain, or both. The following paragraphs discuss executing a company attack (specific to platoon scheme of maneuver) using the four-step tactical framework of the offense (find, fix, finish, and follow through) discussed earlier in this chapter.

Note. Regarding the enemy’s plan, a defending enemy generally establishes a security zone around or forward of main enemy forces to make early contact with friendly attacking forces. This helps the enemy determine the attacking force’s capabilities, intent, chosen COA, and delays their approach. The enemy leader uses the security zone to strip away friendly reconnaissance forces and hide the enemy’s main body dispositions, capabilities, and intent. The goal is to compel the friendly attacking force to conduct movement to contact against the enemy defending force while knowing the exact location of attacking friendly forces.

Find the Enemy

4-138. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy (when the enemy is determined to hide, deny, or break contact) is vital to the success of an attack. As platoons moves from the LD and cross the PLD towards the objective and as current intelligence and relevant combat information on the enemy is updated, the enemy situation generally becomes clearer. Platoon leaders and subordinate leaders, through actions on contact (see paragraph 2-48), rapidly develop the situation in accordance with the company commander’s plan and intent for the attack.

Note. The fictional scenario, used as discussion vehicles in figure 4-8 on page 4-49, figure 4-9 on page 4-52, and figure 4-10 on page 4-54, illustrate different ways an Infantry rifle platoon can accomplish its mission within the conduct of a higher echelon’s attack. For discussion purposes, the fictional scenario will primarily focus on the actions of Company C, the battalion’s main effort. These three examples illustrate potential challenges confronting the platoon leader in accomplishing an attack (specifically platoon breach and platoon assault) but are not intended to be prescriptive of how the Infantry rifle platoon performs any particular operation. This same scenario drives the attack techniques used in ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 3-21.20. ATP 3-21.8 focuses on the techniques used to perform missions, functions, or tasks in support of the Infantry rifle company within an Infantry battalion’s attack.

Fix the Enemy

4-139. Prior to the attack, battalion support by fire positions (SBF-3 and SBF-4, reference figure 4-8 on page 4-49) once established fix enemy actions prior to (initially), on, and surrounding the company objective. Additional operations to fix and/or disrupt—a tactical mission task in which a unit upsets an enemy’s formation or tempo and causes the enemy force to attack prematurely or in a piecemeal fashion (FM 3-90)—the enemy includes preparatory fires and deception operations to deceive the enemy. By fixing and/or disrupting the enemy, the objective of the attacker’s main effort is isolated to prevent the enemy from maneuvering to reinforce the enemy targeted for destruction. Massing forces in one place by using economy of force measures in other areas allows the attacker to mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against a portion of the enemy. The following example, see figure 4-8 on page 4-49, used for discussion purposes, represents one way to fix enemy actions prior to the assault. In the scenario, as assault forces close on the objective, Company C commander employs attached Assault Platoon 3 (with attached company mortar section) in such a way that the commander is best able to maximize isolation of the two points of breach (see chapter 6 section I) locations forward of Objective Fox North.

Note. On order Company D (-), with Assault Platoon 1 and Assault Platoon 2, battalion mortar Section A, and the battalion tactical command post, conducts approach march vicinity Phase Line Jim, moves on Axis Orange (not illustrated) into battalion Support by Fire Position 3 and Support by Fire Position 4 (illustrated in figure 4-8, figure 4-9 on page 4-52, and figure 4-10 on page 4-54). (See ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 3-21.20 for additional information on the scenario at the company and battalion echelons, respectively.)

Figure 4-8. Attack (support by fire), example

Finish the Enemy

4-140. During the assault, the attacking force maneuvers to gain positional advantage to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while avoiding the enemy’s defensive strength. The attacker employs tactics defeating the enemy by attacking through a point of relative weakness, such as a flank or the rear. The key for success is to strike hard and fast, overwhelm a portion of the enemy force, and quickly transition to the next objective or phase, thus maintaining the momentum of attack without reducing the pressure.

Movement From the Line of Departure to the Probable Line of Deployment

4-141. The platoon conducts tactical movement (approach march) once it crosses the LD. It moves aggressively and as quickly as the terrain and enemy situation allow. It moves forward using the appropriate movement formation and movement technique assisted by the fires (when required) of supporting units. Fire and movement are coordinated closely. Suppressive fires facilitate friendly movement, and friendly movement facilitates more fires. Whenever possible, the attacking platoon uses avenues of approach avoiding strong enemy defensive positions, takes advantage of all available cover and concealment, placing the unit on the flanks or rear of the defending enemy. Where cover and concealment are not available, the unit uses obscurants to conceal its movement.

