Step 3 – Make A Tentative Plan

2-23. The platoon leader begins TLP step 3 after having issued the WARNORD, or at any point after having enough information to proceed. The platoon leader need not wait for a complete OPORD before developing a tentative plan. Key steps include mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, COA comparison, and COA selection.

Mission Analysis

2-24. Mission analysis is the process by which a platoon leader gains a full understanding of what the platoon has been tasked to accomplish, and an understanding of the commander’s intent, both of which inform mission planning. Mission analysis is the most important part of making a tentative plan. There is no specific timeline allocated to mission analysis, but leaders should always adhere to the one-third/two-thirds rule, allocating roughly one-third of available planning and preparation time to themselves, and allowing their subordinates the remaining two-thirds.

2-25. The platoon leader uses the mission variables of METT-TC (I) to conduct mission analysis. This form of mission analysis is a continuation of the initial assessment performed in TLP step 1. The potential informational considerations are embedded within each of the other variables. At the conclusion, the platoon leader will understand—

• Commander’s intent at company and battalion.
• Factors of the mission variables as they relate to what the platoon must achieve.
• Tentative decisive point(s) essential to mission success.
• Tentative communications and electromagnetic warfare (EW) activities.
• Type, nature, and probable location of enemy contact throughout the depth of the operation.
• Threat-based and accident-based risks hazards to platoon operations.
• The platoon’s mission statement, nested with higher mission and intent.

Note. Typically, leaders below company level do not issue a commander’s intent. They reiterate the intent of their higher and next higher commanders.

Risk Management

2-27. The RM principles and five-step process help leaders identify hazards, assess risk, and make sound risk decisions-the determination to accept or not accept the risk(s) associated with an action the leader will take or will direct others to take.

2-28. The principles of RM are—

• Integrate RM into all phases of missions and operations.
• Make risk decisions at the appropriate level.
• Accept no unnecessary risk.
• Apply RM cyclically and continuously.

2-29. The five steps of RM are—

• Step 1-Identify the hazards.
• Step 2-Assess the hazards.
• Step 3-Develop controls and make risk decisions.
• Step 4-Implement controls.
• Step 5-Supervise and evaluate.

2-30. Steps 1 and 2 of RM are assessment steps-risk assessment is the identification and assessment of hazards. Steps 3 through 5 of RM are management steps that allow a leader to implement measures to control hazards. The mission variables of METT-TC (I) serve as a standard format for identifying hazards (see ATP 5-19). Mission variables used primarily as part of TLPs for planning and preparing for operations provide a pattern for addressing threat-based and accident-based hazards and associated risk for any activity. Leaders assess risk to protect the force and aid in mission accomplishment.

2-31. During mission analysis, the platoon leader uses informational and intelligence tools (for example, the IPOE and other intelligence products [see paragraphs 2-4 to 2-10]) to help develop a picture of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. During analysis, the leader looks for enemy presence or capabilities that pose hazards and risks to an operation and evaluates what the enemy or outside influences could do to defeat or spoil an operation. Informational and intelligence tools support threat-based risk assessments by identifying opportunities and any constraints the operational environment offers to both enemy and friendly forces.

2-32. Threat-based (tactical) risk is associated with hazards existing due to the enemy’s presence. The consequences of tactical risk take two major forms:

• Enemy action, where the leader has accepted risk such as an enemy attack where the friendly leader has chosen to conduct an economy of force.
• Lost opportunity, such as a decision to traverse across severely restricted terrain that would restrict the unit’s ability to quickly mass the effects of combat power once contact with the enemy is made.

2-33. Accident-based risks include all operational risks other than tactical risk and can include hazards concerning friendly personnel, equipment readiness, and environment. Once the platoon leader identifies an accidental risk based on the results of mission analysis, the risk is reduced through controls. For example, fratricide is a hazard categorized as an accident risk; surface danger zones and risk estimate distance are used to identify the controls, such as target reference points (TRPs), restricted fire lines, and phase lines, to reduce this accidental risk. When the leader decides what risk to accept, the leader also must decide in the COA how to reduce risk to an acceptable level. (See ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 5-19 for additional information.)

Note. Each commander must ensure a thorough understanding of the mission, including the senior commander’s intent and the risk tolerance, while not overly restricting subordinate initiative or ability to turn potential risk into opportunity. An unnecessary risk is any risk that, if taken, will not contribute meaningfully to mission accomplishment or will needlessly endanger lives or resources. Army leaders accept only a level of risk in which the potential benefit outweighs the potential loss. The process of weighing risks against opportunities and benefits helps to maximize unit capability, save lives, and preserve resources. The appropriate level of command makes risk acceptance decisions after applying RM and weighing potential gain against potential loss. Commanders need not be risk averse. Forces may undertake even high-risk endeavors when commanders determine that the sum of the benefits exceeds the sum of the costs. Commanders establish the basis for risk acceptance decisions through RM. (See ATP 5-19 for additional information.)

