Section 1 – Conduct of the Offense

4-1. Offensive action is the critical part of any engagement. Successful offensive operations require units to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to defeat—to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0)—the enemy. Even when conducting primarily defensive operations, taking the initiative from the enemy requires offensive operations that are force- or terrain-oriented. Force-oriented tasks focus on the enemy while terrain-oriented tasks focus on seizing, retaining, and controlling terrain and facilities. The tactical mission tasks, seize, retain, and control are defined as follows:

  • Seize is a tactical mission task in which a unit takes possession of a designated area by using overwhelming force (FM 3-90).
  • Retain is a tactical mission task in which a unit prevents enemy occupation or use of terrain (FM 3-90).
  • Control is a tactical mission task in which a unit maintains physical influence over an assigned area (FM 3-90).

Characteristics of The Offense

4-2. The offense is characterized by audacity, concentration, surprise, and tempo. The ability to gain and maintain the initiative to defeat an enemy greatly depends upon the proper application of the characteristics of the offense. (See FM 3-96 for additional information.)

Audacity

4-3. Audacity is a willingness to take bold risks. The bold execution of plans increases the chance for surprise and enables leaders to control the tempo. This depends upon the leader’s ability to see opportunities for action and accept prudent risks commensurate with the value of their objectives to take advantage of those opportunities. Leaders dispel uncertainty by acting decisively and inspire Soldiers to overcome adversity and danger. They compensate for a lack of information by developing the situation aggressively and seizing the initiative. The Infantry platoon and squad demonstrate audacity through—

  • Building flexible plans that allow leaders to adapt to changing circumstances.
  • Maintaining situational awareness to identify and take advantage of opportunities.
  • Understanding the true value of an objective to the larger operation and the risks involved in achieving it.
  • Maintain continuous communications to ensure others are aware of changes to the plan.
  • Requesting additional support as required to mitigate unnecessary risks.

Concentration

4-4. Concentration is massing the effects of combat power in time and space at the decisive point(s) to achieve a single purpose. This requires coordination and an awareness of the environment to position forces in ways that enable concentration without losing surprise, sacrificing tempo, or creating lucrative targets for the enemy. The Infantry platoon and squad achieve concentration through—

  • Careful planning and coordination to synchronize efforts based on a thorough terrain and enemy analysis and accurate reconnaissance and surveillance.
  • Designating a main effort and allocating resources to support it.
  • Integrating effects from higher-level assets, including indirect fires, Army and joint and multinational aviation assets, and electromagnetic warfare (EW) with maneuver.
  • Maintaining continuous information flow to keep operations synchronized.

Surprise

4-5. Surprise is an effect achieved by attacking the enemy at a time or place they do not expect or in a manner for which they are unprepared. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and confuses enemy command and control systems, induces psychological shock in enemy Soldiers and leaders, and reduces the coherence of defensive missions. By diminishing enemy combat power, surprise enables the attackers to exploit enemy paralysis and hesitancy. The Infantry platoon and squad achieve surprise by—

  • Conducting thorough reconnaissance and surveillance to confirm enemy disposition, determine what actions they are prepared for, and identify opportunities to exploit in unexpected ways.
  • Changing the tempo of operations or accepting risk in a way the enemy was unable to anticipate.
  • Conducting counterreconnaissance, employing stealth, and disrupting communications to deny enemy situational understanding.
  • Striking the enemy from an unexpected direction, at an unexpected time, and with a combination of capabilities that they are unable to defeat.

Tempo

4-6. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). Tempo is not simply moving fast, but the idea that the cumulative effects of offense operations place enemy forces under continuous pressure. Even if portions of friendly forces are in a tactical pause, someone is always applying pressure, resulting in an enemy force that is reactive. Controlling or altering tempo is necessary to retain the initiative. A faster tempo allows attackers to quickly penetrate barriers and defenses and destroy enemy forces in-depth before they can react. Leaders can also purposely slow the tempo to lull the enemy into a false sense of security, but this is rarely done at the platoon or squad level. Leaders adjust tempo as tactical situations, sustainment necessity, or operational opportunities allow. They ensure synchronization and proper coordination, but not at the expense of losing opportunities to defeat the enemy. Rapid tempo denies the enemy the chance to rest while continually creating offensive opportunities but demands quick decisions and places ever increasing strain on Soldiers, equipment, and systems. The Infantry platoon and squad control the tempo by—

  • Streamlining planning, preparation, and recovery activities to start movement more quickly than expected from a previous action.
  • Moving more quickly than expected, especially across restrictive terrain.
  • Engaging the enemy at multiple locations within a short time or simultaneously.
  • Maintaining situational awareness and audaciously exploiting opportunities as they appear.