Actions at the Probable Line of Deployment, Assault Position, or Final Coordination Line

4-142. The attacking platoon maintains the pace of its advance as it approaches its PLD. The attacking platoon splits into one or more assault and support forces once it reaches the PLD if not previously completed. Assaulting forces usually plan to pass through the assault position and deploy to their final assault formation at final coordination line (see paragraph 4-114). All forces supporting the assault force should be set in their support and attack by fire positions before the assault force begins its assault. The platoon leader synchronizes the occupation of support by fire positions with the maneuver of the supported attacking element to limit the vulnerability of forces occupying these positions. Leaders use unit tactical SOPs, battle drills, prearranged signals, engagement area, and TRP to control direct and indirect fires from these supporting positions and normally employs restrictive fire lines (RFLs) between converging forces.

Conduct a Breach

4-143. To conduct a breach successfully, the platoon applies the breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (see chapter 6 section I for information on the fundamentals). The support force sets the conditions; the breach force reduces, clears, and marks the required number of lanes through the enemy’s tactical obstacles to support the maneuver of the assault force. The leader must clearly identify the conditions allowing the breach force to proceed to avoid confusion. For example, one condition is the use of a minimum safe line when a friendly element, such as a breach force, is moving toward an area of indirect fires. As the breach force approaches the minimum safe line, observers call for fires shift (or cease), allowing the breach force to move safely in the danger area (see paragraph A-29). From the PLD, the assault force maneuvers against or around the enemy to take advantage of support force’s efforts to suppress the targeted enemy positions.

Note. For discussion purposes, the platoon breach and assault will primarily focus on the actions of Company C, the battalion’s main effort.

4-144. The following example, see figure 4-9, used for discussion purposes, represents one way to conduct a platoon breach prior to the company’s assault on Objective Fox North. In the scenario, as breach forces close on the points of breach, Company C commander establishes local support by fire positions (with attached Assault Platoon 3)to support First Platoon’s breach. Assault Platoon 3 (with Company C mortar section to engage targets on the far side of the breach) moves by section on the company’s left flank. As Company C’s First Platoon advances, Assault Platoon 3, on order or as First Platoon starts to receive effective fires in route to the obstacle begins to suppress the enemy overwatching the obstacle to isolate—a tactical mission task in which a unit seals off an enemy, physically and psychologically, from sources of support and denies it freedom of movement (FM 3-90)—the points of breach, west of Phase Line Bob. Once the points of breach locations are isolated by Assault Platoon 3, First Platoon moves forward with attached engineers to conduct two explosive breaches of the wire obstacle. The effect of the enemy wire obstacle, west of Objective Fox North, is to block any eastward movement along the trail network. First and Second Squads of First Platoon establish local support by fire positions to support engineer breaches. Once the obstacle breach is open, attached engineers create and mark lanes, and guide Third Squad, Fire Team A (under control of the Third Squad leader, with one attached machine gun) and Third Squad, Fire Team B (under the control of the First Platoon, Weapons Squad Leader, with one attached machine gun) through the obstacle to establish two footholds on the far side of the two breaches. Once footholds are established, fire teams employ two local support by fire positions (SFB-A and SBF-B, reference figure 4-9 on page 4-52) to support Second and Third Platoons’ assault through the breach and movement to the platoon’s PLD for the assault of Objective Fox North. (See chapter 6section I for additional information on actions on the objective involving support, breach, and assault elements in the attack.)

Figure 4-9. Attack (platoon breach), example

4-145. In the scenario, once conditions are set for the assault, Second and Third Platoons maneuver through the lanes established by First Platoon. (See figure 4-10 on page 4-54.) During the establishment of Support by Fire Positions A and B. Company C commander coordinates with Company D for Support by Fire Position 4 to the north to cease-fire. Support by Fire Position 3 continues to support Second Platoon and Third Platoon (assault forces) maneuver to seize Objective Fox North, assault forces clear to LOA, Phase Line Ted. Simultaneously, Company B (guiding off Company C’s rate of advance to LOA, Phase Line Ted) assaults with two platoons abreast (not illustrated), seizes Objective Fox South, assault forces clear to LOA, Phase Line Ted.