Communications

2-34. The ability to communicate during operations is essential. Initially the platoon establishes radio nets to link the platoon leader with higher headquarters and subordinate leaders. During operations, subordinate elements may have their own control net with the platoon leader or primary command post. Other communications activities such as signals are established and rehearsed. The platoon must be prepared to operate with digital networks or during periods of degraded communications. Messengers and visual signals are excellent means of communication during movement or when in static positions. The platoon may move under radio silence, or may use radios only in emergencies, or when it can use no other means of communication.

2-35. In an environment where every transmission is potentially targeted, the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (known as PACE) communications plan enables both mission success and survivability. To be effective, the PACE plan must be understood and rehearsed by every participant. The PACE plan is a communication plan that exists for a specific mission or task, not a specific unit, as the plan considers both intra- and inter-unit sharing of information. The platoon leader’s ability to exercise command and control during an operation can suffer due to communication systems not working properly or otherwise unavailable.

2-36. When the platoon does not have four viable methods of communications, it is appropriate to issue a PACE plan that may only have two or three systems listed. If the platoon cannot execute the full PACE plan to the company, the platoon leader must inform the company commander with an assessment of shortfalls, gaps, and possible mitigations as part of the mission analysis process during the TLP. During COA development, the platoon leader nest the platoon’s plan with the company’s plan (in turn the company’s plan nest with the battalion’s plan) whenever practical. This aids in maintaining continuity of effort. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)

2-37. During TLP units must prepare for denied, degraded, and disrupted command and control systems and reduced access to cyberspace and space operations capabilities. Key indicators that command and control systems are being degraded include:

• Degraded voice communications.
• Increased latency for data transmissions.
• Frequent and accurate targeting by threat lethal and nonlethal effects.
• Increased pings/network intrusions.
• Inconsistent digital common operational picture, for example, spoofing.
• Inaccurate Global Positioning System (GPS) data/no satellite lock and inconsistency between inertial navigation aids and GPS-enabled systems.
• Uncharacteristically few voice or digital transmissions.

2-38. Efforts to increase survivability and prevent degraded command and control systems include—

• Reduce radio power settings.
• Use messengers and hand and arm signals.
• Minimize length of frequency modulation transmissions.
• Use terrain to mask transmission signatures.
• Employment of directional antennas.
• Use remote antennas/carry spare antennas.
• Require physical presence of leaders at briefings, for example, distribute information via analog means in person.
• Use of camouflage and deception in all environments.
• Dig in command post.
• Use of communications windows to reduce transmissions.
• Employment of encryption/cypher techniques.

2-39. Efforts that counter the effects of degraded command and control systems include—

• Train to recognize indicators.
• Develop and rehearse contingency plans during the planning process and preparations.
• Maintain analog common operational pictures at all echelons.
• Train to operate from the commander’s intent, and analog graphics and synchronization matrixes.
• Keep plans as simple as possible that are less susceptible to friction.

Electromagnetic Warfare

2-40. Electromagnetic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85). Commanders and subordinate leaders at each echelon integrate EW activities into operations through cyberspace electromagnetic activities. EW capabilities are applied from the air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace by manned, unmanned, attended, or unattended systems. Cyberspace electromagnetic activities are the process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and EW operations. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)

Electromagnetic Warfare Capabilities

2-41. EW capabilities assist in shaping the operational environment to gain an advantage. For example, EW may be used to set favorable conditions for cyberspace operations by stimulating networked sensors, denying wireless networks, or other related actions. Operations in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum depend on EW activities maintaining freedom of action in both. EW consists of three functions, electromagnetic attack, electromagnetic protection (EP), and electromagnetic support. In any environment, the primary focus at the platoon and company level is on EP considerations as it relates to communications (see paragraphs 2-34 to 2-39) within small-unit operations.

Electromagnetic Protection

2-42. Electromagnetic protection is a division of electromagnetic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability (JP 3-85). For example, EP includes actions taken by the commander and subordinate leaders to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as frequency agility in a radio or variable pulse repetition frequency in radar. They avoid confusing EP with self-protection. Both defensive electromagnetic attack and EP protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment. However, EP protects from the effects of electromagnetic attack (friendly and enemy) and electromagnetic interference, while defensive electromagnetic attack primarily protects against lethal attacks by denying enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum to guide or trigger weapons. (See ATP 3-21.20 and ATP 3-12.3 for additional information on EW functions and activities.)

Emission Control

2-43. Leaders are responsible for emission control (known as EMCON) as an element of EP that inhibits enemy electromagnetic warfare (EW) capabilities from detecting, intercepting, finding, fixing, or engaging emitters. Emission control is the selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security: a. detection by enemy sensors; b. mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or c. enemy interference with the ability to execute a military deception plan (JP 3-85).