Offensive Operations

4-7. An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Offensive operations impose the leader’s will on an enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a physical and psychological advantage. In the offense, the platoon’s main effort is a sudden action directed toward enemy weaknesses and capitalizing on speed, surprise, and shock. If that effort fails to destroy an enemy, operations continue until enemy forces are defeated. The offense compels an enemy to react, creating new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can exploit. The four types of offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.

Movement to Contact

4-8. Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to develop the situation (FM 3-90). The goal of a movement to contact is to make initial contact with the smallest friendly force possible, consistent with protecting the force while retaining enough combat power to develop the situation and mitigate the associated risk. The unit conducts a movement to contact when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. A movement to contact creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. Once the platoon makes contact with the enemy force, the leader has five options: attack (platoon assault), defend, bypass, delay, or withdraw. Subordinate variations of a movement to contact include search and attack, and cordon and search operations. (See section III of this chapter for additional information.)

Attack

4-9. An attack is a type of offensive operation that defeats enemy forces, seizes terrain, or secures terrain (FM 3-90). An attack differs from a movement to contact because enemy main body dispositions are at least partially known, allowing the leader to achieve greater synchronization. This enables more effective massing of an attacking forces’ combat power than in a movement to contact. The attack can be hasty or deliberate depending upon the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. (See section IV of this chapter for additional information.)

4-10. Variations of the attack are ambush, counterattack, raid, and spoiling attack (see section IV of this chapter). The platoon leader’s intent and the mission variables guide which of these variations of attack to employ. Units conduct each of these variations, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation. (See chapter 7 for additional information on the ambush and raid.)

Exploitation

4-11. An exploitation is a type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the enemy in depth (FM 3-90). While Infantry platoons and squads might be part of a higher echelon exploitation as a fixing or striking force, they will not plan or execute one on their own. (See ATP 3-21.20 for additional information.)

Pursuit

4-12. A pursuit is a type of offensive operation to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (FM 3-90). There are two variations of the pursuit: frontal and combination. A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation but can follow any type of offensive operation if the enemy resistance breaks down and they begin fleeing the battlefield. Infantry platoons and squads do not plan pursuits at their levels and are unlikely to participate in a higher echelon pursuit due to a lack of mobility. (See ATP 3-21.20 for additional information.)

Forms of Maneuver

4-13. Forms of maneuver are distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the enemy (ADP 3-90). Leaders select the form of maneuver based on their analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC (I) mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations. Leaders then synchronize the contributions of all warfighting functions to the selected form of maneuver. A platoon operation may contain several forms of offensive maneuver, such as a frontal attack to clear enemy security forces prior to establishing a support by fire position, followed by an envelopment focused on attacking an assailable flank—a flank exposed to attack or envelopment (ADP 3-90)—to avoid the enemy’s strength to the front of an objective. A form of maneuver can also be used in the defense (see chapter 5). For example, in an area defense or mobile defense the counterattacking force or striking force, respectively, conducts an envelopment to destroy the enemy. While Infantry platoons and squads do not have the combat power to conduct all forms of maneuver on their own, they will participate as part of a larger organization. The five forms of maneuver are—

  • Frontal attack.
  • Envelopment.
  • Infiltration.
  • Turning movement.
  • Penetration.

Frontal Attack

4-14. A frontal attack is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place over a broad front (FM 3-90). The frontal attack is usually the least desirable form of maneuver because it exposes the majority of the offensive force to the concentrated fires of the defender. The Infantry rifle platoon normally conducts a frontal attack as part of a larger operation against a stationary or moving enemy force. (See figure 4-1 on page 4-6.) Unless frontal attacks are executed with overwhelming and well-synchronized speed and strength against a weaker enemy, they are seldom decisive. The frontal attack may be appropriate in an attack (see section VI) or meeting engagement (see section III) where speed and simplicity are paramount to maintain tempo and, ultimately, the initiative or in a supporting effort to fix an enemy force.

Figure 4-1. Frontal attack

Envelopment

4-15. Envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force avoids an enemy’s principal defense by attacking along an assailable flank (FM 3-90). The attacking element’s main effort focuses on attacking an assailable flank. It avoids the enemy’s strength at the front where the effects of fires and obstacles are greatest. Generally, an envelopment is the preferred form of maneuver instead of a penetration or frontal attack because the attacking force tends to suffer fewer casualties while having the most opportunities to destroy the enemy. If no assailable flank is available, the attacking force creates one. At the tactical level (specifically at platoon and company echelons), the enveloping force’s main effort is focused on the enemy’s flank while the supporting effort of the envelopment usually engages the enemy’s front by fire. The supporting effort diverts the enemy’s attention from the threatened flank and prevents maneuver against the main effort. This form of maneuver is often used for a hasty operation (specifically an attack) or meeting engagement where speed and simplicity are paramount to maintaining battle tempo and, ultimately, the initiative. The three variations of the envelopment are—

  • Single envelopment—a variation of envelopment where a force attacks along one flank of an enemy force (FM 3-90). (See figure 4-2.)
  • Double envelopment—a variation of envelopment where forces simultaneously attack along both flanks of an enemy force (FM 3-90). (See ATP 3-21.20.)
  • Vertical envelopment—a variation of envelopment where air-dropped or airlanded troops attack an enemy forces rear, flank, or both (FM 3-90). (See ATP 3-21.20 and FM 3-99.)