Figure 4-10. Attack (platoon assault), example

Actions on the Objective

4-146. The effects of overwhelming and simultaneous application of fire, movement, and shock action characterize the final assault. This violent assault destroys or defeats and drives the enemy from the objective area. Small units conduct the final assault while operating under the control of the appropriate echelon command post.

4-147. Assaulting forces usually plan to pass through the assault position and deploy to their final assault formation at the final coordination line. The final coordination line is a phase line close to the enemy position used to coordinate the lifting or shifting of supporting fires with the final deployment of maneuver elements (ADP 3-90). Ideally when established and utilized, the platoon’s assault element occupies the assault position without the enemy detecting the platoon’s elements. Preparations in the assault position may include preparing Bangalore, other breaching equipment, or demolitions; fixing bayonets; lifting or shifting direct fires; or preparing generated obscuration (for example, smoke pots and hand grenades).

4-148. If the platoon is detected as it nears its assault position, indirect fire suppression is required on the objective and the support element increases its volume of fire. If the platoon needs to make last-minute preparations, then it occupies the assault position. If the platoon does not need to stop, it passes through the assault position, treating it as a PLD and assaults the objective. Sometimes, a platoon must halt to complete preparation and to ensure synchronization of friendly forces. Once the assault element moves forward of the assault position, the assault continues. If the assault element stops or turns back, the element could sustain excessive casualties.

4-149. Infantry leaders employ all direct and indirect fire support means to destroy and suppress the enemy and sustain the momentum of attack. By carefully synchronizing the effects of indirect-fire systems and available close air support (CAS), leaders improve the likelihood of success. Fires are planned in series or groups to support maneuver against enemy forces on or near the geographical objective. As leaders shift artillery fires and obscurants from the objective to other targets, the assault element moves rapidly across the objective. The support element must not allow its suppressive fires to lapse. These fires isolate the objective and prevent the enemy from reinforcing or counterattacking. They also destroy escaping enemy forces and systems.

Follow Through

4-150. Once an enemy is finished, actions by the platoon are not complete. Small remaining elements of the enemy may require the platoon to destroy them in detail. If all enemy forces are not neutralized—a tactical mission task in which a unit renders the enemy incapable of interfering with an operation (FM 3-90)—the platoon maintains constant pressure to keep them off balance while capitalizing on successful tactical actions.

4-151. Consolidate is the process of organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so it can be defended. Normally, the attacking unit tries to exploit its success regardless the type of assault. In some situations, however, the unit may have to consolidate its gains. Consolidate may vary from a rapid repositioning of forces and security elements on the objective, to a reorganization of the attacking force, to the organization and detailed improvement of positions for defensive missions.

4-152. Consolidate consists of actions taken to secure the objective and defend against an enemy counterattack. Platoon leaders use TLP to plan and prepare for this phase of operation. They ensure the unit is ready to conduct the following actions (see paragraph 4-116 for a further discussion) that usually are part of consolidate:

  • Establish security beyond the objective by securing areas that may be the source of enemy direct fires or enemy artillery observation.
  • Prepare for and assist the passage of follow-on forces (if required).
  • Continue to improve security by conducting other necessary defensive actions. These defensive actions include engagement area development, direct fire planning, and battle position preparation.
  • Adjust FPFs and register targets along likely mounted and dismounted avenues of approach.
  • Protect the obstacle reduction effort.
  • Secure enemy detainees.
  • Prepare for enemy counterattack.

4-153. Reorganization usually is conducted concurrently with consolidate. It consists of actions taken to prepare units for follow-on operations. As with consolidate, unit leaders plan and prepare for reorganization as they conduct TLP. (See paragraph 4-118 for a further discussion.) Platoon leaders ensure the following actions are conducted:

  • Provide essential medical treatment and evacuate casualties, as necessary.
  • Treat and evacuate wounded detainees and process the remainder of detainees.
  • Cross-level personnel and adjust task organization as required to support the next phase or mission.
  • Conducts resupply operations, including rearming and refueling.
  • Redistribute ammunition.
  • Conduct required maintenance.
  • Continue improvement of defensive positions, as necessary.