2-44. In large-scale combat operations against peer threats, the enemy is expected to use EW capabilities to detect, intercept, deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, or manipulate friendly communications, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. EMCON is a planning aid designed to help leaders develop standard procedures and battle drills for their unit’s unique suite of emitters using an appropriate mix of the EMCON considerations listed in table 2-1 on page 2-18.

Table 2-1. Emission control considerations

2-45. EMCON prevents the threat discovering and attacking the locations of friendly forces with EW. When establishing EMCON best practices, it is important to understand the general categories and status criteria for EMCON levels. Based on the tactical situation, the commander can dictate the appropriate EMCON level to the platoon. During operations, commanders consider EMCON level 3 (amber) as the baseline condition. Figure 2-4 captures the five EMCON levels and the general descriptive criteria associated with each level. (See ATP 3-12.3 and ATP 6-02.53 for additional information.)

Figure 2-4. Emission control status

Decisive Point

2-46. A decisive point is a key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Identifying a tentative decisive point(s) during mission analysis and verifying it during COA development is the most important aspect of the TLP. Visualizing a valid decisive point is how leaders determine how to achieve success and accomplish their purpose. Leaders develop their entire COA from a decisive point. Without determining a valid decisive point, leaders cannot begin to develop a valid or tactically sound COA. Leaders, based on their initial analysis of METT-TC (I), situational awareness, vision, and insight into how such factors can affect the unit’s mission, should visualize where, when, and how their unit’s ability to apply combat power (for example, firepower, protection, maneuver, leadership, and information) achieves their assigned task(s). A decisive point might orient on terrain, enemy, time, or a combination of these. A decisive point might be where or how, or from where, the unit will combine the effects of combat power against the enemy. A decisive point might be the event or action (with respect to terrain, enemy, or time, and generation of combat power) which will ultimately and irreversibly lead to the unit achieving its purpose.

2-47. A decisive point(s) does not simply restate the unit’s essential task or purpose; it defines how, where, or when the unit will accomplish its purpose. The unit’s designated main effort always focuses on a decisive point(s), and always accomplishes the unit’s purpose. Designating a decisive point(s) is critical to the leader’s vision of how to use combat power to achieve the purpose, how to task-organize units, and how to shape operations to support the main effort, and how the main effort will accomplish the unit’s purpose. This tentative decisive point(s) forms the basis of the leader’s planning and COA development. Leaders should clearly explain what the decisive point(s) is to subordinate leaders and why it is decisive; this summary, in conjunction with the commander’s intent, facilitates subordinate initiative. A valid decisive point enables the leader to clearly and logically link how the application of combat power with respect to terrain, enemy, and time allows the unit to accomplish its purpose. If the leader determines the tentative decisive point(s) is not valid during COA development or analysis, then the leader must determine another decisive point(s) and restart COA development.

Actions on Contact

2-48. Actions on contact—is a process to help leaders understand what is happening and to take action (FM 3-90). Leaders analyze the enemy throughout TLP to identify all likely contact situations that may occur during an operation. This process should not be confused with battle drills such as Battle Drill-React to Contact see appendix E. Battle drills are the actions of individual Soldiers and small units when they meet the enemy. Thorough planning and rehearsals conducted during TLP, enable leaders and Soldiers to develop and refine a COA to deal with probable enemy actions. The COA becomes the foundation for a scheme of maneuver.

2-49. Infantry platoons and squads execute actions on contact using a logical, well-organized process of decision making and action entailing these four steps:

• React.
• Develop the situation.
• Choose an action.
• Execute and report.

2-50. This four-step process is not intended to generate a rigid, lockstep response to the enemy. Rather, the goal is to provide an orderly framework enabling the Infantry rifle platoon and its squads to survive the initial contact and apply sound decision making and timely actions to complete the operation. Ideally, the unit sees the enemy (visual contact) before being seen by the enemy; it then can initiate direct contact on its own terms by executing the designated COA.

2-51. During movement once the lead element of a force (for example, during the conduct of a movement to contact) encounters an enemy, they conduct actions on contact. Obstacles encountered during movement are treated like enemy contact, in that, the unit assumes the obstacles are covered by fire. Once contact is made the unit’s security force will seek to gain a tactical advantage over an enemy by using tempo and initiative to conduct these actions, allowing it to gain and maintain contact without becoming decisively engaged, a fully committed force or unit that cannot maneuver or extricate itself (FM 3-90). How quickly the unit develops the situation is directly related to its security, and the tempo is directly related to the unit’s initial planning and use of well-rehearsed tactical standard operating procedure (SOP) and battle drills.