Note. When the Infantry rifle company and platoon are involved in an envelopment as part of a larger attacking force (generally conducted on a deeper axis), the envelopment will generally focus on seizing terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes. Interdict is a tactical mission task in which a unit prevents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route in any domain (FM 3-90). (See ATP 3-21.20 for additional information on the double and vertical envelopments.)

Figure 4-2. Single envelopment

Infiltration

4-16. An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces (FM 3-90). The platoon leader uses infiltration to—

  • Attack lightly defended positions or stronger positions from the flank and rear.
  • Secure key terrain in support of the main effort.
  • Disrupt or harass enemy defensive preparations/operations.
  • Relocate the platoon by moving to battle positions around an engagement area.
  • Reposition to attack vital facilities or enemy forces from the flank or rear.

4-17. The platoon leader can impose measures to control the infiltration including checkpoints, linkup points, phase lines, and assault position—a covered and concealed position short of the objective from which final preparations are made to assault the objective (ADP 3-90)—on the flank or rear of enemy positions. If it is not necessary for the entire infiltrating unit to reassemble to accomplish its mission, the objective area—a geographical area, defined by competent authority, within which is located an objective to be captured or reached by the military forces (JP 3-06)—may be broken into smaller objectives or positions. Each infiltrating element would move through a release point or move directly to its objective or position to conduct operations. (See figure 4-3.) A checkpoint—is a predetermined point on the ground used to control movement, tactical maneuver, and orientation (FM 3-90). The commander designates checkpoints along the route to assist marching units in complying with the timetable. A linkup point—is a designated place where two forces are scheduled to meet (FM 3-90). A linkup point (see paragraphs 6-44 to 6-52) should be an easily identifiable point on the ground, large enough for all infiltrating elements to assemble, and offer cover and concealment. Additional control measures for an infiltration may include—

  • An area of operations (AO) for the infiltrating unit.
  • One or more infiltration lanes.
  • A line of departure (LD) or point of departure (PD).
  • Movement routes with their associated start points and release points, or a direction or axis of attack.
  • Linkup or rally points, including objective rally points (known as ORPs).
  • Support by fire, attack by fire, or assault positions.
  • A limit of advance (LOA).

Figure 4-3. Infiltration route

4-18. Mission analysis will dictate the location of the infiltration route(s), the number of infiltration lanes, the size of the infiltration lane(s), the anticipated speed of movement, and the time of departure. An infiltration should be planned during limited visibility through areas the enemy does not occupy or cover by surveillance and fire. Planning should incorporate infiltration lanes, rally points along the route or axis, and contact points. Platoons and companies usually conduct infiltrations, but it is possible to execute at a battalion or squad level also. Planning considerations for the integration of attachments must be identified to increase effectiveness and to identify the potential for detection. Additional considerations during mission analysis can include:

  • Level of cover and concealment.
  • Movement distance and timeframe.
  • Size of infiltrating force.
  • Time required to linkup/reassemble.
  • Movement of units simultaneously vice sequentially.

4-19. An infiltration lane is a control measure that coordinates forward and lateral movement of infiltrating units and fixes fire planning responsibilities (FM 3-90). Single or multiple infiltration lanes can be planned. Using a single infiltration lane facilitates navigation, control, and reassembly, reduces susceptibility to detection, reduces the area requiring detailed intelligence, and increases the time required to move the force through enemy positions. Using multiple infiltration lanes reduces the possibility of compromise and allows more rapid movement but makes control more challenging. (See figure 4-4.)

Figure 4-4. Infiltration lane

4-20. Infantry forces conducting an infiltration, or a patrol (see chapter 7) commonly use a rally point as a control measure. A rally point is an easily identifiable point on the ground at which units can reassemble and reorganize if they become dispersed (FM 3-90). An objective rally point is an easily identifiable point where all elements of the infiltrating unit assemble and prepare to attack the objective (ADP 3-90). This rally point is typically near the infiltrating unit’s objective; however, there is no standard distance from the objective to the ORP. It should be far enough away from the objective so that the enemy will not detect the infiltrating unit’s attack preparations.