4-154. For all attacks, Infantry units should and must plan to exploit success. However, at the conclusion of an engagement, the platoon leader may be forced to defend. For short defenses, units make use of existing terrain to enhance their survivability. If a longer defense is envisioned, engineer assets immediately should refocus their efforts on providing survivability support (fighting positions and similar activities). Engineer assets should do this even as they sustain mobility and integrate countermobility into the planned defensive mission. The Infantry leader considers the higher commander’s concept of operations, friendly capabilities, and enemy situation when making the decision to defend or continue the offense.

Assess

4-155. Assessment refers to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. Platoon leaders constantly assess the actual progress of the operation against the plan and look for variance in the form of emerging threats or opportunities. Assessment precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. It involves a comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events. Assessment entails three tasks:

  • Continuously assessing the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities.
  • Continuously monitoring the situation and progress of operation towards the commander’s desired end state.
  • Evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

4-156. Upon receiving the mission, platoon leaders perform an initial assessment of the situation and the mission variables of METT-TC (I), focusing on the unit’s role in the larger operation, and allocating time for planning and preparing. The two most important products from this initial assessment should be at least a partial restated mission, and a timeline. Platoon leaders issue their initial warning order (WARNORD) on this first assessment and time allocation. Assessment continues during planning, updated as needed throughout preparation and execution based on information gained through the platoon leader’s continuous assessment.

4-157. Assessment of risk assists the platoon leader in making informed decisions on changing task organization, shifting priorities of effort and support, and future operations. Effectiveness entails making accurate assessments and good decisions about how to fight the enemy. Vital supporting concepts are TLP, actions on contact, and risk management (see chapter 2). Leaders use the assessment process to generate combat power.

4-158. Specific to execution, assessment involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using indicators to judge progress toward attaining desired end state conditions. Assessments help platoon leaders to adjust plans based on changes in the situation, when the operation is complete, and when to transition into the next cycle of the operations process. Platoon leaders constantly assess the actual progress of the operation against the plan through the following (although not all-inclusive) questions:

  • Is there new or changing intelligence from high headquarters?
  • Are there new priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and/or information requirements (and were current PIRs answered correctly)?
  • Is the platoon synched with the plan, for example:
    • Is the movement faster or slower than planned?
    • Are the obstacle types and locations templated correctly?
    • Is planned ammunition consumption correct?
    • Is combat power still adequate to accomplish the mission?
  • Is the threat assessment made during planning and preparation still correct, for example:
    • Is the enemy stronger or weaker than templated?
    • Are preparatory fires adequate?
    • Are enemy locations templated correctly?
    • Are there still local enemy remnants or unengaged counterattacking forces?
  • Is there an ability, in terms of opportunity, to seize or regain the initiative, for example:
    • Is there terrain to gain a better position of advantage over the enemy?
    • Is there an opportunity to catch the enemy by surprise or prior to the employment of enemy forces?
    • Are there unplanned but now-identified enemy reinforcements orcapabilities on the way to, or on the objective that need to be engaged?

Variations of The Attack

4-159. Variations of the attack are ambush, counterattack, raid, and spoiling attack. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.) The commander’s intent and analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC (I) determines which variation of the attack to employ. Each variation of attack, except for a raid, can be conducted as either a hasty or a deliberate operation. As variations of an attack, they share many of the planning, preparation, and execution considerations of attack.

Ambush

4-160. An ambush is an attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. An ambush stops, denies, or destroys enemy forces by maximizing the element of surprise. Ambushes can employ direct fire systems as well as other destructive means, such as command-detonated mines, indirect fires, and supporting nonlethal effects. They may include an assault to close with and destroy enemy forces. In an ambush, ground objectives do not have to be seized and held.

4-161. The three common forms of a small-unit ambush are point, area, and antiarmor ambushes. In a point ambush, a unit deploys to attack a single kill zone. In an area ambush, a unit deploys into two or more related point ambushes. Units smaller than a platoon normally do not conduct an area ambush. In an antiarmor ambush, a unit focuses on moving or temporarily halted enemy armored vehicles. (See chapter 7 for additional information.)

Counterattack

4-162. A counterattack is a variation of attack by a defending force against an attacking enemy force (FM 3-90). (For example, within a company’s area defense, a platoon or squad may conduct a counterattack from its subsequent battle position to retake its prior primary battle position, see paragraphs 5-172 to 5-173.) The leader directs a counterattack to defeat or destroy enemy forces, exploit an enemy weakness such as an exposed flank, or to regain control of terrain and facilities after an enemy success. Units executing a counterattack can use all or part of the defending force, to include their reserve when given as a priority planning mission, against an enemy attacking force.