2-52. Leaders understand properly executed actions on contact require time at the squad and platoon levels. To develop the situation, a platoon may have to attack an assailable flank, conduct reconnaissance by fire—a technique in which a unit fires on a suspected enemy position (FM 3-90) see paragraph A-71, or call for and adjust indirect fires.

Mission Variables of METT-TC (I)

2-53. Analyzing the mission variables of METT-TC (I) is a continuous process. Leaders constantly receive information from the time they begin planning through execution. During execution, their continuous analysis enables them to issue well-developed fragmentary order—an abbreviated operation order issued as needed to change or modify an order or to execute a branch or sequel (JP 5-0). They must assess if the new information affects their missions and plans. If so, then they must decide how to adjust their plans to meet these new situations. They need not analyze METT-TC (I) in a particular order. How and when they do so depend on when they receive information as well as on their experience and preferences. One technique is to parallel the TLP based on the products received from higher. Using this technique, they would, but need not, analyze mission first; followed by terrain and weather; enemy; troops and support available; time available; and civil considerations and integrated into these variables, informational considerations.

Analysis of Mission

2-54. A mission is a task and purpose clearly indicating the action to be taken and reason for the action. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a mission is a duty or task assigned to an individual or unit. The mission is always the first factor leaders consider and most basic information question: “What have I been told to do, and why?”

2-55. Leaders at every echelon must understand the mission, intent, task, purpose, location, and concept of operation one and two levels higher. This understanding makes it possible to exercise disciplined initiative. Leaders capture their understanding of what their units are to accomplish in their revised mission statement. A mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why (JP 5-0). Leaders consider the following elements when analyzing the mission—

• Higher headquarters’ (two levels up) mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations.
• Immediate higher headquarters’ (one level up) mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations, available assets, and timeline.
• Unit’s assigned area of operation (AO), task, and purpose.
• The mission of adjacent, supporting, and supported units and their relationships to the higher headquarters’ plan.
• Assumptions and constraints.
• Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
• Restated mission.

2-56. Specific to platoon and squad mission, leaders must identify and understand tasks required to accomplish a given mission. The three types of tasks are specified, implied, and essential.

2-57. Specified tasks. Specified tasks are assigned to a unit by a higher headquarters and are found throughout the OPORD. Specified tasks also may be found in annexes and overlays; for example, “Seize Objective Fox;” “Reconnoiter route Blue;” “Assist the forward passage of 1st platoon, B Company.” “Send two Soldiers to assist in the loading of ammunition.”

2-58. Implied tasks. Implied tasks are those being performed to accomplish a specified task, but that are not stated in a higher headquarters’ order. Implied tasks derive from a detailed analysis of higher up orders, from the enemy situation and COA, from the terrain, and from knowledge of doctrine and history. Analyzing the unit’s current location in relation to future AO as well as the doctrinal requirements for each specified task might reveal the implied tasks. For example, if the specified task is “Seize Objective Fox,” and an updated intelligence assessment determines that Objective Fox is surrounded by reinforcing obstacles, this intelligence assessment would drive the implied task of “Breach reinforcing obstacles vicinity Objective Fox.”

2-59. Essential task. The essential task is the mission task—it accomplishes the assigned purpose. It, along with the platoon’s purpose, is usually assigned by the higher headquarters’ OPORD in concept of operations or tasks to maneuver units. For main efforts, since the purposes are the same (nested concept), the essential task also accomplishes the higher headquarters’ purpose. For supporting efforts, it accomplishes the assigned purpose, which supports the main effort.

2-60. Leaders conclude their analysis of the mission by restating their mission in terms of the platoon’s (or squad’s) mission statement. To do this, they answer the five Ws:

• Who (the unit).
• What (the unit’s essential task and type of operation).
• When (this is the time given in the company OPORD).
• Where (the objective or location stated in company OPORD).
• Why (the unit’s purpose, taken from the company’s concept of operations).

2-61. Example platoon mission statement in the defense, “1st Platoon/B Company/1-31 Infantry defends no later than 281700 (Z) December 2022 from GL 375652 to GL 394660 to prevent the envelopment of A Company, the battalion main effort.”

Analysis of Terrain and Weather

2-62. Leaders consider the cumulative effects of the natural terrain, man-made features (including obstacles), climate, and weather on both friendly and enemy operations. In general, terrain, climate, and weather do not favor one side over the other unless one is better prepared to operate in the environment or is more familiar with it. The terrain, however, may favor defending or attacking. Analysis of terrain answers the question: “What is the terrain’s effect on the operation?” Leaders analyze terrain using the categories of observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC).

Note. See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information on analyzing the terrain using the categories of OAKOC.

2-63. The MCOO shows the critical military aspects of terrain. It not only facilitates planning, but also aids in briefing subordinates. Specific questions on the aspects of the MCOO include but are not limited to avenues of approach, key terrain, mobility corridors, natural and man-made obstacles, and terrain mobility classifications. The information within the MCOO depicts the terrain according to the mobility classification. These classifications are severely restricted, restricted, and unrestricted.

