2-102. To exploit the principles of speed and surprise, leaders should weigh the advantages of reconnoitering personally against just using the supplied information from higher echelon information systems. They realistically consider the dangers of reconnoitering personally, and time required to conduct them. Leaders might be able to plan their operations using combat information provided by higher echelon information collection assets. Combat information is the unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user’s tactical intelligence requirements. It can be extremely important in a time-constrained environment. However, if time permits, leaders should verify higher headquarters’ intelligence requirement by reconnoitering visually. They should seek to confirm the PIR supporting their tentative plans. These PIRs usually consists of assumptions or critical facts about the enemy. This can include strength and location, especially at templated positions. It also can include information about the terrain. For example, verification that a tentative support by fire position—the general position from which a unit performs the tactical mission task of support by fire (ADP 3-90)—can suppress—a tactical mission task in which a unit temporarily degrades a force or weapon system from accomplishing its mission (FM 3-90)—the enemy, or an avenue of approach is useable.
2-103. If possible, leaders should include their subordinate leaders in their reconnaissance efforts. This allows the subordinates to see as much of the terrain and enemy as possible. The reconnaissance also helps subordinate leaders gain insight into the leaders’ visions of the operation.
2-104. The leaders’ reconnaissance (see paragraphs 7-15 to 7-16) might include moving to or beyond the LD, reconnaissance and surveillance of an AO, or walking from the forward edge of the battle area back to and through the platoon AO or battle position along likely enemy avenues of approach. If possible, leaders should select vantage points with the best possible view of the decisive point(s). In addition to the leaders’ reconnaissance efforts, units can conduct additional reconnaissance operations. Examples include surveillance of an area by subordinate elements, patrols (see chapter 7) to determine enemy locations, and establishment of observation posts/combat outpost (see chapter 6) to gain additional information. Leaders also can incorporate Javelin command launch unit (known as CLU) and small unmanned aircraft systems as surveillance tools (day or night), based on an analysis of METT-TC (I).
2-105. The nature of the reconnaissance and surveillance, including what it covers and how long it lasts, depends on the tactical situation and time available. Leaders should use the results of the COA development process to identify information and security requirements of the unit’s reconnaissance and surveillance mission.
2-106. Leaders must include disseminating results and conclusions arrived from reconnaissance and surveillance into their time analysis. They also must consider how to communicate changes in the COA to their subordinates and how these changes affect their plans, actions of the subordinates, and other supporting elements. (See ATP 3-21.10 for additional information.)
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