4-163. A unit conducts a counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy through offensive action. A counterattacking force may maneuver to isolate and destroy a designated enemy force, or it can be an attack by fire into an engagement area to defeat or destroy an enemy force, restore the original position, or block an enemy penetration.

4-164. To be decisive, the counterattack occurs when the enemy is overextended, dispersed, and disorganized during the attack. All counterattacks should be rehearsed in the same conditions they will be conducted. During planning and preparation, leaders consider planning the commitment criteria and triggers for conducting a counterattack. In execution, leaders must be alert to those criteria and triggers emerging during an operation. If they do emerge, the platoon leader immediately launches the planned counterattack. Once committed, that force becomes the main effort.

Raid

4-165. A raid is a limited-objective, deliberate operation entailing swift penetration of hostile terrain. A raid is not intended to hold territory; and it requires detailed intelligence, preparation, and planning. (See chapter 7 for additional information.) The Infantry platoon and squad conducts raids as part of a larger force to accomplish several missions, including the following:

  • Capture prisoners, installations, or enemy materiel.
  • Capture or destroy specific enemy command and control locations.
  • Destroy enemy materiel or installations.
  • Obtain information concerning enemy locations, dispositions, strength, intentions, or methods of operation.
  • Confuse the enemy or disrupt the enemy’s plans.
  • Liberate friendly personnel.

Spoiling Attack

4-166. A spoiling attack is a variation of an attack employed against an enemy preparing for an attack (FM 3-90). The spoiling attack usually employs armored, attack helicopter, or fire support elements to attack enemy assembly positions in front of a friendly commander’s main line of resistance or battle positions.

4-167. The objective of a spoiling attack is to disrupt the enemy’s offensive capabilities and timelines while destroying targeted enemy personnel and equipment, not to seize terrain and other physical objectives. Two conditions must be met to conduct a survivable spoiling attack:

  • The spoiling attack’s objective must be obtainable before the enemy is able to respond to the attack in a synchronized and coordinated manner.
  • The force conducting the spoiling attack must be prevented from becoming over extended, fixed, or having insufficient mobility to break contact and /or withdraw.

4-168. Infantry forces conduct a spoiling attack whenever possible during friendly defensive missions to strike an enemy force while it is in a TAA or attack position(s) preparing for its own offensive mission or is stopped temporarily. For example, a platoon may conduct an infiltration behind enemy lines to impair (platoon ambush or raid) an enemy’s ability to organize for its operation.

Operations During Limited Visibility

4-169. Effective use of advanced optical sights and equipment during limited visibility attacks enhances the ability of squads and platoons to achieve surprise, hit targets, and cause panic in a lesser-equipped enemy. Advanced optics and equipment allow the Infantry Soldier to see farther and with greater clarity.

Use Of Illumination, Night Vision, And Infrared Lasers

4-170. Night vision devices provide good visibility in all but pitch-black conditions but do somewhat limit the Soldier’s field of view. Leaders must understand that night vision devices emit light at the eyecups, and many have an infrared illuminator which can emit light that is visible to a peer threat. Night vision devices are also visible to other night vision devices. Infantry platoons have night vision equipment mounted on the helmet of each Soldier and weapon-mounted and handheld devices to identify and designate targets.

4-171. Infantry leaders and Soldiers have an increased ability to designate and control fires during limited visibility. There are three types of advanced optics and equipment for use in fire control:

  • Target designators. Leaders can designate targets with greater precision using infrared laser pointers to designate targets and sectors of fire and to concentrate fire. The leader lazes a target for Soldiers to place their fires. The Soldiers then use their weapon’s aiming lights to engage the target.
  • Aiming lights. Soldiers with aiming lights have greater accuracy of fires during limited visibility. Each Soldier in the Infantry platoon is equipped with an aiming light for the individual weapon. Aiming lights work with the individual Soldier’s helmet-mounted night vision goggles. It puts an infrared light on the target at the point of aim.
  • Target illuminators. Leaders can designate larger targets using target illuminators. Target illuminators are essentially infrared light sources that light the target, making it easier to acquire effectively. Leaders and Soldiers use the infrared devices to identify enemy or friendly personnel and then engage targets using their aiming lights.