2-64. Severely restricted terrain severely hinders or slows movement in movement formations unless some effort is made to enhance mobility, such as committing engineer assets to improving mobility or deviating to different movement formations. Severely restricted terrain for armored and mechanized forces is typically characterized by steep slopes and large or dense obstacle compositions with few bypasses.

2-65. Restricted terrain hinders movement to some degree. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility, but units may have difficulty maintaining preferred speeds, moving in movement formations, or transitioning from one formation to another. Restricted terrain slows movement by requiring zigzagging or frequent detours. Restricted terrain for armored or mechanized forces typically consists of moderate-to-steep slopes or moderate-to-dense obstacle compositions, such as restrictive slopes or curves. Swamps or rugged terrain are examples of restricted terrain for dismounted Infantry forces.

2-66. Unrestricted terrain is free from any restriction to movement. Nothing is required to enhance mobility. Unrestricted terrain for armored or mechanized forces is typically flat to moderately sloping terrain with few obstacles such as limiting slopes or curves.

Note. At company level and below, the commander and subordinate leaders develop a graphic terrain analysis overlay (known as GTAO). This product is similar to the MCOO in it shows the critical military aspects of terrain. Not only does it facilitate planning, but it also aids in briefing subordinates.

2-67. From the MCOO developed by higher headquarters (generally the battalion intelligence staff officer [S-2]), leaders can understand the general nature of the ground and effects of weather. However, at company level and below, they must conduct their own detailed analyses to determine how terrain and weather uniquely affects their units’ missions and the enemy. They must go beyond merely passing along the MCOO to their subordinate leaders and making general observations of the terrain such as “This is high ground,” or “This is a stream.” During the development of the GTAO, they determine how the terrain and weather will affect the enemy and their units. Additionally, they apply these conclusions when they develop COA for both enemy forces and their units. (See ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 2-01.3 for additional information.)

2-68. Terrain analysis should produce several specific conclusions for example:

• Battle, support by fire, and/or attack by fire position—the general position from which a unit performs the tactical task of attack by fire (ADP 3-90).
• Engagement areas and ambush sites.
• Immediate and intermediate objectives.
• Asset locations such as enemy command posts or ammunition caches.
• Assembly areas (AAs), attack positions, assault positions, objective rally points (known as ORPs), and/or casualty collection points (CCPs).
• Observation posts.
• Artillery firing positions.
• Air defense artillery system positions.
• Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition positions.
• Forward area arming and refueling points.
• Ford site (wet/dry) (gap—is a ravine, mountain pass, river, or other terrain feature that presents an obstacle that may be bridged [ATP 3-90.4]—locations).
• Landing and drop zones.
• Breach locations.
• Infiltration lanes.

2-69. The five military aspects of weather are visibility; winds; precipitation; cloud cover; temperature, humidity, and atmospheric pressure (see ATP 2-01.3). Consideration of the weather’s effects is an essential part of the leader’s mission analysis. Leaders go past observing to application. They determine how the weather will affect the visibility, mobility, and survivability of the unit and that of the enemy. Leaders review their commander’s conclusions and identifies their own. They apply the results to the friendly and enemy COA they develop. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)

Analysis of Enemy

2-70. Leaders analyze the enemy’s general situation, dispositions, compositions, strengths, doctrine, equipment, and capabilities by warfighting function, vulnerabilities, and probable COA. Analyzing the enemy answers, the question, “What is the enemy doing and why?” Leaders also answer—

• What is the composition and strength of the enemy force?
• What are the capabilities of the weapons? Other systems?
• What is the location of current and probable enemy positions?
• What is the enemy’s most likely COA (additionally most dangerous)? (Memory aid defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or delay [known as DRAW-D].)

2-71. Platoon leaders must understand the assumptions their company commander, in coordination with the battalion S-2, used to portray the enemy’s COA. Their own assumptions about the enemy should be consistent with those of their commander. When not, their assumptions must be known by the commander.

2-72. Leaders continually improve their situational understanding of the enemy and update their enemy SITEMP as new information or trends become available. Deviations or significant conclusions reached during their enemy analysis that could positively or negatively affect the battalion’s and company’s plan should be shared immediately with the battalion, company commander, and S-2.

2-73. In analyzing the enemy, platoon leaders must understand the IPOE (see paragraphs 2-4 to 2-7). Although platoon leaders usually do not prepare IPOE products for their subordinates, platoon leaders must be able to use the products of the higher headquarters’ IPOE.