Turning Movement

4-21. A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy’s principal defensive positions by attacking to the rear of their current positions forcing them to move or divert forces to meet the threat (FM 3-90). A turning movement seeks to make the enemy force displace from their current locations, whereas an enveloping force seeks to engage the enemy in their current locations from an unexpected direction. A turning movement is particularly suited for division-sized or larger forces possessing a high degree of tactical mobility. The Infantry rifle platoon participates in a turning movement as part of that larger force, most likely as a supporting effort or fixing force as opposed to the main effort involving the turning force. (See ATP 3-21.20 for additional information.)

Penetration

4-22. A penetration is a form of maneuver in which a force attacks on a narrow front (FM 3-90). Destroying the continuity of defense allows the enemy’s subsequent isolation and defeat in detail by exploiting friendly forces. The penetration extends from the enemy’s security area through main defensive positions into the enemy support area. The leader employs a penetration when there is no assailable flank, enemy defenses are overextended and weak spots are detected in the enemy’s positions, or time pressures do not permit envelopment. Penetrations are normally only conducted at battalion echelon and above. When essential to the accomplishment of the mission, intermediate objectives should be planned for the attack. Usually, when the penetration is successfully completed, Infantry units within the battalion transition to another form of maneuver. (See ATP 3-21.20 for additional information.)

Common Offensive Control Measures

4-23. The higher commander defines the leader’s intent and establishes control measures allowing for decentralized execution and leader initiative to the greatest extent. Common control measures for the offense are the—

  • Assault position, assault time, and tactical assembly area (TAA).
  • Attack by fire position, attack position, and axis of advance.
  • Battle handover line (BHL).
  • Direction of attack.
  • Final coordination line and forward line of own troops (FLOT).
  • LOA and LD.
  • Objective and ORP.
  • Phase line.
  • Passage line, passage point, and PD
  • Probable line of deployment (PLD).
  • Rally point and release point.
  • Support by fire position.
  • Time of attack.
  • Zone.

4-24. An AO defines the location where subordinate units conduct their offensive actions. One technique breaks the battalion and company AO into many-named smaller AO. Units remain in designated AO as they conduct their missions. Battalion and higher reconnaissance assets might be used to observe an AO not assigned to a subordinate unit, while platoons or companies provide their own reconnaissance in their AO. This technique, along with target reference points (TRPs), help avoid fratricide in noncontiguous operations. Using a TRP facilitates the responsiveness of fixing and finishing elements once a reconnaissance element detects the enemy. Objectives and checkpoints guide the movement of subordinates and help leaders control their organizations. Contact points help coordination among the unit operating in adjacent areas.

4-25. When looking for terrain features to use as control measures, leaders consider three types: contiguous; point; and area. Contiguous features follow major natural and man-made features such as ridgelines, valleys, trails, streams, power lines, and streets. Point features can be identified by a specific feature or a grid coordinate including, hilltops and prominent buildings. Area features are significantly larger than point features and require a combination of grid coordinates and terrain orientation.

4-26. A zone is an operational area assigned to a unit in the offense that only has rear and lateral boundaries (FM 3-0). The non-bounded side of a zone is open towards enemy forces. A higher echelon headquarters uses fire support coordination and maneuver control measures such as an LOA and a coordinated fire line to synchronize its deep operations with those of a subordinate unit. Zones allow higher headquarters to adjust deep operations without having to change unit boundaries. This gives greater flexibility to the higher headquarters for controlling deep operations, allowing subordinate units to focus on close and rear operations. A zone is best for front-line units executing high-tempo offensive operations characterized by direct fire contact with the enemy and a fluid FLOT. Units treat everything behind the FLOT as an AO. Zone can be further subdivided as needed. (See FM 3-90 appendix A for additional information on zones.) (See ATP 3-21.10 and FM 3-96 for additional information.)

Tactical Framework Of The Offense

4-27. Offensive operations are typically executed in a four-step tactical framework. (See paragraphs 4-81 to 4-87 and 4-137 to 4-154.) The framework is for discussion purposes only and is not the only way of executing offensive operations. These steps overlap during the conduct of the offense. Normally the first two steps are supporting efforts, while the finish step is the main effort. Follow through is usually a sequel or branch to the plan based upon the situation. The four-step tactical framework of the offense during execution is—

  • Find the enemy. Intel drives fires and maneuver.
  • Fix the enemy. Prevent repositioning or reinforcement making them easier to destroy.
  • Finish the enemy. Mass available combat power to accomplish the mission.
  • Follow through. Defeat in detail, consolidate, reorganize, and transition.

Next Page : Section 2 – Common Offensive Planning Considerations

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