4-172. Illuminating rounds fired to burn on the ground can mark objectives. This helps the platoon orient on the objective but may adversely affect night vision devices.

4-173. Leaders plan but do not always use illumination during limited visibility attacks. Battalion commanders normally control conventional illumination but may authorize the company commander to do so. If the commander decides to use conventional illumination, the commander should not call for it until the assault is initiated or the attack is detected. It should be placed on several locations over a wide area to confuse the enemy as to the exact place of the attack. It should be placed beyond the objective to help assaulting Soldiers see and fire at withdrawing or counterattacking enemy Soldiers. Infrared illumination is a good capability to light the objective without lighting it for enemy forces without night vision devices. This advantage is degraded when used against a peer threat with the same night vision capabilities.

4-174. The platoon leader, squad leaders, and vehicle commanders must know unit tactical SOP and develop sound COAs to synchronize the employment of infrared illumination devices, target designators, and aiming lights during their assault on the objective. These include using luminous tape or chemical lights to mark personnel and using weapons control restrictions.

4-175. The platoon leader may use the following techniques to increase control during the assault:

  • Use no flares, grenades, or obscuration on the objective.
  • Use mortar or artillery rounds to orient attacking units.
  • Use a base squad or fire team to pace and guide others.
  • Reduce intervals between Soldiers and squads.

4-176. Like a daylight attack, indirect and direct fires are planned for a limited visibility attack but are not executed unless the platoon is detected or is ready to assault. Some weapons may fire before the attack and maintain a pattern to deceive the enemy or to help cover noise made by the platoon’s movement. This is not done if it will disclose the attack.

4-177. Obscuration further reduces the enemy’s visibility, particularly if the enemy has night vision devices. The FO fires obscuration rounds close to or on enemy positions, so it does not restrict friendly movement or hinder the reduction of obstacles. Employing obscuration on the objective during the assault may make it hard for assaulting Soldiers to find enemy fighting positions. If enough thermal sights are available, obscuration on the objective may provide a decisive advantage for a well-trained platoon.

Note. If the enemy is equipped with night vision devices, leaders must evaluate the risk of using each technique and ensure the mission is not compromised by the enemy’s ability to detect infrared light sources.

Deliberate Battlefield Obscuration

4-178. Battlefield obscuration missions can occur during both the offense and the defense and can be highly effective. Firing obscuration on enemy positions can degrade the vision of gunners and known or suspected observation posts, preventing them from seeing or tracking targets and, thereby, reducing their effectiveness. When employed for its incendiary effect, white phosphorous (WP) can cause confusion and disorientation by degrading the enemy’s command and control capabilities; while friendly units retain the ability to engage the enemy using thermal sights and DA Form 5517 (Standard Range Card). Enemy vehicles become silhouetted as they emerge from the obscuration. If obscuration employment is planned and executed correctly, this occurs as the enemy reaches the trigger line. (See ATP 3-11.50 for additional information.)

Note. Phosphorous obscuration is used in instantaneous burst munitions (for example, artillery shells and mortar cartridges), with the showers of burning phosphorous particles being highly incendiary. The projectile has an incendiary-producing effect and is ballistically similar to the high explosive projectile. Normally, shell WP is employed for its incendiary effect. The projectile can also be used for screening, spotting, and signaling purposes.

Projected Obscuration

4-179. Projected obscuration is an obscurant produced by artillery or mortar munitions, naval gunfire, helicopter-delivered rockets or, potentially, weapon grenade launchers. The advantage of using projected obscurant munitions is that they can place obscurants directly on the target without becoming decisively engaged. The disadvantage of projected obscuration is that most projected obscurant devices and munitions are lethal; they cannot be used on or near friendly forces. Ideal military applications for projected obscuration systems are to produce protection effects by obscuring enemy forces at distant locations and to mark distant targets for destruction by lethal fire or protection obscuration to initiate protection screens forward of an attacking force.