2-74. Leaders must know more than just the number and types of vehicles, Soldiers, and weapons the enemy has. The leaders must thoroughly understand when, where, and how the enemy prefers or tends to use their assets. A SITEMP is a visual illustration of how the enemy force might look and act without the effects of weather and terrain. Leaders look at specific enemy actions during a given operation and use the appropriate SITEMP to gain insights into how the enemy may fight. Likewise, leaders must understand enemy doctrinal objectives. In doctrinal terms, leaders ask “Is the enemy oriented on terrain objectives, friendly force objectives, civilian objective, or some combination? What effect will this have on the way the enemy fights?”

2-75. Depending on the situation, some threat forces may lack structured doctrine. In such a situation, a leader must rely on information provided by battalion or higher echelon reconnaissance and surveillance assets and, most importantly, the leader and the leader’s higher headquarters’ pattern analysis and deductions about the enemy in their AO. The leader also may make sound assumptions about the enemy, human nature, and local culture. Questions to determine the enemy’s general situation include:

• Who are they?
• What are they doing?
• When did they get there?
• Where are they generally located?
• Why are they there?
• What is the nature of the threat they pose?

2-76. Gaining complete understanding of the enemy’s intentions can be difficult when the enemy SITEMPs, composition, and disposition are unclear. In all cases, the enemy’s recent activities must be understood, because they can provide insight into the enemy’s future activities and intentions. If time permits, a leader might be able to conduct a pattern analysis of the enemy’s actions to predict future actions. In the operational environment, this might be the most important analysis the leader conducts and is likely to yield the most useful information to the leader.

2-77. Leaders develop their enemy SITEMP after terrain and weather analysis so they better understand how the enemy will fight in a specific scenario. The leader includes in this SITEMP the likely sectors of fire of the enemy weapons and tactical and protective obstacles, either identified or merely template, which support defensive operations. Table 2-2 shows recommended SITEMP items. (See ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 2-01.3 for additional information.)

Table 2-2. Recommended enemy situation template items

Analysis of Troops and Support Available

2-78. Leaders study their task organization to determine the number, type, capabilities, and condition of available friendly troops and other support. Analysis of troops follows the same logic as analyzing the enemy by identifying capabilities, vulnerabilities, and strengths. Leaders should know the disposition, composition, strength, and capabilities of their forces one and two levels down. This information can be maintained in a checkbook-style matrix for use during COA development (specifically array forces).They maintain understanding of subordinates’ readiness, including maintenance, training, strengths and weaknesses, leaders, and logistics status (known as LOGSTAT). Analysis of troops and support answers the question: What assets are available to accomplish the mission? Leaders also answer these questions:

• What are the strengths and weaknesses of subordinate leaders?
• What is the supply status of ammunition, water, fuel (if required), and other necessary items?
• What is the present physical condition of Soldiers (morale, sleep)?
• What is the condition of equipment?
• What is the unit’s training status and experience relative to the mission?
• What additional Soldiers or units will accompany?
• What additional assets are required to accomplish the mission?
• What are the command and support relationships for all supporting or attached forces?

2-79. Perhaps the most critical aspect of mission analysis is determining the combat potential of one’s own force. Leaders must realistically and unemotionally determine all available resources and new limitations based on level of training or recent fighting. This includes troops who are attached either to or in direct support of the unit. It also includes understanding the full array of assets in support of the unit. Leaders must know what fires are available (and when) by type, quantity, and priority of fires.

2-80. Throughout planning and preparation for an operation, leaders continually assess their unit’s combat effectiveness—the ability of a unit to perform its mission. Information factors such as ammunition, personnel, fuel status, and weapon systems are evaluated and rated. (See FM 1-02.2.) The ratings used are—

• Fully operational – green (85 percent or greater).
• Substantially operational – amber (70 to 84 percent).
• Marginally operational – red (50 to 69 percent).
• Not operational – black (less than 50 percent).
• Unknown.

2-81. Because of the uncertainty always present in operations at the small-unit level, leaders cannot be expected to think of everything during their analysis. This fact forces leaders to determine how to get assistance when the situation exceeds their capabilities. Therefore, a secondary product of analysis of troops and support available should be an answer to the question, how do I get help?

Analysis of Time Available

2-82. The fifth mission variable of METT-TC (I) is time available. Time refers to many factors during the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). The five categories leaders consider include the memory aide HOPE-LW:

• Next higher echelon’s timeline.
• Operational.
• Planning and preparation.
• Enemy timeline.
• Light and weather.

2-83. During all phases, leaders consider critical times, unusable time, the time it takes to accomplish activities, the time it takes to move, priorities of work, and tempo of operations. Other critical conditions to consider include visibility and weather data, and events such as higher headquarters tasks and required rehearsals. Implied in the analysis of time is leader prioritization of events and sequencing of activities.

2-84. As addressed in step 1 of the TLP, time analysis is a critical aspect to planning, preparation, and execution. Time analysis is often the first thing a leader does. The leader must not only appreciate how much time is available, but also must be able to appreciate the time/space aspects of preparing, moving, fighting, and sustaining. The leader must be able to see the leader’s own tasks and enemy actions in relation to time. Most importantly, as events occur and more information is available, the leader must adjust the time available and assess its impact on what the leader wants to accomplish. Finally, the leader must update previous timelines for subordinates, listing all events affecting the platoon and its subordinate elements.

2-85. As an example, leaders estimate the time available to plan and prepare for the mission. Leaders begin by identifying the times they must complete major planning and preparation events, including rehearsals. Reverse planning assists in this process. Leaders identify critical times specified by higher headquarters and work backwards, estimating how much time each event will consume. Critical times might include times to load aircraft, cross the line of departure (LD), or the reach the start point for movement.

Analysis of Civil Considerations

2-86. Civil considerations include the influences of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes, activities of civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO, with regard to the conduct of military operations. Civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on operations in progress. Civil considerations of the environment can either help or hinder friendly or enemy forces; the difference lies in which leader has the information needed and taken the time to learn the situation and its possible effects on the operation. Analysis of civil considerations answers critical questions:

• How do civilian considerations affect the operation?
• How does the operation affect the civilians?
• What operations security measure can we implement to protect our critical information?
• For support we need from headquarters, when is it available?

2-87. The battalion, through the company commander, provides the platoon leader with civil considerations affecting the mission within the platoon’s AO. The memory aid: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) is used to analyze and describe these civil considerations.

2-88. The line between enemy combatants and civilian noncombatants is sometimes unclear. This requires the leader to understand the laws of war, the rules of engagement (ROE), and local situation. (See ATP 3-21.10 and FM 3-24.2 for additional information.)

Informational Considerations

2-89. Informational considerations are those aspects of the human, information, and physical dimensions that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information (FM 3-0). Understanding the physical, information, and human dimensions of each domain—a physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills (FM 3-0), helps the leader assess and anticipate the impacts of their operations. Their definitions follow:

• Physical dimension is the material characteristics and capabilities, both natural and manufactured, within an operational environment (FM 3-0).
• Information dimension is the content and data that individuals, groups, and information systems communicate and exchange, as well as the analytics and technical processes used to exchange information within an operational environment (FM 3-0).
• Human dimension encompasses people and the interaction between individuals and groups, how they understand information and events, make decisions, generate will, and act within an operational environment (FM 3-0).

Note. Within the context of an operational environment, a domain (land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace) is a physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills. Each military Service and branch trains and educates its leaders to be experts about operations in a primary domain, although each Service has some capability in each of the domains, and each develops shared understanding of how to integrate capabilities from different domains. (See FM 3-0 for additional information.)

2-90. Operations reflect the reality that war is an act of force (in the physical dimension) to compel (in the information dimension) the decision making and behavior of enemy forces (in the human dimension). Actions in one dimension influence factors in the other dimensions. Understanding the interrelationship enables decision making about how to create and exploit advantages in one dimension and achieve objectives in the others without causing undesirable consequences.

2-91. The platoon leader integrates information into all operations and activities to create favorable support and circumstances for friendly action, limit enemy or adversary action, and minimize unintended consequences. Informational considerations are the relevant friendly, threat, and neutral (both military and civilian) individuals, organizations, and systems capable of generating cognitive effects and influencing behavior. Informational considerations and example information related questions within each mission variable are addressed in paragraphs 2-54 to 2-88. These considerations and example questions are not intended to be an all-inclusive, but they can help guide the platoon leader to integrate informational considerations into the analysis of the mission variables. (See FM 5-0 and FM 3-13 for additional information.)

Specific Operational Environments

2-92. Specific operational environments include urban, mountain (includes cold weather regions), jungle, and desert. Subsurface areas are conditions found in all operational environments. Offensive, defensive, and stability operations in these environments follow the same planning process as operations in any other environment, but they do impose specific techniques and methods for success. The uniqueness of each environment may affect more than their physical aspects but also their informational systems, flow of information, and decision-making. As such, mission analysis must account for the information environment, space operations, and cyberspace within each specific operational environment. Each specific operational environment has a specific publication because of their individual characteristics. They include:

• Urban terrain—see ATTP 3-06.11 and ATP 3-06 for additional information.
• Mountainous terrain and cold weather environments—see ATP 3-90.97, ATP 3-21.50, and ATP 3-21.18 for additional information.
• Jungle terrain—see ATP 3-90.98 for additional information.
• Desert terrain—see ATP 3-90.99 for additional information.
• Subsurface areas:
  • See ATP 3-21.51 for information on threat and hazardous subterranean structures existing or operating in concealment or hidden or when utilized in secret by an enemy or adversary.
  • See ATTP 3-06.11, ATP 3-06.1, ATP 3-21.50, ATP 3-06, and ATP 3-34.81 for additional information on subsurface areas.