4-180. Obscuration employed to screen friendly forces and their interests is delivered in areas between friendly and enemy forces or in a friendly AO to degrade enemy ground or aerial detection, observation, and engagement capabilities. Units use screening obscuration to attack enemy target acquisition and guidance systems by placing obscuration effects between the friendly unit and enemy sensors. There are three visibility categories for visual screening obscuration that the supported unit commander uses to establish the visibility requirement for an obscuration mission. The visibility categories include obscuration blanket, haze, and curtain:

  • Obscuration blanket. An obscuration blanket is a dense horizontal concentration of smoke covering an area of ground with visibility inside the concentration less than 50 meters. The blanket is established over and around friendly areas to protect them from air visual observation and visual precision bombing attacks. An obscuration blanket may hamper the operations of friendly forces by restricting movement and activity within the screen. It provides maximum concealment.
  • Obscuration haze. An obscuration haze is obscuration placed over friendly areas to restrict adversary observation with fire, but not dense enough to disrupt friendly operations within the screen.
  • Obscuration curtain. An obscuration curtain is a vertical development of smoke that reduces the enemy’s ability to clearly identify what is occurring on the other side of the cloud. Visual recognition depends on the curtain width and obscurant density. It is placed between friendly and enemy positions to prevent or degrade enemy ground observation of friendly positions. Since the obscuration curtain is not placed directly on friendly troops, it will not hamper friendly operations.

Planning and Preparation Considerations

4-181. Obscuration missions are important functions for grenade launchers and mortars. Obscuration missions must be planned well and prepared for in advance so that the grenade launchers or mortar carriers are loaded with enough obscuration rounds.

4-182. Atmospheric stability, wind velocity, and wind direction are the most important factors when planning target effects for obscuration and WP mortar rounds. The effects of atmospheric stability can determine whether projected obscuration is effective at all or, if effective, how much ammunition is needed. The considerations are—

  • During unstable conditions, grenade and mortar obscuration rounds are almost ineffective—the obscuration does not spread but often climbs straight up and quickly dissipates.
  • Under stable conditions, both grenade and mortar obscuration rounds are effective.
  • The higher the humidity, the better the screening effects of grenade and mortar obscuration rounds.

4-183. The terrain in the target area affects obscuration rounds. If the terrain in the target area is swampy, rain-soaked, or snow-covered, then burning obscuration rounds may not be effective. These rounds produce obscuration by ejecting felt wedges soaked in phosphorous. These wedges then burn on the ground, producing a dense, long-lasting cloud. If the wedges fall into mud, water, or snow, they can extinguish. Shallow water can reduce the obscuration produced by these rounds by as much as 50 percent.

4-184. The vehicle mounted grenade launchers (from the assault platoon of the weapons company) can provide a screening, incendiary, marking, and casualty-producing effect. It produces a localized, instantaneous obscuration cloud by scattering burning WP particles. The 120-millimeter (mm) heavy mortar and 81-mm medium battalion mortar WP and red phosphorous rounds produce a long lasting and wide area obscuration screen and can be used for incendiary effects, such as marking, obscuring, screening, and casualty producing. The 60-mm lightweight company mortar WP round can be used as a screening, signaling, and incendiary agent. All mortar obscuration rounds can be used as an aid in target location and navigation.

Employment Considerations

4-185. When used correctly obscurants can significantly reduce the enemy’s effectiveness both in daytime and at night. Use obscurants to reduce the ability of the enemy to deliver effective fires, to hamper hostile operations, and to deny the enemy information on friendly positions and maneuvers. Obscurant reduces the effectiveness of laser beams and inhibits electro optical systems including some night vision devices. Additional usage and purpose include:

  • Obscuration to:
    • Defeat flash to bang ranging and restrict the enemy’s counterfire program.
    • Obscure adversary observation posts and reduce their ability to provide accurate target location for enemy fire support assets.
    • Obscure enemy direct fire weapons and lasers.
    • Instill apprehension and increase enemy patrolling.
    • Slow adversary vehicles to blackout speeds.
    • Increase control problems by preventing effective visual signals and increasing radio traffic.
    • Defeat night observation devices and reduce the capability of most infrared devices.
  • Obscuration curtain for:
    • Deceptive screens. Smoke draws fire. Deceptive screens cause the enemy to disperse their fires and expend ammunition.
    • Flank screens. Smoke may be used to screen exposed flanks.
    • Areas forward of the objective. Smoke helps the maneuver units consolidate on the objective unhindered by enemy ground observers.
    • Gap crossing operations. Screening the primary crossing site denies the enemy information. Deceptive screens deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the main crossing.
    • Obstacle breaching. The enemy is denied the ability to observe breaching unit activities.

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