Note. Subsurface areas are below the surface level (ground level) that may consist of underground facilities, passages, subway lines, utility corridors or tunnels, sewers and storm drains, caves, or other subterranean spaces. This dimension includes areas both below the ground and below water. In older cities, subsurface areas can include preindustrial age hand-dug tunnels and catacombs.

Course of Action Development

2-93. The purpose of COA development is to determine one or more ways to accomplish the mission consistent with the immediate higher commander’s intent. ACOA describes how the unit might generate the effects of overwhelming combat power against the enemy at the decisive point(s) with the least friendly casualties. Each COA the leader develops must be detailed enough to describe clearly how the leader envisions using all of the assets and combat multipliers to achieve the unit’s mission-essential task and purpose.

Note. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them. A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (See FM 5-0 for additional information.)

2-94. To develop a COA, leaders focus on the actions the unit must take at the decisive point(s) and works backward to the start point. For example, leaders ensure sufficient combat power is available to enable the required actions against anticipated enemy contact(s) during movement. Leaders focus their efforts to develop at least one well-synchronized COA; if time permits, leaders should develop several. The result of the COA development process is paragraph 3 of the OPORD. A COA should position the unit for future operations and provide flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also should give subordinates the maximum latitude for initiative.

Screening Criteria

2-95. Leaders use screening criteria to ensure solutions they consider can solve the tactical problem. Screening criteria defines the limits of an acceptable solution. They are tools to establish the baseline products for analysis. Leaders may reject a solution based solely on the application of screening criteria. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.) Leaders apply five categories of screening criteria to test a possible solution:

• Feasible—fits within available resources.
• Acceptable—worth the cost or risk.
• Suitable—solves the problem and is legal and ethical.
• Distinguishable—differs significantly from other solutions.
• Complete—contains the critical aspects of solving the problem from start to finish.

Note. Leaders assess risk continuously throughout COA development.

Actions (Generate Possible Solutions)

2-96. After gathering information relevant to the tactical problem and developing criteria, the platoon leader formulates possible solutions to accomplish the mission. The leader carefully considers the guidance provided by the commander or their superiors and develop several alternatives to solve the tactical problem. Too many possible solutions may result in time wasted on similar options. Experience and time available determine how many solutions the leader considers. The leader should consider at least two solutions. Limiting solutions enables the problem solver to use both analysis and comparison as problem-solving tools. Developing only one solution to “save time” may produce a faster solution but risks creating more problems from factors not considered. The leader analyzes relative combat power, generates options, arrays forces (generally two levels below their echelon), develops a concept of operations, analyzes Soldier load, assigns responsibility, and prepares a COA statement and sketch for each COA. (See ATP 3-21.10 appendix B for additional information.)

Course of Action Analysis

2-97. COA analysis begins with both friendly and enemy COA and, using a method of action-reaction-counteraction war game, results in a synchronized friendly plan, identified strengths and weaknesses, updated risk assessment, and a gaining of insights into possible branches and sequels to the basic plan. After developing the COA, leaders analyze it to determine its strengths and weaknesses, visualize the flow of the battle, identify the conditions or requirements necessary to enhance synchronization, and gain insights into actions at the decisive point(s) of the mission. If leaders developed more than one COA, they apply this same analysis to each COA developed.

2-98. Leaders do this analysis through war gaming or “fighting” the COA against at least one enemy COA. For each COA, leaders think through the operation from start to finish. Leaders compare their COA with the enemy’s most probable COA. During the war game, leaders visualize a set of enemy and friendly actions and reactions. Wargaming is the process of determining “what if” factors of the overall operations. The object is to determine what can go wrong and what decision leaders will likely have to make as a result. COA analysis allows leaders to synchronize their assets, identify potential hazards, and develop a better understanding of the upcoming mission.

2-99. The best way for the platoon leader to war game is to start at the platoon’s current location and go through the mission from start to finish or start at a critical point such as the objective or engagement area. Using the action-reaction method, the platoon leader can think through the engagement beforehand. As war gaming proceeds, the leader can either record observations into a matrix or keep notes in a notebook. The most important aspect of this process is not the method but the output, meaning a more in-depth understanding of the operation. Depending on the time available and the platoon leader’s personal preference, the leader may use the box, belt, and avenue-in-depth war gaming techniques. (See ATP 3-21.10 appendix B for additional information on each technique.)

Course of Action Comparison And Selection

2-100. If leaders developed more than one COA, they must compare them by weighing the specific advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses of each as noted during the war game. These attributes may pertain to the accomplishment of the unit purpose, the use of terrain, the destruction of the enemy or other aspect of the operation they believe is important. Leaders make the final selection of a COA based on their own judgment, the start time of the operation, the AO, the scheme of maneuver, and subordinate unit tasks and purposes. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)

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